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ABSTRACT 
POLITICS OF XU: BODY POLITICS IN CHINA 
 
by 
 
Peng Yu 
 
 
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2015 
Under the Supervision of Professor Kennan Ferguson 
 
 
 
This dissertation examines body politics in the People’s Republic of China. It first closely looks 
at Zhuangzi’s idea of xu by analyzing the major aspects of the term—blandness, lack of substance, 
spontaneity, dispossession, incompleteness, and absurdity. It then argues that the concept of xu 
generates profound implication for politics by bringing up a particular mode of politics—politics 
of indeterminacy. In this mode of politics, power relation and power structure are never settled. 
Instead, they morph without being actualized. Examined in this context, the body for Zhuangzi is 
understood as an indeterminate entity whose political agency is attributed to its capacity in re-
articulating power relation by constantly receiving and transforming a manifold of forces. That 
the body can be alternatively construed this way is crucial for our re-examination of the shaping 
of reshaping of identity in the contemporary Chinese society. In this light, the work investigates 
two cases—the Cultural Revolution and the state capitalism to find out in what specific ways the 
body, identity and politics are intertwined in manifesting the story of changing political relations 
in the everyday life of the ordinary Chinese people. The work contends that the making of the 
subjectivity is an indeterminate process in which one’s identity is impossible to be fixed. It can 
never be composed with certainty. The construction of identity is a process of detachment by 
which one experiences the unexperienced without being settled around a center. The making of 
the political, to Zhuangzi, is thus founded on this indeterminacy to create new self and dissident 
political subject. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Just one thing: that denseness and that strangeness of the world is the absurd. 
—Albert Camus, The Myth of 
Sisyphus 
 
The Rising China, the Rising Paradox 
China today is a country of paradoxes. On one hand, the world is amazed by 
China’s rapid economic growth and modernization over the past thirty years. On the other 
hand, China is a country of mounting internal issues, as exemplified by its recent history 
of troubling topics, including human rights, freedom of speech, political corruption, 
environment pollution, and food insecurity. This juxtaposition of impressive economic 
achievement and grave internal issues begs serious questions of how China’s paradox can 
be understood with respect to its particular form of rule. What is equally at stake, perhaps, 
is the controversial ramification of its politics founded on its distinctive form of 
governance. In this regard, the “China model”—combining state-sponsored economic 
mobilization with repressive authoritarian governance—is itself a paradox. As Fukuyama 
and Zhang note, the China model features “a centralized, bureaucratic and authoritarian 
government” and a state boosted economic system in which the country “has not been 
prone to rely on the market economy in its development” (2014: 62-63). Echoing 
Fukuyama and Zhang, Breslin also suggests “strong government and stability together 
form the political basis of a number of characterizations of the China model” (2011: 
1330). Yet, this model comes with a high price. As a result of the China model, many 
internal issues are not addressed effectively, including various social, economic, political, 
historical and cultural problems within China. However, the paradox is not only an 
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academic concept, but one that affects the everyday life of Chinese citizens, including 
myself. 
In 2008, I served as the president of the Chinese Students and Scholars 
Association at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee (from here on, UWM). That year 
turned out to be a very special year for both China as a country, and Chinese students like 
myself who was studying in foreign countries at the time. That year was marked by a 
series of politically sensitive events that triggered national and international discussions, 
including the Tibetan ethnic unrest, the Beijing Olympic Games and the Sichuan 
Earthquake. These controversial events were intertwined in a way that made them 
virtually impossible to separate one from another. For example the occurrence and 
crackdown of the Tibetan ethnic riot in March (five months before the opening of the 
Games) triggered a massive wave of international boycott of the Beijing Olympics. Later, 
the extravagant opening ceremony of the Games was sharply contrasted with the “Tofu-
Dreg Project” (doufu zha gongcheng, referring to the poorly constructed school buildings) 
that was linked with the local schools’ corruption scandal unveiled in the tragic Sichuan 
Earthquake in May of that year. In response to the negative international reports on China 
many Chinese students around the world gathered together to organize various activities 
in support of their country. This wave of global Chinese patriotism was also felt in my 
community at UWM. Despite my initial reluctance, I eventually gave in to the growing 
pressure from fellow Chinese students and organized two events—a march at the state 
capitol to promote the Beijing Olympics and a fundraising event at my university to 
collect donations for the victims of the Sichuan earthquake. Our patriotism was supported 
by the Chinese government. In an email, a consul from the Education Section of the 
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Chinese Consulate in Chicago wrote to me, “Dear Peng, we are much moved by the 
students who want to express love and loyalty to our homeland. It is important that we 
express our responses when we are hurt…We are highly educated Chinese 
representatives, and we just want to let the public know that we are hurt.” A few days 
later, I received a package with many small Chinese national flags from the Consulate for 
the organized march along with a few copies of DVDs on the history of Tibet that were 
officially approved by the Chinese government.  
Unfortunately, the march did not go well, as we were not only countered by a 
group of Tibetan activists loudly shouting “Shame on China!” at us but were also 
questioned by a few Americans on the Chinese government’s ethnic policy as well as our 
motivations of promoting the state-sponsored Games. Their confrontation caught many of 
us off guard, and some of us were very frustrated and disappointed. I still vividly 
remember how upset my friend, Bingying, was when an aggressive woman angrily listed 
the Chinese government’s human rights violations. Bingying was speechless and I pulled 
her away from the hostility without knowing how to comfort her. Many of us left 
Madison that day confused—a contradictory feeling about both our country, a rising 
power received by the international community with a love-hate attitude, and us, young 
Chinese students who may or may not be the “representatives” of the country but identify 
as Chinese citizens nonetheless. We felt disheartened once again when we were 
organizing the fund raising event for the Sichuan Earthquake victims at UW-Milwaukee. 
When approached and asked if interested in making a donation, one passerby stoically 
responded, “Your country is rich enough. It doesn’t need my money.” Although one 
cannot expect everyone to show sympathy toward the victims of the Sichuan Earthquake, 
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this individual’s indifference again struck many of us with frustration. In both cases, the 
worst part of this experience was that none of us knew what to respond to such 
challenging reactions. We remained silent, upset and frustrated. This silence was an 
ironic indication of our inability to sufficiently defend not only the political acts of China 
but also the moral ground of our patriotism—it was virtually a moment of loss and 
frustration. This frustration was not simply about China’s controversial image projected 
onto the world stage—a gulf between self-claimed peaceful rising and the tumultuous 
internal politics. Rather, deep down, it was more about how the China experience in any 
way affected us in terms of what it means to be Chinese—a concern (sometimes even 
anxiety) ultimately about our self-identity. In many ways, this shared and permeating 
experience of frustration among many of us spoke of the fact that we were caught in the 
unfathomable obscurity with respect to how we were viewed by outsiders, and more 
importantly, how we were viewed by ourselves. It is perhaps the latter that troubled us 
most—a result of the difficult choice between being “representatives” (as the consul 
suggests) of the country and who else we can possibly be. Being lost in silence meant that 
we were really not prepared to solve this dilemma. When our patriotism was seriously 
challenged, we apparently lost our ground in which we can firmly plant our feet to 
answer the questions of who we are and what we stand for. 
The difficulty of this dilemma is largely due to the fact that disguised in the 
growing economic strength, China is gradually presenting itself as “pessoptimist,” to 
borrow the terminology from William Callahan. A “pessoptimist nation” is the 
intertwined mesh of both pessimist and optimist feelings within China that account for 
the country’s uncertain, and yet quickly changing, behaviors both inside and outside the 
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country. The term offers us a valuable perspective in viewing the contradictory feelings 
of today’s Chinese people toward the relationship between the country’s pride-
humiliation ridden past, present and future. In his own words, “To put it simply, China is 
a pessoptimist nation. To understand China’s glowing optimism, we need to understand 
its enduring pessimism, and vice versa. To understand China’s dreams, we also need to 
understand its nightmares” (Callahan, 2010: 9). The term can be particularly useful for 
understanding the intermingling of both the positive and negative sides of the Chinese 
experience—a paradoxical historical development replete with contradictions—as well as 
how these experiences are written into the composition of each Chinese individual’s 
identity today. In this regard, what the term “pessoptimist nation” is alternatively 
suggesting is that the country is identified with its complicated historical experience, 
which supplies the state and its people with enormous and yet contradictory materials to 
shape personal identity. For Callahan, the effect of “pessoptimism” is very much open-
ended and unsettled. Although the state has been making efforts to flatten the vicissitudes 
of those historical experiences into a coherent narrative, fragments of deviation often 
escape the historical narratoracy to register the “pessoptimist nation” with a more 
diversely indeterminate image. While in the state’s propaganda, being a Chinese means to 
bear the duty of standing with the state in rejuvenating the great country. However, its 
real meaning is often more convolutedly composed, as demonstrated in our experiences 
of being “overseas Chinese,” thereby eventually alienating us from the official state line. 
In the case of the Beijing Olympics, for example, even though being chosen to host the 
Games was supposed to be celebrated as a national success, the political symbol of the 
fiesta was tampered by many of us as unconfident citizens in front of confrontations, 
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which turned this grandiose event into an oxymoron. We learned that we are not simply 
what we are told we are. But who else could we be?  
This paradox generates profound political implication for the lives of the Chinese 
people. In fact, the strangeness of being a Chinese today unavoidably lends itself to a 
myth, one that is paradoxically interwoven by both the crying aspiration of belonging to a 
new power of the century on one hand, and the overwhelming sense of frustration over 
the state’s politics that hinders the possibility for more social changes to come, on the 
other. Such moments of frustration penetrate into every ordinary Chinese person’s daily 
life in which our identity is bound by the magnificence of the “China Dream,” and yet 
simultaneously burdened with the cost of undelivered promises. From this perspective, 
the feelings of frustration not only engender but also proliferate the “pessoptimist” view 
among the ordinary Chinese individual toward how our relationship with the state is 
construed. That many of the Chinese today frequently share the common feeling of 
frustration, here and there, from time to time, is very much an unavoidable indication of 
our paradoxical “pessoptimist” attitude—invoked by a deep sense of uncertainty—toward 
the perplexing image of the “motherland” and ourselves as Chinese citizens imagined in 
our patriotism.  
One Possible Perspective 
This work is dedicated to these frustrations. It is a devotion to the unraveling of 
the political paradox that keeps frustrating not only myself and the fellow Chinese 
students but also those ordinary Chinese who share similar feelings with us, in search for 
identity. This research seeks to explore this frustration as a result of the indeterminate 
dynamics of the identity composition shaped in the context of Chinese politics. It aims to 
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investigate the root of the frustration in order to find out how it is formed, sustained, 
nurtured and inflected by the interpenetration between the top and the bottom. By 
interpenetration, I specifically mean a particular mode of engagement in which inter-
embeddedness occurs in the exchange of forces between the state and its people. It 
happens when both sides receive and recycle each other’s force in ways that are far from 
being pre-determined. When analyzing this interpenetration, the work tries to eschew the 
determinism-oriented approach by which either side is said to triumph over the other (e.g., 
the state as a power juggernaut keeps eroding the society or the organized social forces 
successfully push the boundary of the state’s power for democratization). The problem of 
this approach is that it captures only one side of the “pessoptimist” view, reducing the 
complexity of the issue to a single-sided, overly simplified situation. Different from this 
approach, this research examines the interpenetration construed as a realm of 
unknowability, which emerges as a consequence of unpredictable spontaneity that 
escapes the control of both sides. In fact, this realm brings in a special kind of absurdity 
in the form of an enduring moment of incompatibility between the enacting and the 
enacted. Rather than viewing this interpenetration as an enclosure, this work treats it as 
an open field imbued with a variety of forces by a multiple of agents in a manifold of 
ways, in which actions can never be reconciled into one simplistic unity. Rather, they 
inaugurate spontaneous political events with unpredictable results. 
The political significance of this realm hinges on its engendering of a particular 
mode of politics—politics of indeterminacy—as a means of redefining the political status 
of a subject within power structures, or rather as a radical re-articulation of how we refer 
to power relation in the first place in composing political identity. In this specific mode of 
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politics, indeterminate subjectivity has become the necessary pre-condition, rather than 
an undesirable consequence of politics. In other words, the sustaining condition of 
politics is inseparable from the incompatible power relations in the making of the 
political subjects, which helps bring about nomadic vis-à-vis situated subjectivity as the 
indispensible part of politics. The field of indeterminacy is a grey zone that witnesses the 
temporality and fragility of political power and political relation. In it, politics is no 
longer obsessive with institutional/organizational structure and actions; formal procedure 
such as voting and representative system never occupies the center. On the contrary, it 
stresses the de-politicizing process in which the realm of politics gets extended 
horizontally and attends to question such as how politics can possibly include rather than 
exclude more potential agents. In this circumstance, self-identity is about the creation of 
and sustenance through more incompatible contradictions as necessary components of 
identity composition. What matters for who we are is the very precarity retained in the 
power relation occurred during the interpenetration between the state and the individuals 
such that the answer can by no means be found at either side of the two ends alone. 
Although this precariousness undoubtedly leads to frustration, it nevertheless gives us the 
opportunity to reflect on more possibilities about ways in which the frustrating 
ambivalence of being a Chinese could in fact be more politically productive. 
The work proposes to focus on the body as an example par excellence of this grey 
zone in elaborating this distinctive mode of politics in the specific context of the Chinese 
politics. Its theoretical framework relies on the ideas of Zhuangzi (ca. 369-286 BC) to 
explain how and why the body is an ambivalent and yet promising site that enacts the 
politics of indeterminacy. A prominent philosopher who spent his life in the chaotic 
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period of the Warring States era (ca. 475-221 BC), Zhuangzi follows the intellectual 
legacy of Daoism and writes extensively on a variety of topics. His writing is often 
studied for the distinctive skepticism and satire embedded in its characteristic 
metaphorical allegories. The project explores Zhuangzi’s writing as a significant text of 
political theory—an often neglected aspect in the study of Zhuangzi’s philosophy. Its 
focus here is how various forms of power relation is articulated in addressing different 
modes of politics. Particularly, this research proceeds its analysis with an eye toward the 
interrelation between Zhuangzi’s political imagination and its implication for the body 
with both constituting the crucial segment of my analysis. That Zhuangzi sheds important 
light on the political meaning of the body not only offers us different perception of the 
body but more importantly enables us to find an alternative perspective in viewing 
politics in general—a valuable detour, perhaps, in showing us what else could be 
promisingly added to our discussion of politics.  
From one perspective, to choose the body as a unity of analysis for this research 
means to understand it by rejecting the notion of essentialism that aims to reduce the 
body to a set of pre-given roles as consequences of fixed historical/cultural/political 
production and reproduction. Rather, we must take the body as an indeterminate site 
constructed without fixed forms and permanent actors. In fact, it morphs in conjunction 
with the changing interaction of a variety of forces that cannot be settled in a static 
morphology. That means, we should regard the body as a grey zone, forever unknown 
and alien to the interior and exterior environment in which it lives. This perception of the 
body invites the political import of Zhuangzi who recognizes, values and promotes this 
mode of indeterminacy. In general, Zhuangzi opposes a deterministic approach to politics 
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that aims to tie politics to essentialized structural ground (e.g., morality). To Zhuangzi, 
politics is composed of a multitude of indeterminate modes in which political relations 
are too nascent and variable to be finalized. This particular mode of politics, as Zhuangzi 
calls it, is xu (虚). In Zhuangzi’s writing, xu is a very vague term whose elusiveness 
mainly comes from its changing connotations in different contexts. Zhuangzi uses the 
term to evoke a sense of uncertainty in which all things are intertwined without 
boundaries.  
Thanks to its theoretical and methodological fluidity, this term is particularly 
helpful for understanding the frustrating instability of the Chinese politics whose 
particular existing condition often defies the explanatory power of any universal 
framework. Therefore, in this light, the political idea of xu is as much a theoretical issue 
as it is a methodological one. For one thing, the term itself institutes a system of 
theoretical/conceptual innovations to refine our ability in capturing those nuanced 
political differences emerged in the complexity of the changing Chinese society. For 
another, it lends itself to the improvement of the methodological approach so much so 
that one finds transcending theory/methodology of universality untenable. The 
exploration of Zhuangzi’s idea of xu allows me to engage comparative political theory in 
a different way—one that is different, at least, from that of Fred Dallmayr. To Dallmayr, 
the purpose of comparative political theory “is precisely to move forward toward a more 
genuine universalism, and beyond the spurious ‘universality’ traditionally claimed by the 
Western canon and by some recent intellectual movement” (2004: 253). The key point of 
this approach, in Dallmayr’s view, is to “take otherness seriously and hence not pretend 
to speak for all others universally” (2004: 254). Yet, although Dallmayr is aware that a 
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comparativist should not proceed from “a presumed self-righteousness or hegemonic 
arrogance,” the problem of his approach is that it still fails to recognize the cultural-
embeddedness that is inlaid in the specificity of a given culture, inherent to its socio-
political context. Hence, Dallmayr’s proposal does not solve the fundamental issue of 
comparative political theory. Rather, it only deepens the already-consolidated culture of 
otherness, an issue that has been bothering postcolonialists such as Edward Said. The fact 
is that the complexity of the contemporary Chinese society has already debunked and will 
keep defying the simplicity of all kinds of universalism. Is China going to be a 
responsible democracy or will it become another powerful autocracy? These are more or 
less clichéd questions which lack intellectual freshness. Although this is not to deny the 
legitimacy of the questions, they prove theoretically insufficient in addressing the rapid 
changing patterns of the Chinese society over the decades. They share similar function 
and destiny with the China model debate, at best. The problem of these questions lies in 
their inherent incapacity to go beyond this dualism (which is also a source of illness that 
troubles our politics today) of democracy vs autocracy. Instead of choosing a side 
between the two, what about a third possibility—that is, the country is moving toward a 
direction that resembles neither? This is very likely to be a route that can be neither 
envisioned by our experience in the past nor captured by our limited political catalogue at 
the present. If so, we are perhaps too early to conclude with our optimism or pessimism. 
The particularity of the China case urges us to find diversely different space and time in 
which politics can be alternatively conceived and operative. Put it another way, the 
experience of China is presenting us a third way as a frustrating puzzle to challenge our 
political wisdom. This is particularly important for our understanding of the identity 
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politics occurring in China. The ways in which the Chinese people are struggling with 
their individual and collective identities in a politically convoluted society indicates that 
theorizing politics from a new tradition is completely possible and necessary, even 
though its particularity may not be shared by outsiders in the first place. The absurdity of 
the Chinese case provides us with a good opportunity to reexamine the comparative 
methodology of political theory by exploring how different modes of politics can be 
reexamined via the particular experiences of the Chinese people in their daily lives. 
Fortunately, in dealing with this frustration, Zhuangzi’s concept of xu can make sense of a 
variety of seemingly contradictory concepts. Xu is a strange term that resists and exact 
English equivalent. And yet, when applied to the conceptualization of the body, it may be 
powerful in helping understand China, the monster country that frequently morphs 
between its indeterminate statuses of human and beast, as well as its politics from a new 
perspective. In the following two sections, I further map out my specific points of this 
theoretical and methodological choice.  
Zhuangzi, Xu and Politics 
          Zhuangzi was writing at a time when China was divided into eight separated states 
after the fall of the Zhou Dynasty and its politics were growing radically intractable and 
chaotic. The 250 years’ history of the period was marked by frequent wars and conflicts 
among those individual states, and the country was torn apart into a turbulent state in 
which the states fought wars in order to conquer each other. And yet, on the other hand, 
the time also witnessed a famous golden era for Chinese philosophy (aka. pre-Qin 
philosophy) during which “a hundred schools of thought” blossomed and contended 
against each other. A new social class—the scholar class (shi)—began to rise along with 
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the flourishing intellectual movement. Philosophical thinkers from different schools 
competed against each other in order to influence the ruling class. At that time, for 
instance, Mencius was touring among the states to promote his reformed Confucianism 
while Mohism had its disciples everywhere preaching its thought (Fang, 2010). However, 
Zhuangzi was a noticeable exception. In many ways, Zhuangzi was a stranger to this 
mainstream intellectual movement. Not only did he opted for staying away from the 
mainstream by living a hermitic life, Zhuangzi also proposed “no-rule” and “uselessness” 
as a critical response to the celebration of the movement’s common goal that aimed to 
improve the monarch’s rule. However, Zhuangzi should by no means be considered as 
apolitical. In fact, his writing is so permeated with insightful political ideas that his 
dissonance with his peers has made his writing even more promising to look at. 
In this research, Zhuangzi is read with an focus on his idea of xu. The term 
proves critical for two main reasons. First, the elusiveness of the term effectively 
embodies the very ambiguity it describes and thus necessitates a manifold of 
interpretations of it, virtually making it impossible for us to settle the concept on one and 
finalized meaning. For example, xu may denote the meaning of weakness in xuruo (虚弱), 
the meaning of fictitiousness in xuni (虚拟), or the meaning of emptiness in xukong (虚
空); it could relate to the meaning of mirage or illusion as in xuhuan (虚幻), the meaning 
of formlessness in xutai (虚态), or the meaning of incompleteness as in xushi (虚实). 
That the term produces different nuances and connotations in varying contexts is 
suggestive of its fluidity. The amorphousness of xu is particularly interesting in 
Zhuangzi’s writing. Throughout the Zhuangzi, xu has been described more as a living and 
existing condition under which “the ten thousand things” (wanwu, all things in the 
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universe) relate to each other in indeterminate relations. Xu has been used as an 
encompassing term to describe a variety of changing modes of existence. In other words, 
the use of the term, in Zhuangzi’s writing, has moved beyond a monist sense by which a 
concept loses its ability to stretch and morph. We can further understand xu by 
contrasting it with Sartori’s “ladder of abstraction.” Reflecting on the problem of 
“conceptual stretch,” Sartori writes, “a major drawback of the comparative expansion of 
the discipline is, then, that it has been conducive to indefiniteness, to undelimited and 
largely undefined conceptualization” (1970: 1035). The goal of “the ladder”, thus, for 
Sartori, is to solve this issue  (by moving up and down the ladder) so as to obtain the 
definiteness of a given concept. Yet, for Zhuangzi, xu is radically different. It relies on 
the stretchy part of it to denote its ambivalence.  
This emphasizes xu’s elasticity and its political implication. It argued that what is 
political about the term comes from its very indeterminacy—a mode of politics in which 
power gets extended horizontally to include more relations before it defines itself in a set 
of presupposed structures. Xu is thus a political grey zone. Rather than demarcating for 
the purpose of categorization, it engages itself in blurring the boundaries such that power 
is no longer territorialized and hierarchically structured. In this sense, xu should not be 
confused with yin (阴). While yin only represents one end of the yin-yang balance, xu 
stresses the dynamic of the whole power spectrum. The difference is: xu refers to the 
dynamic in-betweeness between the two extremes—an approach through which the effect 
of the yin-yang equilibrium is retained. Thus, xu can be viewed as a political means by 
which the power contestation between the yin and yang is constantly maintained at its 
balance. In addition, the crucial part of this xu-ed grey zone is that it values agency. In 
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this grey zone, more agents are cordially invited to make the change. In the sense that xu 
keeps maintaining a notion of incompatibility precisely means that the actants relate 
themselves to each other while not being reduced to a singular unity. They act politically 
under various changing conditions out of weakness, incompleteness, emptiness, 
formlessness, etc. The substantive chapters (Chapters 2, 3, 4, & 5) further investigate in 
detail the meaning of xu in each aspect of the term to find out how specifically the 
concept lends itself to its political making. 
The second reason has something to do with the ordinary, with each bit of the 
mundane, everydayness in it. The idea of the ordinary has captured the interests of many 
political theorists. For example, in A Politics of the Ordinary, Thomas Dumm sees the 
ordinary as an agent that “expresses and mediates politics, understood as a capacity and 
yearning” (1999: 5). What matters politically for Dumm is that the ordinary shifts our 
attention from norms and events to “processes through which a kind of constitution and 
amendation of human existence unfolds” (1999: 5). The ordinary, even in the form of 
boredom and loneliness, alludes to moments of uncertainty what engenders the fecundity 
of pluralizations of human actions. For Kennan Ferguson, the ordinary refers to a sense of 
incommensurability within everyday family life. With incommensurability, Ferguson 
outlines the condition of politics that is dependent on incommensurate familial relations: 
“the family is where people have the highest level of identification with one another, but 
also where their differences and distances seem most important” (2012: 27). That power 
relations thrive on indeterminate mutuality among family members implies that politics 
unquestionably lives on family. For Bonnie Honig, people’s everyday activities shape the 
way politics is, not just vice versa: “every day, after all, new citizens are born, and still 
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others emigrate into established regimes. Every day, already socialized citizens mistake, 
depart from, or simply differ about the commitments of democratic citizenship” (2007: 3).  
As shown in these writings, the ordinary is already saturated with its political 
connotations. What this research attempts is to add another layer of meaning to the 
political narrative of the ordinary. By focusing on xu, it unfolds Zhuangzi’s depoliticizing 
approach to politics to re-explore the seemingly “apolitical” embedded within the 
Chinese people’s everyday life. In this regard, the work launches a detour around the 
institutional/organizational/structural analyses of the country’s politics by shifting my 
attention to how people’s lives are lived in a political way, for Zhuangzi’s political theory 
is virtually dead if left out of the everydayness. In fact, Zhuangzi encourages the 
discovery of politics in such areas as aesthetics, memory and body that tend to be 
neglected (or even ignored) by many political analysts. In Zhuangzi’s writing, the 
concept of xu makes these realms so politically interesting that they can also get 
integrated into the people’s ordinary life for the making of the political. According to 
Zhuangzi, aesthetic judgment, for instance, is dependent on the mode of xu to be formed. 
As Fang Yong rightly observes, Zhuangzi’s aesthetics believes that “the beautiful is 
based on zhen (真, being true)—spontaneous inaction that restores the truthfulness of 
things,” and that it is “a form of spiritual aesthetics that transcends all physical forms” 
(2010: 19). In this particular mode of xu, all forms recede back to emptiness in order to 
make room for indeterminate mutual transformation to happen among the ten thousand 
things.  
In this process, Zhuangzi also proposes a particular kind of visual as a useful 
wedge into the political meaning of the blankness. That the emptiness should be visually 
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contemplated as such demands the collapse of traditional preying visuality by which the 
division between subject and object is fortified in relation to their statuses as the seer and 
the seen. Zhuangzi underlines the inner cultivation of people’s aesthetic judgment 
through every day’s visual appreciation of this xu-wu (nothingness). The political stake of 
the xu-ed aesthetics is its visual breach of the boundary between there-is and there-is-not. 
It declares the collapse of the walls that separate thing from each other. The politics of 
the ordinary, to Zhuangzi, hinges on the blurring of lines that demarcate boundaries. It is 
an orientation and outlook that eventually transcends oppositional dualism. So are the 
cases of the memory and the body. In the similar vein to the aesthetics, what matters most 
to the memory and the body is their existing conditions of indeterminacy. Like 
Zhuangzi’s emptiness, both are formed and function in spontaneous ways that defy 
presupposed routes such that the past is blended into the present and formlessness is 
embodied in our everyday bodily practices. And both require this particular mode of 
visual as well to enact the making of the political.  
Here, Zhuangzi resonates with Nishitani in terms of the creation of the space of 
randomness in which a preying subject’s “tunnel vision” gets dissolved (Bryson, 1988: 
87). To both Zhuangzi and Nishitani, this space must be formless to cast off the rigid 
frame created through the tunnel vision in embracing a universal field. For the latter, the 
universal field is by flinging ink onto the paper to bring in the force from outside to 
dissolve the zoning of the inside. For the former, the field of randomness is immersed in 
the permeating emptiness that defies the fixity of structure. What is at stake for both xu 
and Nishitani’s śūnyatā (emptiness) is the composing of zones of indeterminacy where 
relations can break free from the subject who wants to exercise control over them. For 
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Zhuangzi, the stake of the “politics of vision” does not merely lie in the purpose of de-
powering or decentering the subject (the making of a frustrated subject). Rather, it rests 
on the collapsing of the subject as well as the entailed knowledge possessed by the 
subject (the making of no subject). In other words, Zhuangzi’s politics of the ordinary is 
also partly concerned with a transcending visual force-field developed in our everyday 
life through which “the ten thousand things” are seen to transform themselves via 
ceaselessly changing power relations. Visuality is therefore of special importance to this 
project, as the work will use paintings and films as good examples to illustrate how xu 
functions politically. This, in turn, justifies another vital part of the methodological 
choice: to examine xu, this research relies on those visual media to help me clarify 
through their special visual representations—the bland emptiness of the traditional 
Chinese landscape painting and the unique cinematic styles of the chosen films. In the 
following section, I explain another crucial part of the project—the body—in explaining 
its political stake for our understanding of the identity politics in China. 
The Body and Politics: A Chinese Story 
           The body is political. With its political orientation, the body provides us with a 
particularly interesting perspective in viewing Chinese politics during the era of the 
People’s Republic. The body shapes and is shaped by politics of the country. Throughout 
the country’s turbulent political history, the body has not only been bearing the imprint of 
the state’s political enactment but also intervening the politics in ways that may or may 
not be aware by the state and its people. The body has been so politically intertwined with 
the country’s social/economic/political development that no serious student of Chinese 
politics can afford to ignore it. In this regard, what is more important is the fact that the 
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body actually embodies the political life of ordinary Chinese people. Its political wedge 
penetrates into almost every corner of Chinese people’s lives from public health policy to 
family planning. Among others, the widespread food insecurity issue, the worsening 
environment pollution and the forced abortion and sterilization of women’s body are 
good examples of how the body affects people’s ordinary lives because they are 
profoundly influenced politically. The body is both a crucial symbol of and an 
indispensible participant of the political story.  
In the state’s official account, the national humiliation of the past 150 years or so 
has always been affiliated with the image of the “Sick Man of East Asia,” which suggests 
the close link between China’s deteriorating politico-economic condition with the poor 
physical health of its people. In the state’s line as Callahan points out, “the Chinese body 
politic, which was disintegrating in the face of foreign aggression and domestic 
corruption, could only be strengthened through the robust health of many individual 
Chinese bodies” (2010: 8). The symbolism of individual Chinese person’s body is 
politically significant. Callahan continues that to “‘rejuvenate China’ therefore means 
both strengthening Chinese people individually and strengthening China’s state power” 
(Callahan, 2010: 5). As early as in 1952, Mao wrote the following words as his general 
policy for the country’s sports development: “promote sports culture, build up the 
people’s physiques (fazhan tiyu yundong, zengqiang renmin tizhi).” For Mao, the body 
not only ensures the socialist production in a continuous and sustainable way, but also 
represents China as a young vigorous and promising socialist country. My earliest 
encounter of this politicized sporting culture dates back to my elementary years in the 
early 1990s. Every day, when the eye exercise was broadcasted at school during break 
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time, the announcement always began with: “for the revolution, protect the eyesight and 
prevent myopia, let’s now begin the eye exercise.” Obviously, even for a group of ten-
year-olds who had the least understanding of politics, the indoctrination of the idea about 
the political body still mattered. In fact, the words left us with such an ineradicable 
impression (through repetition, mostly) that they have become part of the collective 
memory of my generation. In some ways, they have even marked the collective identity 
of us. 
Susan Brownell presents a helpful insight in this respect. In her anthropological 
study of the relation between sports, the body and the nation in China, she brings up the 
terminology of “somatization” in approaching the Chinese politico-social culture. By 
“somatization,” Brownell refers to “the way in which social tensions are often expressed 
in a bodily idiom, so that calls for their resolution often center on healing and 
strengthening the body” (1995: 22). In the specific context of the Chinese society, 
“somatization” points to an intimate interdependence by which the tension between the 
individual, the family and the state is routinely expressed in its bodily metaphors. The 
fluidity of the term, as Brownell stresses, captures the very permeable boundaries of the 
relations among the individual, the social and the state. In the area of the sporting culture, 
for example, Brownell writes:  
Because of their bodily dependency on others, Chinese athletes do not perceive their bodies  
as  entirely their own. Their interconnectedness with their families is primarily expressed  
through concerns about their reproductive organs; their interconnectedness with their work  
unit, and by extension the state, is expressed through an obsession with food. Somatization is  
a way of coping with the stresses of everyday life. For athletes, the main sources of stress are  
their relationship with their families and with the state (Brownell, 1995: 239).  
 
In the Foucaultian sense, this interdependency is produced by the “dispositif”—a set of 
intertwined policing social apparatuses—to which the state and the family belong. In 
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Michael Shapiro’s exploration of the ontology-apparatus relation in pursuit of a politics 
of life, he refers to Giorgio Agamben’s re-inflection of Foucault’s notion of “dispositif” 
as a concern about the division between two groups or classes. One is filed with living 
substances and the other is replete with apparatuses “in which living beings are 
incessantly captured” (2013). The powerful “dispositif” produces the conditioning 
discourse for interdependency by which the Chinese athletes’ bodies exist and live. Their 
bodies undoubtedly bear the mark of tension that is somatized during the intermingling of 
a variety of social forces. The body is hence trained, disciplined and policed to ensure 
that the state’s politics is able to penetrate into the people’s everyday lives by influencing 
its very basic material foundation. The identity of the Chinese athletes is thus collectively 
owned by both the social and state apparatuses. Eventually, it deprives those men and 
women of their own bodily autonomy by shaping their personal identities.  
Yet, the body is also capable of intercepting politics via its enactment of disruptive 
modes of politics. One case in point is demonstrated in Jie Yang’s research of informal 
surrogacy in China. In addition to her discussion of how the Chinese young surrogates’ 
bodies reflect an embodied “biopower” that is manufactured by various agents such as 
the state, the family and the market, Yang also asserts that the significant ways in which 
the “surrogates use their bodies to transform codes, forces and reform the self,” 
ultimately “interacts and shapes local affective and political economies” (2015: 90). 
According to Yang, the agency of the surrogates’ bodies is found in their capacity to 
converge and transform diverse social, political, economic forces that are acted upon 
them in order to trigger the infrastructure of the given community. As Yang writes: 
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“through their subjectivities and their bodies, surrogates engage or shape their own lives, 
as well as the lives of those involved in surrogacy and the local community” (2015: 98).  
Here, the body is viewed and functions as a self-initiated actant whose political 
agency is evident in its power of recycling and reusing the imposed forces from the 
external. More importantly, in this recycling process, the surrogates’ subjectivities 
become transformed as a result of their bodies’ inherent political agency that enacts a 
mode of politics and disrupts the intermingled external forces of exploitation. 
This work combines the legacy of both perspectives with my own study of how 
the body acts politically amidst the rapidly changing social/economic/political Chinese 
climate. It examines the body in relation to the interpenetration between state politics and 
ordinary Chinese people’s everyday lives. It not only investigates how the body is formed 
as a consequence of the state’s political/economic discourse but also addresses a way in 
which the body is reshaped due to its inherent agency. What should be noted here is that 
the re-instituted political meaning of the body is defined during this very process of 
interpenetration. It discusses how the body’s political meaning works in connection with 
the identity politics in China. The work is particularly interested in how the body turns 
out to be a frustrating grey zone in which personal identity becomes more and more 
ambivalent and fluid rather than clarified and situated—a significant marker of the 
political inherent agency. It approaches the body with the goal in mind, that with 
ambiguity it should project more indeterminate power relations in the making of the 
political. The body should be thought of as a mediating force by which individual 
Chinese people find more possibilities in their everyday lives to engage in politics in 
ways that previously have not been undertaken. They find themselves owing to the body 
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for the open space it created and therefore makes policing politics more difficult to 
enforce.  
The work focuses on two specific cases—the Cultural Revolution and the state 
capitalism. The primary reason for this case selection is simple: both cases share one 
fundamental similarity—that is, they begin their political projects by engaging the body 
with established purposes and end up with indeterminate results. For Mao’s Cultural 
Revolution, the body is aesthetically projected onto its propaganda fronts, and yet, as will 
be shown in the later part of the thesis, it escapes this discourse and finds itself in 
unsettled conditions. The story of state capitalism is not any different: the state executes 
its power based on the particular form of governance that combines both its authoritarian 
rule on the political side and the state sponsored “free market” on the economic side. This 
model of governance aims to shape the migrant peasants’ body into submissive politico-
economic instrument. However, the body keeps resisting this political rule by turning 
itself into an ambiguity.  
The work will methodologically exploit this indeterminacy embedded in both 
cases. It will unveil how the body inaugurates new political actions in re-structuring the 
state’s politics. This analysis does so by engaging the visual experience of three films—
The Red Lantern (1971), In the Heat of the Sun (1994) and Beijing Bicycle (2003). Films, 
with their unique techniques such as lighting, soundtrack, mis-en-scène and camera 
movement, produce different cinematic styles that enable us to imagine and reimagine 
politics in ways that other forms of art cannot. All three of these selected films are 
commonly studied as classical works with respect to the topic of the Cultural Revolution 
and state capitalism. The value of the films lies in their enduring reputation for diverse 
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interpretations regarding both cases. This thesis will thus closely look at the visual 
presentation of the body undertaken by the three films to explore how the body is shaped 
and reshaped in the convoluted political context of the country. In this regard, I can find 
no better media in studying the topic than these cinemas.  
 The theoretical methodology comes from Zhuangzi’s idea of xu. It explains the 
sense of frustration over the question of who we are among Chinese people. The 
breakthrough point is found in the ambiguous body, by which Zhuangzi defines as a 
morphing and amorphous entity formed by both material and immaterial forces. To 
understand the indeterminacy of identity politics in China exactly means to recognize xu 
as the very foundation of the making of the body. The xu-ed body is not an enclosure. 
Rather, it is an open ensemble of the dynamic interchange of various forces, from inside 
out. It receives and transforms. It has the capacity to take in, recycle and transform 
diverse forces in the process of mutual interpenetration and turn the ensemble into an 
indeterminate grey zone. The key point of the xu-ed body revolves around its political 
agency in making politics unsettled beyond pre-established structures and without pre-
designated results. To a certain extent, it is akin to empathy understood as a heightened 
skill or state of awareness in sharing the in-betweenness among each other. But the xu-ed 
body goes beyond that. On one hand, it is a necessary and inevitable process of 
internalization through which one incorporates and integrates the outside environment 
into his consciousness by sharing and living the experiences of others. But on the other 
hand, Zhuangzi is even more ambitious. Zhuangzi proposes that while empathy is 
certainly necessary, it is insufficient in helping us realize our bodily potentials, as it is 
perhaps still not radical enough in surpassing the structure of dualism. For example, 
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becoming a butterfly (see chapter 2), as will be discussed more in detail in the ensuing 
chapters, is a medium through which the body becomes imperceptible, no matter how 
fragmenting, fleeting and provisional the moment might be. The Zhuangzian body thus 
produces a particular mode of politics, namely, the politics of indeterminacy, which, 
understood from this perspective, is more than ethics. It is a mode of political 
engagement by which power is not to be perceived as a function of enclosed political 
hierarchy. Rather, it should be conceived as a capacity or skill to extend the horizontality 
of diverse political relations. Therefore, in this mode, the identity can never be composed 
in the ways of certainty; and in this sense, the frustration over the identity is not an 
obstacle to, but a preparation for an emerging political awareness. The fact that Chinese 
people, including myself and fellow Chinese students, often get frustrated about who we 
are and what home is, indicates that we are prepared to be political more than ever. Being 
political precisely means to retain rather than to eliminate this frustration. With this 
awareness, we are becoming political. And, this is just the beginning. 
Breakdown of Chapters  
               This work is structured into six chapters, including an introduction and a 
conclusion The four central substantive chapters deal with four major aspects of the 
central theme, with each substantive chapter tackling one aspect of xu, respectively. The 
second and third chapters serve as the theoretical chapters, and the fourth and fifth 
chapters discuss concrete examples of Chinese politics, namely the Cultural Revolution 
and the state capitalism.  
            The second chapter concerns the aesthetics of Zhuangzi’s xu. By looking at the 
use of emptiness (liubai) in traditional Chinese landscape paintings (shanshui hua), it 
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adresses how the aesthetic idea of xu is manifested in its meanings of lacking in 
substance and blandness. It argues that the fluidity of blankness diffuses the boundary of 
all natural things such that they become intermingled with one another. Due to the 
indeterminacy of nothingness, nature has thus become perpetually unknowable and 
impenetrable to human knowledge. It then discusses the idea of the body influenced by 
xu. To Zhuangzi, what is vital is a bland body that is incapable of subjective judgment 
and devoid of sensory sensitivity by integrating itself into the world without 
presupposition. The abandonment of sight and hearing constitutes the important process 
of unlearning and unperceiving, which is a crucial step for the body to experience self-
transformation, according to Zhuangzi. 
            The third chapter deals with another important aspect of xu in relation to the body 
of creating the self. It shows the xu-ed body as both spontaneous and dispossession. In so 
doing, it focuses on Zhuangzi’s philosophy of the grand Dao to understand how the xu-ed 
body is conceived. The chapter argues that the body is not a representation of Dao. 
Instead, it is the Dao. The body as dispossession means it is detached from a hierarchical 
center and acts with its inherent agency. In addition, the body should also be considered 
as a form of spontaneity as a mode of indeterminacy and intuitiveness, whose trajectory 
cannot be pre-determined. Having argued the xu-ed body, the chapter then proceeds to 
Zhuangzi’s theory of the heart-body dynamics and discuss the self as “creative 
transcendence.” It contends that Zhuangzi proposes a transcending self that not only frees 
itself from an ingrained mind-body dualism, but also aims for creation in new living 
experiences. This notion of the self matters as it brings up the Zhuangzian freedom—
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xiaoyao—referring to a state in which one is able to make the self through intuitive 
spontaneity. 
Chapter four focuses on the case of the Cultural Revolution to provide a 
theoretical critique of the political event. It explores how the central theme of the 
Revolution, that is class struggle, is mnemonically deployed in order to underline its 
politics of dualism that is founded on the division between friend and enemy in shaping 
revolutionary political subject. It argues that memory is a forbidden field policed by the 
state to enforce its political control. This political domination is further enforced by the 
state’s institutionalization of a revolutionary body to be linked with the construction of 
memory. However, Zhuangzi’s xu debunks the rigidity of the connection between the 
body and memory, leaving both areas persistently indeterminate. While the state aims to 
construct revolutionary subjectivity through the consistency between the two, political 
identity is itself a xu-ed area in which body and memory rival each other without ever 
being settled. 
Chapter five concerns the critical analysis of contemporary China’s state 
capitalism. It addresses the paradox between modernization and the state capitalism in the 
context of contemporary Chinese society. It aims to capture the tension between the state 
and society (especially the migrant peasant workers) arising from this paradox. The 
chapter argues that modernization is essentially a rhetorical instrument being utilized by 
the state to form and sustain its particular capitalist form of governance. Under this 
governance, the body has been exploited to the degree that it serves the interest of state 
sponsored market. Nevertheless, the body demonstrates its deviant trajectory by turning 
itself into modes of unconformity. Our understanding of the body can be enhanced by 
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Zhuangzi’s idea of xu. On the other side of this tension, there lies another mode of the 
body—one that escapes the state’s zoning of homogenization and engages itself in 
making the marginal periphery where the body finds and retrieves autonomy. The chapter 
concludes with an explanation that the agency of the body lies in its power of making 
dissident territory. Furthermore, the state-imposed moral regime falls apart with its 
fragmented elements being recycled and reused for new political ends. 
The last chapter wraps up the whole work. This chapter outlines the conceptual 
implications for a larger scale for related studies. It talks about its implication for both the 
study of Chinese politics and the study of political theory (especially comparative 
political theory). It proposes that the importance of Zhuangzi’s xu lies in its potential of 
bringing up a different mode of politics—namely, the politics of indeterminacy. This 
political mode not only clarifies China’s identity politics as being based on indeterminate 
frustrations but also approaches the political theory by way of suggesting that power 
relation can and should transcended conceptual delimitation by re-locating politics at 
different time and space. 
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Chapter 2: Zones of Indeterminacy: Art, Body and Politics in 
Zhuangzi’s Thought 
Introduction 
For many, the major purpose of politics is to clarify and to divide. Politics is 
largely predicated on explicit binary oppositions along lines of us/them, friend/enemy, 
center/periphery. That politics is assumed with a normative function and our political 
prescription serves the end of classification seems to buttress many people’s 
understanding of politics today. The search for sameness at the cost of excluding 
otherness appears to be necessary in forging our unanimous political actions. Such binary 
oppositions usually view politics as a result of hierarchical arrangement of power 
relation, produced by domination versus subordination. The aim of these dyads is to cast 
politics into specified, immobile shapes so as to place the latter under strict scrutiny and 
management. Yet, politics does not have to, nor should it be, conceived this way. The 
pluralist dimensions of politics can be extended as we change our view of politics—a 
shift of attention from its hierarchical to horizontal structure in order to find more areas 
for new and unsettled power relations. Body, art, and nature, for example, are such zones 
of indeterminancy that are widely discovered with profound political implications. 
Theorists like Panagia, Rancière, Grosz and Bennett, for instance, all explicitly or 
implicitly shed light on politics through their respective discussions of body (sensation), 
artwork and nature. What these theorists share in common is a similar task—an effort to 
re-discover the power of various intensifications of the interior that have been neglected 
or ignored in the political world for long. Their studies mainly aim to discover the missed 
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intensifications that were previously excluded from our attention. Yet, this chapter seeks 
to show a different approach brought up by Daoism. Instead of focusing on interior 
intensifications, the Daoist approach closely looks at nothingness in engaging the making 
of the political with respect to body, art and nature. Here, my focus is Zhuangzi. 
One of the most prominent Daoist philosophers, Zhuangzi is famous (and 
infamous) for his elliptical and metaphorical writing of philosophy. The notorious 
elusiveness of Zhaungzi’s philosophy lies not only in its discursive form but also in its 
seemingly disconnected arguments. What is more noteworthy, thematically, is Zhuangzi’s 
favor over ambiguity. As Robert Allinson points out, “The Chuang-Tzu (Zhuangzi) is a 
treasure trove of philosophic wisdom. At the same time, it is a most obscure work. There 
is no apparent linear development of philosophical argument. In addition, many of its 
internal passages seem to be non sequiturs from each other. To make matters worse, it is 
replete with internal passages which are themselves so obscure that they defy any kind of 
rational analysis” (Allinson, 1989: 3). The idea of ambiguity is prevalent in Zhuangzi’s 
writing and theoretically underpins his philosophy. This idea has much to do with the 
philosopher’s theory of ambiguity put in an ambiguous way. Due to the obscurity of his 
writing, Zhuangzi has multiple interpretations and he is diversely labeled as a moral 
skeptic, relativist or even agnostic. The large volume of research on the meaning 
Zhuangzi conveys is a good testimony of the controversial nature of Zhuangzi’s thought. 
This chapter proposes to read Zhuangzi differently—a reading that seriously takes 
him as a political thinker, one who boldly challenges our traditional understanding of 
politics. For him, politics mystifies. Politics is a chaos that is all about persistent power 
contestations. It is an enigmatic realm, muddy, flowing and morphing without being fixed 
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and predetermined. In Zhuangzi’s view, politics is an ambiguous myth to be explored and 
experimented, but it can never be dominated and ruled. It is an open process that 
concerns not so much about the construction of the center as about the expansion of the 
horizon. For Zhuangzi, clarification of politics through prefixed division is no more than 
terminating the life of politics.  
 In an attempt to unfold Zhuangzi’s understanding of politics, this chapter focuses 
on his concept of xu (虚)—a very important concept that forms a significant part of 
Zhuangzi’s idea on politics. The chapter aims to examine the theoretical content of xu as 
well as the representations of xu-generated politics. I contend that, comprised of 
blandness and lack of substance, xu is a tenacious vacuity that concerns relationality. 
Born in turbid vortex, xu produces a cluster of indeterminate relations to structure and 
restructure power relations. Xu is vital to Zhuangzi’s politics as it enriches a political 
sphere that is too obscure to be determined. The politics of xu is a politics of 
indeterminacy, a particular mode of politics that underlines the continuous dynamics of 
changing power relations. To achieve this goal, the chapter discusses in detail how xu is 
illustrated via liubai and body. The aim of this chapter, at last, is far from drawing a 
conclusive remark on Zhuangzi’s political thought. Instead, it hopes to call for more 
future attention to Zhuangzi’s writing as a profound work of politics. 
Xu in Zhuangzi’s Philosophy and the Politics of Xu 
In Zhuangzi’s philosophy, xu is an important and yet difficult concept. References 
to xu appear frequently throughout Zhuangzi’s writing. It constitutes the core foundation 
of ambiguity in the Zhuangzian Daoism. Xu is in fact not exclusive to Daoism. Both Zen 
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Buddhism and Confucianism also elaborate on this idea. Yet, xu has become a very 
distinctive concept in Daoism that helps bring about the conceiving of the unique Daoist 
cosmos, especially by way of underpinning the infinite revealing of ambiguity. In the 
Zhuangzian Daoism the concept of xu encompasses and denotes a very particular mode 
of ambiguity. The difficulty of translating xu is attributed to its pluralist philosophical 
connotations that include—but certainly not limited to—blandness and lack of substance. 
Rooted in xu, ambiguity in the Zhuangzian sense constantly unfolds itself to 
transformation without being reduced to a concrete manifestation of actualization. The 
Zhuangzian ambiguity, in one word, is an indeterminate relational process. The 
synthesized concept of xu thus entails an overflowing of ambiguity over relationality. The 
philosophical flavor of xu is savored through a rich mixture of meanings in producing a 
multiplicity of diverse and yet indeterminate relaitons. Xu is a generative, transformative 
and relational idea whose fecundity lies in its inexhaustible production of blended 
ambiguity that animates the engendering of new relations. In this process, the 
incompleteness of substance and blandness provide the necessary site for the idea of 
ambiguity to evolve, transform and illuminate under the enrichment of xu. In what 
follows, I further examine the ideas of lack of substance and blandness to analyze 
Zhuangzi’s concept of xu. 
 One of the key components of xu is lack of substance. For Zhuangzi, while it is 
true that absence of substance entails nothingness, it differs from no-thing-ness. It is 
understood as a blend (not even a combination) of both the existent and nonexistent. A 
xu-ed lack of substance necessarily involves processes of detachment from the absolute 
that concretizes via actualization. In addition, this is also a process of mutual 
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engendering—by way of bypassing substance—of tenuous and yet innate relations of 
new creation. The relational oneness of the existent and nonexistent consists of the 
flowing of qi (气). In Zhuangzian Daoism, qi is understood as the “matter energy” or 
“vital energy” that invigorates the constitution and reconstitution of the “ten thousand 
things” (a Chinese term referring to all things in the universe, both existent and 
nonexistent). Qi is by no means an abstracted ontological being. Rather, it is an 
enlivening and nurturing force that holds together the formlessness of nature. “As death 
and life are together in all this,” writes Zhuangzi, “All the forms of life are one…All that 
is under Heaven is one breath (qi)” (Palmer, 2006: 188). Life and death, for Zhuangzi, is 
the consequential effect of the movement of qi. Where life is the convergence of qi, death 
is the diffusion of qi. In Zhuangi’s philosophy of cosmology, qi is flowing and amorphous 
energy, serving as the fundamental constituent of the cosmos. The birth of the universe 
starts from a fluid and formless void, a void of oneness. As Zhuangzi continues to point 
out, “at the great origin there was nothing, nothing, no name. The One arose from it; there 
was One without form…The forces worked on and things were created, they grew and 
looked distinct shapes, and these were called bodies” (Palmer, 2006: 97). The oneness of 
qi, as Jian Xu rightly observes, is “protomaterial, a vital creative force that gives ‘form’ to 
everything in the universe” (Xu, 1999: 967). An all-pervading force, qi de-ontologizes 
natural substance through its indeterminate fluidity. It disintegrates and congregates the 
bodies of “ten thousand things,” which inevitably renders them formless. The 
occurrences of constitution and reconstitution transpose between there-is and there-is-not, 
leaving behind the reductionist actualization of substance for its exclusion of variation 
and becoming.  
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We need not look very far to find a good example in Zhuangzi’s repudiation of 
Gongsun Long. For Gongsun Long, the pertaining attributes of whiteness and hardness, 
independent of each other, belong separately to a stone. A stone is either white or hard 
without being both white and hard at the same time. In this division of white stone and 
hard stone, Gongsun Long’s dualism of either-or is elevating the stones to the level of 
ontological substance, rendering the two attributes immutable and inert. Yet, questioning 
Gongsun Long’s jianbai lun (on white and hard)，Zhuangzi despises arguments like 
these as “pointless nitpicking debate about similarity and divergence” (Palmer, 2006: 67). 
In opposition to Gongsun’s ‘petite knowledge’ about precise demarcation, Zhuangzi 
stresses his idea of ambivalent and vague substance. Lack of substance, in Zhuangzi’s 
theory of xu, seeps across the dualist border between whiteness and hardness, disavows 
the essentialist territorialization of the attributes as given, unchangeable and passive, and 
makes their unexpected encounter not only inevitable but also productive. Zhuangzi’s 
idea of substancelessness is devoid of preinscribed, intrinsic attributes of any kind and 
embraces an ambiguous and yet grand fullness of countless merging from within and in-
between, a profusion of indeterminate and vague there-only-is. It is about the fusion of 
both-and via a primordial emptiness—a living emergence of manifold—that renders the 
‘ten thousand things’ of nature uncontainable. 
 Xu also denotes the meaning of blandness, a Daoism-influenced Chinese aesthetics 
that is dull to intensifications. A taste of insipidity, blandness in the Zhuangzian aesthetics 
speaks of a bland detachment from flavor—an inert inclination toward intensification, a 
state of ambiguity that is not readily excited by flavor. For François Jullien, this 
blandness is explicated in his terminology of fadeur, a concept that Jullien uses to 
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interpret the Chinese idea of blandness (dan,淡) (Jullien, 2008). In illustrating the 
meaning of fadeur (blandness), Jullien insightfully observes, “when no flavor is named, 
the value of savoring it is all the more intense for being impossible to categorize; and so 
it overflows the banks of its contingency and opens itself to transformation” (Jullien, 
2008: 42). For Jullien, blandess is an enabled process, a ceaseless course of mutual 
transformation without being treated as pregiven. Often used in the word xu dan (xu-ed 
blandess), Zhuangzi’s blandness is a philosophical approach to achieve the yinyang 
balanced state of serenity so as to savor the flavorless. “Resting, they are empty; empty, 
they can be full; fullness is fulfillment. From the empty comes stillness; in stillness they 
can travel; in travelling they achieve,” writes Zhuangzi (Palmer, 2006: 106). Implicating 
emptiness, a xu-ed blandness turns into an unstable, bland flavor, a balancing affect that 
remains indifferent and inert to completion. It is a critical point beyond which fullness 
comes into being while completion never meets its termination as yet. Mediated by the 
blandness, completion is always on the go, forever to be attained. Bland tenuousness 
permeates it all over and isolates it from dependence on intensified flavors, leaving it all 
the more porous to change and becoming. In this sense, the Zhuangzian concept of 
blandness is vital to an obscure and dull taste of flavor. Thus, the stake of the xu-ed 
blandness lies in its persistent strive for inception, an inchoative stage that is always 
about to digress from the already forged in order to experiment the new. For Zhuangzi, 
the appreciation of the blandness is thus all about those tasting experiences that are 
diffusing, disseminating, distorting and elusively ambiguous. It is notable to mention that 
this part of xu is bodily registered. The savoring of this blandness, according to Zhuangzi, 
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requires a decentered body, bland in its interiority and diffusive in its exteriority without 
center: 
A hundred parts and nine orifices and six organs,  
are parts that go to make up myself,  
but is any part more noble than another? 
You say I should treat all parts as equally noble: 
But shouldn’t I also treat some as better than others? 
Don’t they all serve me as well as each other? 
If they are all servants, then aren’t they all as bad as each other? 
Or are there rulers amongst these servants (Palmer, chap 2, 2006:10-11)? 
Zhuangzi’s body is a self-detached life, a flowing, unsettled and fused energy, 
alienating itself from a structured hierarchy, blurring the encircling of a center, expanding 
and proliferating the uncertainties among the relations between the organs. In this sense, 
the body is no longer associated with a privileged heart that structures it as such. Rather, 
it is a body both with and without organs—a bland surface that orients itself inwardly and 
outwardly, consistently morphing so as to find the organ that cannot be precisely 
specified with clearly demarcated interior and exterior. The bland body, for Zhuangzi, is 
alien to a formally structured entity as pregiven. It is, instead, a balance forever in 
attaining that distances itself from intensified flavors. It is a product of divergence and 
coincidence. It would be interesting to compare Zhuangzi’s bland body with Deleuze and 
Guattari’s “Body without Organs” at this point. On the one hand, Zhuangzi may agree 
with Deleuze and Guattari with respect to the stake of immanence in conceiving the 
BwO, a plane of cartography that opposes organizational structure and stratification and 
instead embraces substantial mappings and remappings. The bland body shares similarity 
with the BwO in the sense that they both renounce the internal and external structural 
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imposition of preordained relations and oppose organized, centered body. They are a 
moving surface that is not yet definable by its hierarchy but by its horizontality. However, 
on the other hand, Zhuangzi’s body also differs from the BwO noticeably in that while 
the latter stresses the consistency of desire and intensity in activating the circuits of the 
BwO, the former talks about a process of infinite fusion—a mutual engendering that does 
not rely on the multiplication of the intensities of the circuits. For Zhuangzi, the xu-ed 
body is not a “desiring machine,” indulging in teeming the BwO with intensified desires. 
Rather, it is the body of neutrality that absorbs the interchange of opposite energies (qi) 
into its insipid unity, dissolving and recreating the relations among different types of the 
BwOs. It is the surface where desire evaporates and the BwOs bump into and experience 
each other. The bland body is post-BwO. Thus, compared with Deleuze and Guattari, 
Zhuangzi is even more radical: it is Body without Body—a body with neither center nor 
parts! Thus, Deleuze and Guattari’s observation is not entirely accurate by saying that 
Dao is immanence. Immanence, or circuit fields, instead, is just one precondition of 
Dao—the dynamic transposing between yin and yang.  
Xu is political. The politics of xu is deeply rooted in the concept’s core content of 
relationality. The political potential of xu hinges on its vigorously persistent investment in 
in-between-ness as xu itself arises from the muddy relatedness. Xu is political in that it 
constantly finds itself in tension with organizational, situated hierarchical structure that 
aims to permanently settle power relations. Through the lack of substance and blandness, 
xu distances itself from political ontology that threatens to base politics on a variety of 
entrenched divisions. The politics of xu revolves around the breach of the walling of 
politics via its deployment of indeterminate and blurring connectedness. It is, essentially, 
	  	  
38	  
a politics of indeterminancy—a politics driven by undetermined relations and change. In 
this mode of politics, xu produces a vacuity of mega-authority that prestructures the flow 
of relations. 
One empirical example of xu’s politics can be found in the political development of 
the early Chinese Han Dynasty. The beginning of the Han Dynasty witnessed the 
flourishing of Daoism as the ruling political ideology. In the beginning of this dynasty, 
the Chinese intellectuals were striving to construct a legitimating ideology for the 
political elites, as the demise of the preceding Qin Dynasty was very much a result of its 
harsh and ruthless rule. Daosim eventually gained its ascendency among the ruling elite 
class. The political leaders accepted the Daoist idea of light rule and abandoned the 
imposition of harsh taxes and military oppression. The ruling ideology in the early Han 
Dynasty followed the tradition of Huang-Lao school—a combination of the mythical 
Yellow Emperor and the legendary Lao Zi—which proposed ‘a ruler in touch with the 
Dao who rules by emptying his mind and limiting his and his subjects’ desires’ (Rapp 
2012: 99). In following Lao Zi’s core idea of “rule through inaction” (wuwei erzhi), the 
rulers of the early Han Dynasty implemented the policy of rehabilitation (xiuyang 
shengxi) to relax the relation between the central authority and its subordinate. The 
monarch’s hands-off approach exerted considerable toleration over cultural and political 
differences across the nation. Unlike the Qin Dynasty’s forceful pursuit of homogeneity, 
the early Han leaders favored the co-existence of heterogeneity among its peoples 
(Zhang, 2013). This policy clearly reflected the value of xu. What lay in the heart of the 
early Han politics was its unsettled power relation between the ruling and the ruled 
classes in a hierarchical structure. Given that the nation’s political and economic 
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recuperation became imperative after the overthrow of the old regime, a bland, 
indeterminate relation granted more autonomy to its people to experiment and create new 
ideas for social development. What is more at stake for the early Han rulers to adopt a 
xu’s rule was the urgent project of nation-state building. In order to popularize the 
recognition of the new regime, the politics should be constructed horizontally rather than 
hierarchically. That means, the assimilation of more members into the new political body 
through non-coercion was more important than building up the hierarchy of a central 
power. As Francis Fukuyama points out, “the initial Han equilibrium was based on a 
balance between the interests of all parties…”(Fukuyama 2012: 138). Without 
repressively filling up the substance of a unified national identity, the political cohort in 
the early Han Dynasty got tremendously extended. Yet, as the Han regime became more 
stabilized in its later period, the rulers (particularly since the Emperor Wu) abandoned 
Daoism and embraced Confucianism as its ruling ideology to strengthen the country’s 
hierarchical power structure under its central monarchy.  
           In explicating the political meanings of silence, Kennan Ferguson (2003) combs 
through different approaches to silence’s social roles. Despite similar forms, silence, or 
lack of language, is understood with divergent ends. Symbolizing denigrated, resistant, 
and constitutive political power, silence resists any reductionist political role. ‘It must be 
rethought’, writes Ferguson, ‘as not only a site of repression but also a nexus of 
resistance or even as a potentiality for creation’ (Ferguson, 2012: 65). Silence suggests a 
politics of indeterminacy. This particular mode of politics is tethered to the pluralist 
dynamism of silence that “makes singular interpretation of silence’s function 
problematically simplistic” (Ferguson, 2003:62). The politics of indeterminacy, put it 
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another way, indicates an open political process where power cannot be fixed and 
preordained. If politics is understood as an ongoing process of contestation, its open 
possibility lies in a vast array of indeterminate negotiations in more than one way and by 
more than one means. In this regard, the xu-inspired political rule of the early Han 
Dynasty is exemplary of this indeterminate politics—an unsettled open political process 
that does not structure politics upon hierarchical organizations. Rather, it extends the 
horizon of politics to include more rejuvenated political participants in the absence of a 
dominating central power. In order to justify Daoism as the legitimate ruling ideology, 
Huainanzi, another Daoist magnum opus, a book evocative of anarchist sense as Roger 
Ames suggests, was presented to the Han ruler at that time to propose less overbearing 
rule. Xu-generated politics (in the case of the early Han politics, e.g.) indicates that 
political power itself in this period of China’s history is transformative and cannot be 
fully contained. It was a result of multi-directional communication and exchange that 
evades the determinative top-down classification. Embedded in the flowing multiplicity 
of relations, power dynamics was explored and experienced without being stabilized. 
Politics of indeterminacy, after all, is eventually about the perseverance of the vacuity—
xu—that always exists within the network of power relations. 
However, to what extent can we broaden our understanding of politics via the idea 
of xu? How do lack of substance and blandness specifically forge the xu-ed politics? In 
what ways can this xu-generated politics help us conceive of a different political sphere? I 
will now turn to these questions in the following sections. 
Liubai, Xu, and Politics 
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           This section introduces the relation between the emptiness of liubai and xu’s lack 
of substance in illustrating how a politics of indeterminacy comes into being out of this 
relation. Liubai, or leaving blankness in its literal meaning in Chinese, is a painting 
strategy popularly applied in traditional Chinese landscape (shanshui hua) ink painting. 
Heavily influenced by the teaching of Daoism, liubai is popularly used as an important 
strategy in creating sparseness to help painters not only structure the space of the 
paintings but also achieve a particular aesthetic effect that centers on the theme of 
nothingness.  
The motif of liubai, or nothingness, arises from the aesthetics of Daoism. A xu-
inspired emptiness is the origin of “ten thousand things:”  
“There is the beginning, there is not as yet any beginning of the beginning; there is not as  
yet beginning not to be a beginning of the beginning. There is what is, and there is what is 
not, and it is not easy to say whether what is or, is not; or whether what is, is” (Palmer, 
chap 2, 2006: 15).  
These infamously confusing words of Zhuangzi in fact allude to the noneness of 
the cosmos, a perpetual inceptive condition of ambiguity that allows things to emerge and 
merge into one another. “The ‘that’ is on the one hand also ‘this’, and ‘this’ is on the other 
hand also ‘that’” (Palmer, 2006: 12). That what-is and what-is-not are both in and of 
themselves the beginnings suggests a cosmos that is far from being stabilized. We can 
take a look at Guo Xi’s (ca.1000-1080) Zaochun Tu to savor the taste of liubai (Figure 
2.1).  
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Figure 2.1 Guo Xi, Zaochun Tu. The Collection of National Palace Museum. 
This painting is a close follower of Zhuangzi’s theory of emptiness. In this 
painting, nature is not imitated. Rather, it is conceived through the interplay of there-is 
and there-is-not. Structured by blankness, nature is portrayed as a xu-ed matter (xuwu) 
with a void core. Washed ink is so immersed in the blankness that liubai intermingles 
trees with mountains, mountains with mists. The emptiness hence is characterized of an 
indirectional fluidity of relations that defies ontologization and predomination. Embedded 
in the imagination of nature, the nothingness of liubai is both the producer and catalyst of 
relations. It emptifies so as to catalyze and revamp relations. It is flowing, changing, and 
most importantly, constructive and constitutive. “Like notes from an empty reed, or 
mushroom growing in dampness…we cannot know more about the Origin than this” 
(Palmer, chap 2, 2006: 10). In Wang Hui’s (1632-1717) Taohua Yuting (Figure 2.2), we 
see another example of how liubai conceptually structures the space of nature.  
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Figure 2.2 Wang Hui, Taohua Yuting. The Collection of National Palace Museum. 
Noticeably, blankness winds through the painting’s space from its forefront all the 
way to the far back, extending infinitely beyond. For Wang Hui, nature’s liveliness lives 
on the space that is left blank as if it breathes through the winding blankness. In this light, 
liubai is also understood as flowing emptiness (流白), a fluid stream of blankness that 
runs through the “ten thousand things” of nature. It helps the force of qi to channel 
through the material world and renders it into formless fluid to morph into each other. 
Liubai is an idealistic expression of the conceived rather than a realistic representation of 
the seen. Liubai is not the representation of the xu-ed ambiguity, it is part of the idea 
itself. Absent liubai, things exist in fixed relation to each other and are hence sequestered 
from the opportunity for mutual encountering. 
To better demonstrate its distinctiveness, this chapter compares liubai with Paul 
Cézanne’s works. In so doing, it relies on Merleau-Ponty (1968)’s rendition of Cézanne 
to explain how liubai’s ambiguity is distinctly different from Western art forms. 
Technically, the use of color poses distinctive difference between the two. For Cézanne’s 
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scenery painting, color is an important means through which natural objects’ immanent 
vibrancy is revealed (Figure 2.3).  
 
 
Figure 2.3 Mont Sainte-Victoire. Philadelphia Museum of Art. 
“Doing away with exact contours in certain cases, giving color priority over the outline—
these obviously mean different things in Cézanne and for the Impressionists. The object is 
no longer covered by reflections and lost in its relationships to the atmosphere and to other 
objects: it means subtly illuminated from within, light emanates from it, and the result is an 
impression of solidity and material substance,” (Merleau-Ponty,1964: 12).  
For Merleau-Ponty, the meaning of Cézanne’s color is two fold. First, it highlights 
objects’ interior vitality from within. Through his unique use of color, Cézanne attempts 
to present an object that is full of depth and reserve, “an emerging order, of an object in 
the act of appearing, organizing itself before our eyes” (Merleau-Ponty, 1964: 14). In 
Merleau-Ponty’s eyes, Cézanne’s paintings make objects swell. Cézanne’s objects are 
encircled by contours, not outlines. The difference is this: while the latter limit objects in 
continuous lines that sacrifice depth, the former allows an apple to spread out 
inexhaustibly from within. Second, the vividness of color separates the objects from their 
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surroundings. From Cézanne’s painting, according to Merleau-Ponty, we see living, self-
centered objects that radiate from its density. Cézanne’s apple has a fresh smell. It is a 
production of an intensified brushstroke “with an infinite number of conditions.” It is 
depth and density, not horizontality, that is highlighted in Cézanne’s work. Cézanne 
abandons himself to the instantaneity of permeating color to achieve the intrinsic energy 
of objects in nature. The obscurity in Cézanne’s works is attributed to the portrayed 
externalization of this interior illumination that estranges objects from their surrounding 
environment. Cézanne’s purpose is to introduce a knowing vision: an epistemic sensation 
capable of acquiring and producing knowledge. It is his contention that science is not 
independent of nature and thought cannot stand above sensation. Rather, they must be 
reconciled. An intensified vision is perhaps the best way for Cézanne to substantiate the 
incompleteness of our mind. 
Yet, liubai has different take on ambiguity. At technical level, the fusion of ink and 
emptiness replaces the function of color in Cézanne’s works, leaving the realization of 
object-vibrancy to the effect of liubai in the Chinese paintings. The blankness of liubai is 
suffused into the space of the paintings and animates the painted natural objects through 
the creation of a xu-ed wholeness. The use of non-color, in the form of emptiness and 
washed ink, enacts the transformation between there-is and there-is-not. Unlike 
Cézanne’s color, the emptiness of liubai pervades through nature’s whole body and 
renders all natural objects in their flowing interrelation with one another. This wholeness, 
as Shi Tao (1642-ca.1707), a prominent Chinese art theorist and painter who closely 
followed the teaching of Daoism, suggests, “could prevent the dangers of destabilization 
and mediocrity. If the wholeness is not perceived, then inhibitions will arise in the 
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depiction of things. But if it is thoroughly understood, then all things can be 
comprehended” (Shi, 1989: 72). Dong Qichang’s (1632-1717) Xiamu Chuiyin Tu (Figure 
2.4) illuminates Shi Tao’s point. Liubai is vital to his painting in terms of achieving this 
wholeness.  
 
 Figure 2.4 Dong Qichang, Xiamu Chuiyin Tu. The Collection of National Palace 
Museum. 
Blankness in this painting is the undertone of the whole space as if ‘the ten 
thousand things’ grow out of it and thrive on its abundance. In this regard, liubai “brings 
about a complete metamorphosis” by “transforming ‘one’ into a state of fusion” (Shi, 
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1989: 71). What is at stake here is that liubai functions as “a single, pervasive energy” of 
flowing qi that diffuses the boundaries of ‘ten thousand things’ such that ‘mountains and 
oceans take on each other’s characteristics’ and hence “mountains are oceans and oceans 
are mountains” (Shi, 1989: 80). “Nothing exists which is not ‘that,’” teaches Zhuangzi, 
“nothing exists which is not ‘this.’” Via this interconeectedness, “this” and “that” have 
become fused into each other so much so that “‘this’ comes out of ‘that’ and ‘that’ arises 
from ‘this’” (Palmer, 2006: 12). Without the other, one’s existence is impossible. Thus, if 
Cézanne’s obscurity is identified with an isolationism-based vibrancy through the fullness 
of pulsating color, the ambiguity of liubai is characterized by its dynamic interrelationism 
through vacuity. Contra Cézanne who relies on the cultivation of intensified vision for us 
to understand nature, Zhuangzi proposes to blur our vision to marginalize human agency. 
For Zhuangzi, nature is not seen; it is conceived and imagined as such. Where 
ambivalence for Cézanne is a tool to gain knowledge, ambiguity itself is wisdom, 
according to Zhuangzi, when our eyes are shut and our minds closed. Nature is absent of 
substance, it is a perpetual impermeability that cannot be penetrated by vision. 
      Thus, growing out of liubai’s ecology, a tree may not be a tree and a mountain 
might perhaps become more of a mountain. In Ni Zan’s (1301-1347) Rongxi Zhai Tu 
(Figure 2.5), clear visual distinction between the foreground and background is 
challenged as the blandness of mist and water permeates the whole scene to arrange 
everything at the same horizon.  
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Figure 2.5 Ni Zan, Rongxi Zhai Tu (Partial). The Collection of National Palace Museum. 
       The “invisible” river, lake and mist in this painting are seen as limitless extension 
of each other’s body—a ceaseless and unexhausted changing of existence that has 
transcended a Heiddegerian ‘ontic’ through a process of becoming. As Guo Xi rightly 
points out in his famous An Essay on Landscape Painting, “thus views of a single 
mountain combines in themselves the changes and significances of thousand mountains” 
(Guo, 1935: 38). In a nutshell, the emptiness in liubai alienates itself from the 
nothingness of nihilism. Rather, it speaks of a fullness of ambiguous relations. 
           Liubai shares commonality with the new materialism. For example, at the 
forefront of this field, Jane Bennett brings up the important concept of “thing-power” in 
her book Vibrant Matter. The project of “thing-power,” for Bennett, as Mel Chen 
insightfully observes, is “an interest in the animal that hides in animacy”—an intellectual 
investment in discovering vital materiality or materiality with life (Chen, 2012: 11). 
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Thing-power deals with the intrinsic energy of the material world. “Vibrant matter” is the 
name that Bennett gives to them. Vital to the vigorous energy of such vibrant matter is its 
own immanent forces in intervening the making and shaping of our natural world as 
active actant or operator. Bennett would agree with Zhuangzi in seeing qi as the vital 
force of energy that energizes the “the vibrant matters.” Understood as transcending 
force, Bennett’s “thing-power” is also the power of qi intrinsic to “ten thousand things” in 
nature and turns them into actants. For both Bennett and Zhuangzi, the powerful force of 
thing-power and qi emerge and operate in the absence of form, structure and order. They 
encircle and permeate through the materiality of the nature and protect it from the 
intervention of human agency. Despite the similarity, however, Bennett’s theory of “thing 
power” lacks the characteristics of xu. Similar to Cézanne’s ambition in finding the 
intrinsic vitality of things, Bennett also focuses on the inherent liveliness of the material 
world from within. The effect of the “thing power” is the rich fullness of natural objects 
filled up with energy both internally generative and outwardly expansive. Nevertheless, 
for Zhuangzi, a xu-generated world retreats from full substantiation, morphing between 
materiality and immateriality, transposing freely across the fixity of things, matters, or 
objects. Evaporated by qi, the void of the “ten thousand things” is a commitment to an 
unknown world, a strangely ambiguous one whose existence is a multiplicity of accidents 
and coincidences.  
           Liubai’s ambiguous emptiness is political. Liubai creates an ecological space 
suffused with profound political meanings—a site imbued with open and dynamic 
relations between nature and its political environment—that extends itself from human 
society to nonhuman entourage. It is a politics of indeterminacy that suspends the fixity 
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of human-centered power structure. It not only rejects a human-centered understanding of 
agentic capacity but also counts in the affect of nonhuman agency. What matters about 
this political ecology is that it introduces more possibilities for new power relations. 
Political ecology as such consists of a series of indeterminate relations that transcends 
beyond human political ideology—discourses of power regime that only flow toward the 
“centric” of the “anthropo.” A bee is as effective a political actant as is the flower that 
feeds it. The political agency of the bee is based on its capacity in introducing new 
relation through this enacted connection between the flower and itself. The instance of 
touch is the very moment when two strangers void out their formed identity and become 
each other’s life—a new life of relation that makes the world different. This relation is 
thus the unexpected result of the bee and the flower’s becoming-each-other in enacting 
and sharing the relation. Since the politics of xu is the politics of indeterminacy which 
essentially concerns the discovery and rediscovery of excessive relations, liubai provides 
us with alternative ecological imagination in obtaining the goal. This tenuous 
excessiveness, forever unsettled, is exactly the characteristic of nature, lack of 
predetermined relations and meanwhile productive of new relations. They change and 
transform among themselves. As Zhuangzi reminds us in his most well known chapter 
“Working Everything Out Evenly” (QiWu Lun), “everything has what is innate, 
everything has what is necessary” (Palmer, chap 2, 2006: 13). The “innate” and 
“necessary” constitute the political agency of “ten thousand things” to act and to be acted 
upon. It is not about the initial; rather, it is about every initial, each, in its own way. In this 
particular mode of politics, the divisions between men/animal, subject/object, 
positive/inert, us/them get inevitably get dissolved.  
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Body, Xu, and Politics 
           Democracy, as Davide Panagia (2009) sees it, is essentially about how to deal with 
the visual. For Panagia, politics necessarily involves the participation of body. Panagia’s 
analysis of The Ring centers on his conceptualization of the “haptic visuality” as the vital 
regulative that guides the viewing relationship between the film and its spectators. The 
idea of “haptic visuality” revolves around the collapsing of the gap between the 
theatricality inside the film and the visual outside of it. As a result, the audiences are 
cordially invited to participate in the proceeding of the film through their experiences of 
the “haptic visuality.” More importantly, such participation is not only upfront but also 
inseparable to the making of the film, which successfully overthrows the predominant 
rule of theatricality buttressed by traditional reign of narratocracy. The disruption of a 
predetermined vision contributes to the democratic making of the plural. In visuality, 
Panagia finds a way to address the relation between democracy and body.  
            So does the project of Jacques Rancière (2010). Arguing that politics ultimately 
concerns the ‘distribution and redistribution of the sensible’, Rancière holds that politics 
are embodied in human’s bodily sensation and to what extent those physical sensations 
are allowed to operate and function. Politics of consensus, according to Rancière, builds 
its regime around policing the judgment of bodily experiences. Anything beyond is 
disavowed. For Rancière, the politics of dissensus, however, aims to overthrow such 
presupposed partition of sensation by supplementing a gap in sensible itself and 
redistributes the latter in search of the “unfeelable” (Rancière 2010: 38). Challenging 
consensus politics that partitions the counted from the uncounted, the politics of 
dissensus extends the making of the political to include he excluded. In this light, 
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Panagia’s “haptic visuality” resonates with the “disensus politics” in breaking through 
fixed divisions of the visual.  Rancière shares his view with Elizabeth Grosz. For Grosz, 
what resides at the core of art is the excessiveness that invites the intensive participation 
of a variety of sensorium. This process of sensorium intensification involves the 
magnified and active functioning of such receiving organs as ears, eyes, and nose, 
“resonating with colors, sounds, smells, shapes, and rhythms’ to find out intact sensory” 
(Grosz, 2008: 66). In Grosz’ view, sensation is the effective intermediacy that draws the 
connection between human body and art. It prepares an emptied body to be enriched by 
artwork for sensational intensification from within—interior revival through the body’s 
encounter with various forms of art. What matters about the aestheticized politics is a 
political force of dissenssus that distorts the distinction between the seeable and 
unseeable, the hearable and the unhearable, the speakable and the unspeakable to remake 
the potentiality of our pluralist bodily sensation. Thus, for Grosz, the political meaning of 
women’s body is predicated on its intensified experiences of the corporeal volatility that 
ultimately express sexual difference (Grosz, 1994). 
   For these theorists, body ventures into the unknowable and becomes explorative 
rather than the explored. The political, in this light, lies in the dissident bodies that were 
previously uncounted and untrusted. Thanks to erratic sensations, the discursive body is 
now turned into a political arena in which we begin to experience the unexperienced and 
experiment the unexpriemented. Zhuangzi may agree with these authors to the extent that 
the digressive body trumps the supremacy of rationality. In echoing Panagia, Rancière 
and Grosz, Zhuangzi would once again heighten the latter’s political capacity to act and 
change. However, Zhuangzi’s theory of body is more ambitiously and radically 
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transcending. Zhuangzi does not find the seed of politics through the excitement of the 
sensorium and the redistribution of sensations. Instead, his political body is conceived 
through the blandness of xu. 
   Zhuangzi proposes a bland and dull body in making the political. If Cézanne relies 
on color to highlight the perceptive capacity of vision and indicate that thought cannot 
work independent of vision, Zhuangzi is suspicious of such sensational capacity itself. 
Wisdom and knowledge, what traditionally separate human from animals, are now 
turning against us and hurting our potential as political being. For Zhuangzi, men are 
deprived of their political agency because of their attachment to being a knowing subject, 
their obsession with knowledge and perception. Instead of using our mind and body to 
learn and perceive, we should use them to become, to transform, and most importantly, to 
retreat into the primordial void—the indeterminate and yet vibrant oneness above all 
knowledge. “I can sit down and forget everything…My limbs are without feeling and my 
mind is without light. I have ignored my body and cast aside my wisdom. Thus I am 
united with the Dao. This is what sitting right down and forgetting is” (Palmer, 2006: 58). 
Sit-down-and-forget (zuo wang), for Zhuangzi, is to dwell in a xu-ed body, an insipid 
body that protracts itself into the noneness, a fusion of self and other and an exchange of 
a conscious body for a void body. It is about an absence of a preconceived body and a 
body of balanced and bland void. Here, xu distinguishes the Zhuangzian body from 
Merleau-Ponty’s body. For the former, body is animated in its alienation from self and 
achieves vitality to become. For the latter, body’s energy awaits our recognition of its 
capacity to perceive. Compared with Merleau-Ponty, Zhuangzi’s conceptualization of 
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body is characterized by its tenuous part of that which is always to be fulfilled by others. 
Zhuangzi’s bland body is a body that becomes animal： 
“Once upon a time, I, Chuang Tzu (Zhuangzi), dreamt that I was a butterfly flitting around  
and enjoying myself. I had no idea I was Chuang Tzu. Then suddenly I woke up and was 
Chuang Tzu again. But I could not tell, had I been Chuang Tzu dreaming I was a butterfly or 
a butterfly dreaming I was now Chuang Tzu? However, there must be some sort of 
difference between Chuang Tzu and a butterfly! We call this the transformation of things” 
(Palmer, chap 2, 2006: 20).  
  This is Zhuangzi’s theory of becoming-animal. It is a process of becoming 
butterfly—a bodily invitation from a butterfly for self-alienation and self-
transformation—a process of unlearn and becoming. What matters here is not a simple 
question of subject/object interchange: it goes beyond identity and subjectivity, it is about 
freeing up our bodies to encounter, experience and become part of each other. Becoming 
animal, for Zhuangzi, is a medium through which the body becomes imperceptible, no 
matter how fragmenting, fleeting and provisional those moments might be. In this light, I 
find Fraser (2008)’s understanding of xu limited. For Fraser, the idea of xu is only 
expressed within the sphere of psychology and ceased with the argument that “the 
epitome of xu is the mirror-heart of the perfected person, blank and empty of any content 
of its own, which merely reflects what appears before it” (Fraser, 2008: 136). While 
Fraser might be right that Zhuangzi uses xu partially to mean interior self-cultivation, he 
does not adequately capture xu’s meaning by neglecting the blank and empty body.  
“Your mind must become one, do not try to understand with your ears but with your heart. 
Indeed, not with your heart but with your soul. Listening blocks the ears, set your heart on 
what is right, but let your soul be open to receive in true sincerity. The Way is found in 
emptiness. Emptiness is the fasting of the heart” (Palmer, chap 4, 2006: 29). 
   Palmer’s translation here is not entirely precise as the original text uses the word 
qi instead of soul. What Zhuangzi emphasizes is a bland body that is devoid of sensory 
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sensitivity and flows with qi. The abandonment of hearing and seeing constitute the 
important process of unlearn/unperceive, which is a crucial step for Zhuangzi’s body to 
experience self-transformation. Unlearn prepares our body not for the purpose of 
perceiving but for the end to become and to transform. No-knowledge, the effect of 
unlearn, hence necessarily entails a dull human sensation—a feeble sensorium without 
penetrating power of knowing. The ambiguous effect of xu brings a blind date between 
our body and the world—an indeterminate encountering that is tenuous and yet 
enlivening. Nature lives us: our obsession with knowledge about nature and inquiry of 
knowledge from nature leads us astray in understanding the true political meaning of 
body.  
    The political force of body resides in the ambiguous and bland body, forever 
impervious to external objectification. As Jullien (2009) observes, “it cannot inquire into 
the existence of emptiness because it is constantly experiencing it, prior to any 
constituted knowledge, prior even to any ‘question of knowledge,’ which emptiness is in 
the process of bringing about” (Jullien, 2009: 81). The seed of politics, for Zhuangzi, is 
found in body’s potential in persistently nourishing the unsettlement of the power 
relation. Power is indeterminate and indefinite, for body is an ambiguous void, empty of 
knowledge. True knowledge is unspoken. It can only be bodily experienced in the process 
of unlearn. The reason for which the Confucian sages are deceptive, according to 
Zhuangzi, is their preaching of misleading ways of hearing and seeing in pursuing 
knowledge. “Throw away the six tones, destroy the pipes and lute, block the ears of Blind 
Kuang the musician, then every person in the world would for the first time be able to 
hear properly” (Palmer, chap 10, 2006: 78). As Zhuangzi sees it, the danger of the sages 
	  	  
56	  
arises from their inculcation of knowledge through disciplined and tamed body. Crucial 
to the Confucian moral regime, for example, is exactly the ritualization (li hua) of human 
body, an organized and structured body taught to hear and see. Under this regime, power 
is defined in the form of bodily domination. It prepares body for the purpose of learning 
knowledge. Yet, for Zhuangzi, such a training of body not only eliminates more 
possibilities for power relation, but worst of all, it terminates politics, for the 
incompleteness of body is replaced by the fullness of body, an absolutism that inhibits 
body from becoming and being political. For Confucius, politics is rectification; but for 
Zhuangzi, politics is contestation. The Zhuangzian xu-ed body demonstrates a “force-
field,” to borrow the terminology from William Connolly, that displays a capacity to 
morph in unsettled patterns in the making of a world of becoming. Within this “force-
field,” Shi or efficacy, is the driving force in rendering the metamorphosis of body. It is 
dynamic and that vitalizes the propensity of things to reach maximum efficacy. The 
withdrawal of knowledge is crucial for shi to perform. “Allow the propensity of things to 
operate outside you,” writes Jullien, “as their own disposition dictates; do not project 
values or desires on them but adapt constantly to the necessity of their evolution” 
(1995:39). Agreeing with Jullien, Bennett defines shi as “the style, energy, propensity, 
trajectory, or élan inherent to a specific arrangement of things” in describing her 
conceptualization of “thing-power” (Bennett, 2010:35). That shi concerns more about 
efficacy than telos precisely speaks of the essence of the Zhuangzian body. It is animating 
force that makes Zhuangzi’s politics of indeterminacy come into being.  
In conclusion, Zhuangzi has a very different vision in conceiving politics. Instead 
of embracing a substantiated politics predicated on settled power structures, he proposes 
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a xu-ed politics—a particular mode of politics that defies simplistic determinism. Evident 
in his understanding of emptiness and body, Zhuangzi’s theory of xu aims to explore 
more possibilities to extend the development of politics horizontally. For him, politics is 
never solved. Its organic development receives its best vitality when it remains inchoative 
and ambiguous. 
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Chapter 3: The Making of the Self: the Dao and the Body in Zhuangzi’s 
Writing 
Introduction 
          Rosi Braidotti points out in Nomadic Subject, “I see modernity as the moment of 
decline of classical rationalism and the view of the subject attached to it” (1994: 97). In 
her line, the crisis of modernity involves the collapse of a dominant rational 
categorization as well as the ensuing phallocentric structure that is built upon it. What is 
also noticeably dissolved along with the decline is the specific configuration of the 
subject that co-exists with such identifications of rationality. For Braidotti, changing 
historical, social, economic, cultural and political conditions have substantially 
challenged not only the meaning of reason but also the extent to which rationality can 
play a role in schematizing the making the self. Therefore, the project of “nomadic 
subjects,” to Braidotti, is to develop a consciousness which is “a form of resisting 
assimilation or homologation into dominant ways of representing the self” (1994 25).  
           Braidotti’s observation suggests that the purpose of the political is about finding a 
nomadic style or relation whose core content is about “transitions and passages without 
predetermined destinations or lost homelands” (Braidotti 1994: 25). This is to say, 
politics concerns the ways in which those moments of indeterminacy, passage of 
transition, and epics of difference can be located in the making of nomadic subject. The 
politics of the self, in this sense, is therefore about the search for places where the 
composition of self is never settled as a consequence of unsettled power relation. In this 
regard, Zhuangzi is helpful. A renowned Daoist philosopher, Zhuangzi is often 
considered as a moral skeptic and a nihilist, and is less known as a political theorist. And 
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yet, Zhuangzi’s writing is saturated with serious political thinking that provides us with 
interestingly alternative perspectives in viewing politics. In particular, Zhuangzi 
challenges our traditional understanding of politics by conceiving of it based on unsettled 
power structure. For Zhuangzi, such a political process necessarily involves body, a space 
without borders or enclosure, empowered and animated by its own intrinsic agency in 
connection with its living environment. Yet, in this regard, an important question should 
be raised. That is, in what ways does Zhuangzi’s body contribute to the construction of 
self? In addition, how specifically might this Zhuangzian selfhood lead to a different 
making of the political? What kind of politics does this connection bring forth?  
What will be described and analyzed in this chapter contains four major aspects: 
1) the idea of the Dao in Zhuangzi’s philosophy, 2) how body may possibly be 
understood in relation to the Dao, 3) the concept of self in Zhuangzi’s conceiving, and 4) 
the implication of the self for freedom. The purpose of this chapter is to figure out how 
body may be reconceptualized to explore its political implications. In so doing, the 
chapter continues to investigate the idea of xu in order to examine its affective force on 
body as well as its political making of the Zhuangzian self. I argue that rather than a 
dominating idea characteristic with its ontological supremacy, the Dao in Zhuangzi’s 
philosophy is a living force that possesses the capacity of enlivening interelations among 
“the ten thousand things” (a Chinese philosophical term that refers to all things in the 
universe). The body, for Zhuangzi, is not a representation of the Dao, but on the contrary, 
it is the Dao. It is composed of a multitude of animating forces that make up and turn the 
body into a morphing plateau. The indeterminacy of xu renders the body as both 
dispossessed and spontaneous. The body as dispossession and spontaneity means it 
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should be perceived as an indeterminate and morphing entity whose centrality lies in a 
manifold of changing relations. Such a Zhuangzian body also suggests that the making of 
the self is never structured and pre-organized. The composition of the self always entails 
an ongoing process wherein I is never perpetually positioned and centered. Thus, freedom, 
as Zhuangzi may envision, pertains to the capacity by which one is able to recognize his 
living environment to the best of his/her knowledge and enjoy freely the mutual 
transformations between him/herself and the surrounding context. As Braidotti 
insightfully writes, “the political is a form of intervention that acts simultaneously on the 
discursive and the material registers of subjectivity; thus it has to do with the ability to 
draw multiple connections” (1994: 35). Echoing Braidotti, the politics of Zhuangzi’s self 
speaks of an ability concerning spatio-temporal rearrangement whereby changing power 
relations keep extending the horizontality rather than hierarchy of politics.   
Zhuangzi and The Grand Dao 
          To begin with, the idea of the Dao (generally translated as the Way) is not 
exclusive to Daoism—it has also been widely addressed and talked about in the tradition 
of Chinese philosophy. However, this philosophical concept has an original and 
distinctive root in the Daoist thought. Laozi, or “The Old Master” of Daoism, laid down 
his seminal theory on the grand principle of the Dao in Daodejing (especially in the first 
part of the book—“Daojing,” or “On the Dao”) that has been influencing numerous 
Daoist followers including Zhuangzi for over a thousand years. For Laozi, the Dao is 
both generative and grand. “Way-making (Dao) gives rise to continuity, continuity gives 
rise to difference, difference gives rise to plurality, and plurality gives rise to the 
manifold of everything that is happening (the ten thousand things),” writes Laozi (Ames 
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and Hall 2003: 142). The grand Dao is generative producing, animating and enlivening 
“the ten thousand things” in the Daoist cosmos. The Dao is empty (xu) in the sense that it 
does not come with concretized and determined predominance as a transcendent and 
supreme entity such that the rest of the world has to be only a derivative of its 
hierarchical structure. Rather, nothingness is the origin of life—a state where a variety of 
energies are just at the beginning of waking up from their dormancy, nascent and yet 
eager to meet the burst of a new world. The fullness of the Dao, on the other hand, 
emerges from its fertility in persistently producing countless in-betweenness and the 
affective dynamics that empower the world to reach its infinity of change and becoming 
through interrelations among “the ten thousand things”—both as distinctly created 
particularities and as inseparable parts of the whole, the unity of the Daoist cosmos. In 
this respect, Tang Junyi regards this Daoist cosmology as “the inseparability between one 
and the many, of continuity and multiplicity” (Ames and Hall 2003: 143). Tang’s 
characterization of the Dao is an accurate observation of a Laozian pluralism—one that 
relies on the Dao’s proliferation to bring forth a constantly changing universe. 
           Rather than a supreme idea or a unitary unity that dominates at its ontological 
level, Dao in Laozi’s cosmology is instead a dynamic field—a field of multiple flowing 
energies and forces, located in its permanent engendering of vitality. An energy field, the 
Dao is indeed an assemblage of relations, creating contexts and environments, inducing 
the liveliness of each life and providing parity for them to emerge and thrive in co-
relative connections with each other. In the Dao’s energy field, relations are never 
presupposed; rather, they are characteristic of their inventiveness and spontaneity in 
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bringing about the new. The grandness of the Dao, for Laozi, is thus found in the infinite 
intertwining of relations. In the opening chapters of Daodejing, Laozi writes,  
        Way-making being empty,  
         You make sure of it 
         But do not fill it up.  
         So abysmally deep— 
         It seems the predecessor of everything that is happening (wanwu).  
         It blunts the sharp edges 
         And untangles the knots; 
         It softens the glare 
         And brings things together on the same track. 
         So cavernously deep— 
         It only seems to persist. 
  I do not know whose progeny it is; 
 It prefigures the ancestral gods (Ames and Hall, chap 5, 2003: 83). 
The grand Dao is empty (xu) exactly because of its inexhaustible capaciousness that 
continuously revitalizes itself in making more relations come into being. “It blunts the 
sharp edges and untangles the knots” as the Dao precludes any inclination toward 
extremity—the ultimate end for alterity—in order to maintain its healthy energy to keep 
producing changing relations. Ames and Hall’s (2003) comments are insightful regarding 
the inexhaustibility of the grand Dao: “The processive and fluid character of experience 
precludes the possibility of either initial beginning or final closure by providing within it 
an ongoing space for self-renewal” (83). As Laozi would see it, the Dao neither comes 
with a beginning nor with an end—it is a persistent circle between the emptiness and 
fullness, a forever ongoing process of self-renewal. 
          Inheriting Laozi’s inspirational teaching, Zhuangzi also sees a world elevated by 
the spirit of the Dao. For Zhuangzi, the grand Dao is the root of the “ten thousand 
things,” driving the engendering of all things in the universe: “Death and birth are fixed. 
They are as certain as the dawn that comes after the night, established by the decree of 
Heaven. This is beyond the control of humanity, this is just how things are. Some view 
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Heaven as their father and continue to love it. How much more should they show 
devotion for that which is even greater” (Palmer chap 6, 2006: 49). Alluding to the great 
force of the Dao, Zhuangzi considers the Dao as the ultimate source of all 
transformations in the world—the alternation between night and day, the change between 
life and death. They all escape the territory of mankind as the follower of the grand Dao. 
For Zhuangzi (also for Laozi), Dao cannot be simplistically reduced to a dominating 
ontological Being that predates and pre-arranges the world in conjunction with a settled 
order. The Dao is neither a Kantian principle a priori nor a Platonic idea in its world-
making; instead, it is born simultaneously with the world, with its animating force and 
guiding principle embedded in the world itself, rather than standing above and overseeing 
the lives of “the ten thousand things.” In fact, in studying the philosophical idea of the 
Dao, too much attention has been paid to its ontological possibility as well as whether or 
not the Dao is ontologically real. One obvious shortcoming of this approach is that it is 
prone to the pitfall of reductionism and absolutism such that the Dao has become the sole 
provider of a pre-established structure upon which the world is founded, or an ultimate 
truth understood at its highest metaphysical level, from which derives a variety of ontics. 
For example, Shen Tao’s “One Dao” theory suggests that “while there are many ways to 
do things, there is only one way the world is—one actual world history, one way things 
actually take place” (Hansen 1983: 34). This view is exemplary of how the idea of the 
Dao can be mistakenly reduced to an absolutist idea at ontological level that aims to 
dominate rather than animate the world. Against this misunderstanding, Chad Hansen 
rightly points out the plural content of the Dao to the extent that “the actual tao consists 
of taos, that is, the way the world is includes the many contending systems of discourse” 
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(1983: 35). The Dao may even be chaotic, as Frank Stevenson sees it. Stevenson borrows 
the chaos-theory model from physics and makes the argument that “Dao as a disorder 
that self-orders (into bodies/systems) and then decays and dissipates into disorder…” 
(Stevenson 2006: 303). Distinction without difference—the Dao in Zhuangzi’s 
philosophy is both holistic and pluralist. It allows “the ten thousand things” to grow and 
develop in their own ways to maintain distinctions while retaining similar attributes 
shared by all. The Dao is a significant approach through which all things in the universe 
get animated and transformed in a variety of relations to the surrounding environment.  
        Zhuangzi further elaborates the Dao in the following words: 
        The great Dao has both reality and expression, but it does nothing and has no form. 
         It can be obtained, but not seen. 
         It is rooted in its own self, existing before Heaven and Earth were born, indeed for eternity. 
         It gives divinity to the spirits and to the gods. 
         It brought to life Heaven and Earth. 
         It was before the primal air, yet it cannot be called lofty; 
         It was below all space and direction, yet it cannot be called deep (Palmer, chap 6, 2006: 51). 
This paragraph implicates the contradictory meaning of xu—the seemingly oppositional 
statuses between form and formlessness, possession and dispossession, loftiness and 
humbleness, shallowness and unfathomableness—that presents the Dao with opposing 
properties. Xu, in this sense, refers to a mode of indeterminacy where two polarized ends 
of contradiction engage each other in a reciprocal relation through mutual 
transformations such that a kind of interdependence is established and always functions 
effectively between them. According to Zhuangzi, the Dao is an infinite and unlimited 
force of contradiction by which contradictory phenomena are constantly generated and 
introduced into the growth and development of all things, giving birth to them and 
nurturing them. Things are not only contradictory in themselves but more importantly 
found in contradictory relations with others: “When the springs dry out, the fish are found 
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stranded on the earth. They keep each other damp with their own moisture, and wet each 
other with their slime. But it would be better if they could just forget about each other in 
rivers and lakes” (Palmer, chap 6, 2006: 50). This famous allegory of dying fish is 
illustrative of the inevitability of contradiction in Zhuangzi’s philosophy of the Dao—life 
vs death, self vs others, none of which could possibly evade the Dao’s unavoidable 
contradiction. The force of the Dao creates a field of xu where things find themselves not 
only in contradictions intrinsic to themselves but also in contradictory relations with 
others. Here, xu indicates a persistent condition of indeterminacy under which we, just 
like the fish, are always entangled in such contradictory issues as life and death. 
Nevertheless, unlike Hegel who tries to solve contradiction through dialectics, or the 
Greeks who find destiny as their solution to tragic contradictions, Zhuangzi has no 
intention to solve contradiction. The Dao, or the force energy that animates, is by no 
means a solution to contradiction but instead, a producer of even more contradictions in 
fleeting changes! For Zhuangzi, contradiction is exactly the power that keeps driving the 
incessant process of transformations among “the ten thousand things.” Contradictions are 
not to be solved—they are to be preserved. Zhuangzi’s Dao relies on its productivity in 
impregnating the world with endless chains of creative transformations. In this sense, the 
aim of the seemingly bipolarized ends of life and death, for the fish, is not defined as 
definitive status of permanent fixture. On the contrary, what is more important for 
Zhuangzi is to reach out beyond either status per se as a singular position and embrace a 
multiplicity of relations. Thus, both contradictory ends of the fish’s dilemma is reconciled 
into Zhuangzi’s Dao by way of forgetting about the obsession with living for living’s own 
sake in that life becomes even more vitalized through experiencing “the opposite.” Here, 
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Angus Graham’s observation is not entirely accurate when he suggests that, “Chuang-tzu 
writes sometimes of the withdrawal from the many into the one as a detachment from the 
entire world change and multiplicity, one’s own body included, into a solitude beyond the 
reach of life and death” (Graham 2001: 23). While he is correct about Zhuangzi’s 
transcendence, Graham wrongfully takes Zhuangzi’s world of transformation as a matter 
of teleological being. Conversely, it is not through the withdrawal from but an entry into 
a world of change and multiplicity does one transcend his/her solitude to encounter the 
many. As one breaks out of his/her predetermined conditions by transmuting into others, 
he/she thus reaches beyond the finite and limited boundaries of life and death. 
Dao’s Body, Body’s Dao 
          This section attempts to unfold Zhuangzi’s theory of the body from another 
perspective—one that traces Zhuangzi’s conceptual root of the body in his philosophical 
origin of the Dao—in order to explore how the body is theoretically connected with the 
Dao and what its major attributes and properties would possibly consist of with respect to 
the Dao. The chapter introduces spontaneity and dispossession, derived from the xu-ed 
principle of the Dao, as two crucial attributes of Zhuangzi’s body. In so doing, I compare 
Zhuangzi with Deleuze and Guattari as well as Judith Butler to find out the 
distinctiveness of the Zhuangzian body.        
           Zhuangzi’s idea of xu-ed Dao certainly has profound implications for his theory of 
the body. The body, for him, is neither a representation of the Dao, nor an effect of the 
Dao. It is the Dao. By this, Zhuangzi is to mean that body is exactly the textualizaiton of 
the Dao, a complex bodily assemblage of affective energies, through which there runs a 
multitude of forces of the Dao. The Zhuangzian body is composed of immaterial 
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materialities, a state of evaporation. For Zhuangzi, the body is an organic architecture, a 
field or plateau, with tens of thousands of qi channeling through it and making up of it. It 
extends multi-dimensionally toward all directions in expanding both its spacial and 
temporal spheres. The body is visible and touchable but is also transparent; the body 
morphs and transmutes, but it never gets settled. In Zhuangzi’s view, the body is a perfect 
example of “Hiding the World in the World” (cang tianxia yu tianxia): “if you take 
everything under Heaven and try to store it under Heaven, there is no space left for it to 
be lost in” (Palmer, chap 6, 2006: 50). What Zhuangzi means by this is that by storing the 
world within the world, with nowhere else left to escape or hide, everything in the world 
has become the world itself without being reduced to an outside particular that needs to 
be hidden from us. Everything is us, and we are everything. As Zhuangzi himself writes, 
“To have happened only on man’s shape is enough to please us; if a shape such as man’s 
through ten thousand transformations never gets nearer to a limit, can the joys we shall 
have of it ever be counted?” (Graham, chap 6, 2001: 86). The body thus transforms, and 
transformation is its action, with distinctions being the affirmation of this action. 
According to Zhuangzi, we should be rejoined by not only the body that hides the world 
but also by the mysterious world that is hidden inside of it. Deciphering the body 
precisely means decoding the animating force of the grand Dao and the world that is 
enlivened by it. 
          How might this Zhuangzian body be approached? In what specific ways can we 
further understand the body, particularly in its relation to xu-ed Dao? In this regard, two 
key attributes stand out, both derived from xu as crucial constituents of Zhuangzi’s body: 
dispossession and spontaneity. Both properties are crucial factors in helping maintain the 
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indeterminacy of xu. First, to Zhuangzi, the body is dispossession, it is always an ongoing 
event of dispossessing. The body comes and goes; it forms and escapes; it deludes us and 
is never possessed by us; it constitutes us but also alienates us. Thanks to the force of the 
Dao, the body is not only dispossessed but also dispossessed of itself such that it becomes 
experiences of all forms of transformations that make up of the whole universe. The 
dialogue between Shun and Cheng in the Zhuangzi is most evident of the body as 
dispossession:  
        Shun asked Cheng, “Is it possible to obtain the Tao and have it as mine?” 
         He said, “As you aren’t in control of your own body, how could you hope to obtain and 
         hold the Tao?” 
         Shun said, “If I don’t control my own body, then who does?” 
         He said, “Your shape is given by Heaven and Earth. Life is not yours to have, it is the   
         combining harmony of Heaven and Earth. Your innate nature and destiny are not yours to  
         have, they are constructs given by Heaven and Earth. Grandsons and sons are not yours to  
         have: they are the sloughed-off skins bequeathed to you from Heaven and Earth. You     
        should walk, therefore, as if you don’t know where you are going;  remain where you are  
        without knowing why; eat without knowing what you’re tasting. All this arises from the  
        yang breath of Heaven and Earth. How can it then be possible for you to obtain and hold  
        anything? (Palmer, chap 22, 2006: 190-191) 
 
Here, body as dispossession has two meanings. First, it means that the body is detached 
from a center, a hierarchy that aims to structure the body and makes it bound by certain 
orders. Zhuangzi’s body is centerless in the sense that it does not act in accordance with 
any centralizing power that separates head and body into a knowing subject and an object 
known, with the former informing the latter of injunctions. Body as dispossession in this 
sense exactly means the collapsing of a center upon which the body is dependent. Here, 
when Cheng tells Shun that he does not own his body, Cheng is saying that the intention 
to possess body is exactly an equivalent of drawing up a clear boundary between the 
thinking and the led, the subject and object. This is doomed to failure in that as the grand 
Dao is in no ways to be obtained and held but lived, so is the body. Like Dao, the body 
can never be owned as a whole unified entity; rather, it is a derangement of ordering and 
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reordering, or a fissure, so to speak, among strata ran by the energy force of qi. The body 
is thus less concerned with structure than with process in which organization and 
structure experience and re-experience their indeterminate ad hocs.  
            Second, to recognize body as dispossession also means that body performs and 
acts as the Dao. Shun’s puzzle of “who owns my body” in fact comes from his 
unawareness of the permanent metamorphosis of the body in the spirit of the Dao. In 
Shun’s presumption, body is a static entity, a foreclosure depleting with its own intrinsic 
agency. Yet, the body keeps renewing itself just as what the grand Dao does to “the ten 
thousand things.” The body does so without requiring to divide up the interior and 
exterior—the interior finds itself as motivated by the exterior and the exterior is 
dislocated in the interior. In this sense, Zhuangzi’s dispossession resonates with that of 
Judith Butler. For Butler, dispossession refers to a status whereby “we are dispossessed 
of ourselves by virtue of some kind of contact with another…The experience itself is not 
simply episodic, but can and does reveal one basis of relationality—we do not simply 
move ourselves, but are ourselves moved by what is outside of us, by others, but also by 
whatever ‘outside’ resides in us” (Butler and Athanasiou 2013: 3). Dispossession, in 
Butler’s view, is a measure of contact between the inside and outside, perhaps a blind 
encounter between two dimensions of space or time, that calls into question an atomized 
and self-sufficient individual. Thus, arguing against Athanasiou, dispossession, for Butler, 
is not necessarily an effect of abjection and vulnerability inflicted by the normative and 
thus speaks of the damaging power of the latter upon an independent self. Instead, 
dispossession suggests that “we are moved by various forces that precede and exceed our 
deliberate and bounded selfhood” (Butler and Athanasiou 2013: 4). Akin to Butler, 
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Zhuangzi would also endorse that selfhood is an effect, rather than a pre-condition, of the 
external-internal exchange. Zhuangzi would certainly agree with Butler with respect to 
the exterior-interior dynamics and propose that through dispossession, the body reveals 
its interdependence with its living environment by forming a dispossessive rather than 
possessive self. 
           As its second important dynamic, the Zhuangzian body is also characteristic of 
spontaneity. Spontaneity is a particular mode of indeterminacy, a moment of 
pervasiveness when the body is being permeated through by energies of vitality in 
forging and reforging its shape and rendering the body formless. Spontaneity can also be 
viewed as a kind of intuitiveness that is fully invested with fleeting moments of 
unprincipled change and unplanned transformations. Being spontaneous precisely means 
that one has to abandon prefilled body and instead delve into an empty body, or xu-ed 
body, a body of inaction (wuwei) that relies on unregulated hypostasized exchange 
among “the ten thousand things” in making the world a world of pluralist becoming. In 
this regard, to say the body is spontaneous is to say the body act without action. As 
Zhuangzi writes: 
           Self-forgetful right down to the liver and the gall, leaving behind their own ears and eyes,  
they turn start and end back to front, and know no beginning-point or standard. Heedlessly  
they roving beyond the dust and grime, go rambling through the lore in which there’s 
nothing to do. How could they be finicky about the rites of common custom, on watch for   
the inquisitive eyes and ears of the vulgar? (Graham, chap6, 2001: 90) 
 
“Nothing to do” means to forget about “my possession of body” and leave the body to its 
insistent transcendent transformation and becoming. “I sit and I forget”(zuowang) enables 
the body to be alienated from not only a knowing subject but also body itself, which 
brings about a body without body—a body that acts through inaction. Wuwei, or inaction, 
entails autonomy for the body to act and perform, in a process that unfolds spontaneously 
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on its own through the inherent vitality and resilience of the body. As Ames and Hall 
accurately observe, inaction refers to “actions uncompromised by stored knowledge or 
ingrained habits are relatively unmediated: they are accommodating and spontaneous” 
(Ames and Hall 2003: 39). The spontaneity of the body thus exactly means the body acts 
out in a variety of intuitive ways without being interfered and regulated by forces that 
aim to possess it.  
          In contemporary philosophy, Deleuze and Guattari reiterate a similar conception of 
the body, especially as it emerges from their concept of the rhizome. This is to 
demonstrate how Deleuze and Guattar could engage with Zhuangzi in helping us 
understand the latter’s idea of body. For them, rhizome is multiplicity; it is a thousand 
plateaus interwoven together. A rhizomic state is a site where the center gets 
deconstructed and the structured uprooted. A rhizomic moment is a point when 
interconnections and interactions are enacted to produce empowered assemblages for 
becoming to take place as continuous and ongoing events. Things do not resemble each 
other, they never do. Strangers meet each other in the terrain of rhizome to create 
something new: in Deleuze and Guattari’s own words, rhizome is a principle of 
connection and heterogeneity”—“any point of rhizome can be connected to anything 
other, and must be. This is very different from the tree or root, which plots a point, fixes 
an order” (1987: 7). Like the Dao, rhizome is an approach that decenters hierarchy and 
breaks its center into dimensions, rearranges them for more incessant multiplicities. As 
Deleuze and Guattari write, “there are no points or positions in a rhizome, such as those 
found in a structure, tree, or root. There are only lines” (1987: 8). Chaotic lines weave up 
a thousand plateaus and make the movement of the latter unpredictable and amorphous. 
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Lines are like the energies of the Dao, penetrating and pervasive, engendering invisible 
and yet vigorous rhizomes. This is “Hiding the World within the World” in Deleuze and 
Guattari’s way: there are constant forming and reforming inside rhizome, but the 
metamorphoses of rhizome in fact create even more rhizomes to come. What is equally 
important for rhizome is the idea of deterritorialization. To them, deterritorialization is a 
process of metamorphosis between two entities. Deterritorialization takes place as a mode 
of interdependence in which the unexpected and the new emerge out of mutual 
encountering. It should by no means be viewed as a procedure of duplication, through 
simple rearrangement of segments, in order to create identical things in different way. In 
Deleuze and Guattari’s own words: “reterritorialization must not be confused with a 
return to a primitive or older territoriality: it necessarily implies a set of artifices by 
which one element, itself deterritorialized, serves as new territoriality for another, which 
has lost its territoriality as well” (1987: 174).  
          Deleuze and Guattari’s rhizomatics help clarify Zhuangzi’s body, just as 
dispossession and spontaneity parallel deterritorialization. The Zhuangzian body is 
rhizomic in the sense that it is transient and fleeting without being fixed as the Dao never 
gets settled in any particular moment. Body, for Zhuangzi, is an embodiment of 
provisionality in both registers of spatiality and temporality. It morphs and becomes 
through dispossession in similar ways as rhizome does via deterritorialization. In Grosz’s 
insightful reading of Deleuze and Guattari, “becoming is the way each of the two series 
can transform: becoming is bodily thought, the ways in which thought, force, and change 
invest and invent new series, metamorphosing new bodies from the old through their 
encounter” (1995: 134). Deleuze and Guattari’s rhizome is hypostatized—it is bodily 
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registered, in other words. The occurrence of deterritorialization through the encounter 
between a wasp and orchid is exactly the moment when wasp bodily becomes the orchid 
and orchid the wasp. Rhizome is amorphous, and it transcends and reorganizes time and 
space. So is the Dao and Zhuangzi’s body. What is more important, however, is the 
urgency shared by both in tackling the making of self. As Braidotti suggests, “the 
challenge to which Deleuze is trying to respond is how to think about and account for 
changes and changing conditions: not the staticness of formulated truths, but the living 
process of transformation of the self” (1994: 100). 
The Self as Creative Transcendence  
          This section aims to examine Zhuangzi’s theory of self. Having explored the 
Zhuangzian body, I want to further introduce Zhuangzi’s heart-body theory (shenxing 
guan), which is a fundamental concept that structures Zhuangzi’s philosophy of self. In 
explicating this theoretical framework, the chapter attempts to address in what ways mind 
and body form a dynamic relation between each other and how specifically Zhuangzi’s 
idea of self emerges out of this dynamic interrelation. It makes the argument that 
Zhuangzi is proposing a transcending self that not only frees itself from an ingrained 
mind-body dualism, but also aims for creation in new living experiences. In addition, the 
chapter explores why Zhuangzi’s self is political by explaining how it is connected with 
the idea of freedom in Zhuangzi’s theory.  
           The heart-body relation constitutes the core of Zhuangzi’s Daoist cosmology and 
is frequently visited and revisited throughout the text. It is fair to say that one major 
purpose of Zhuangzi’s writing was to restore the Daoist understanding of heart-body 
relation as an alternative prescription to cure the corrupted politics that had been 
	  	  
74	  
rampaging throughout the country. First, for Zhuangzi, the term “mind” possesses a 
rather peripheral position and is reduced to a derivative of the more important concept of 
heart (xin). Put it another way, what matters here is not a knowing mind that always aims 
to pursue and capture the outside world; rather, it is the heart that is truly of central 
concern for Zhuangzi. According to Zhuangzi, the heart is a sense of intuitiveness that 
helps us maintain a balanced relation with the grand Dao. What is noteworthy here is that 
the heart cannot be understood simply as a human organ with significantly important 
physical function to sustain our lives. Instead, the heart is a central hub where 
physiological, psychological, sensational and emotional forces within our body converge 
and conflate into one major stream of energy. It includes but is certainly not an exclusive 
equivalent of mind. For Zhuangzi, the heart has its intrinsic agency as an intuitive sense 
of balance. It receives and congregates the energy forces flowing through the whole body 
and responds with its intuitive adjustment and regulation. The heart acts in a way that is 
comparable to how the traditional Chinese medicine nurtures our health. The similarity 
shared by both is their holistic view in approaching life as life is most fruitfully nourished 
when all forces running through our body (physiological, psychological, sensational, etc.) 
are taken together as an inseparable whole. Unlike the western medicine that pinpoints 
certain specific parts in our body for treatment, the Chinese life-nurturing (yangsheng) 
emphasizes the wellbeing of the whole, whose stake is held at the balance of the heart. 
Reflecting on this respect, Farquhar and Zhang (2012) interpret life and life-nurturing in 
the traditional Chinese sense as a process, an emergence both manifold in its diversity 
and rooted in a nature that is dynamic” (12). In this sense, no one single force should 
predominantly prevail to take over and disturb the balance of the heart as it is maintained 
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by the both its diversity such that each energy force earns an equal share with other forces 
in a dynamic relationship. 
          As Zhuangzi puts it, “Rather than listen with the ear, listen with the heart. Rather 
than listen with the heart, listen with the energies. Listening stops at the ear, the heart at 
what tallies with the thought” (Graham, chap4, 2001: 68). Zhuangzi relies on the agency 
of the heart to gather the energies from every part of the body and processes them with its 
intuitiveness. “Listen with energies” means listen with close attentiveness to a multitude 
of forces within the heart without it being distracted by only one particular kind of 
sensational organ (e.g., ears). Being the intersection of various flowing energies, the heart, 
via its intuitiveness, enables the senses to run into each other so as to make up a 
synthesized and yet constantly changing oneness. Nevertheless, being tallied with thought 
does not in any sense mean that Zhuangzi endows the heart with privileged position of 
any kind such that it dominates and controls the whole process. Here, thought in fact only 
refers to the intuitive activity of the heart, its ability of spontaneity in receiving and 
congregating a variety of energy forces into an indivisible wholeness. In one word, the 
Zhuangzian heart acts but never predominates. In Ma Yun (2008)’s interpretation, 
Zhuangzi’s heart is even a capacity, a rational capacity that oftentimes leads to its own 
judgment. While Ma is certainly correct that the heart is a kind of capacity inherent to 
itself as an active agent, he inevitably falls into the pitfall by claiming that this capacity is 
inherently rational as for Zhuangzi the heart does not act without presupposed rationality. 
In fact, the Zhuangzian heart is actively spontaneous, coordinating across a manifold of 
energy forces in its balance without determining the patterns and directions of their flow. 
It should also be pointed out that the heart acts like the grand Dao whose life is invested 
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in all sorts of continuous and ongoing processes, it is persistently dynamic such that each 
energy force is appropriately enlivened to its full vitality while never being predominant 
at any given moment. Should its balance and amorphousness be disturbed, the heart 
would unavoidably end up with malfunction. In Zhuangzi’s terminology, chengxin, or 
completed heart, is in fact the result of an unbalanced heart that is formed with static and 
inert shape and that starts to discriminate. “But if you go by the completed heart and take 
it as your authority, who is without such an authority,” writes Zhuangzi (Graham, chap 2, 
2001: 51). For Zhuangzi, chengxin means a biased heart that has already deviated away 
from its balance, indulging itself in ingrained prejudice. It is a form of intensification that 
aims to create authority and breaks apart intuitiveness. Therefore, Graham’s 
interpretation of the heart as “an organ of thought” is not precise (Graham, chap 2, 2001: 
51). The Zhuangzian heart is not a willful thought but a kind of intuitive awareness 
intrinsic to the agency of the heart—a blandness of xu which, instead of intensifying, 
balances out various flows of energy across the body without conscious thinking. With 
this understanding of the heart in mind, we can now have a better knowledge of 
Zhuangzi’s mind-body theory. As mentioned above, the heart, in Zhuangzi’s philosophy, 
is a concept fundamentally different from the mind for the former comes with a more 
holistic view as a contrast to the latter.  
         In Zhuangzi’s heart-body relation, the body assumes a quite distinctive role. For 
Zhuangzi, the body of the Dao should never be viewed as an obstacle for the heart to 
surpass and overcome. The body per se is not an intrinsic disturbance to the balance of 
the heart. Instead, the heart needs the body with both its spontaneity and dispossession to 
be the provider of necessary energy force. What is key to this interrelation between the 
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heart and the body is that the latter must remain bland by being deprived of divided and 
intensified bodily senses because they can disturb the balance of the heart. As Zhuangzi 
writes, “Remain sure in actionless action, and all things will then transform themselves. 
Reject your body, throw out hearing and eyesight, forget that you are anyone, become 
one with the Vast and the Void” (Palmer, chap 11, 2006: 88). What Zhuangzi rejects is 
not body itself but rather a body that is distracted by certain intensified senses such that it 
no longer roams with spontaneous amorphousness—it is trapped in concretized forms. As 
Zhuangzi suggests, this happens when body begins to discriminate, judge and favor, 
which is exactly how Hundun (Chaos) dies: 
        The Emperor of the South Sea as Fast, the Emperor of the North Sea was Furious, the  
         Emperor of the centre was Hundun. Fast and Furious met from time to time in the land of  
         Hundun, who treated them very generously. Fast and Furious were discussing how to repay  
         Hundun’s bounty.  
         “All men have seven holes through which they look, listen, eat, breathe, he alone doesn’t  
         have any. Let’s try boring them.” Every day they bored one hole, and on the seventh day,  
         Hundun died (Graham, chap 7, 2001: 98) 
 
The division of Hundun’s body into various organs with each responsible for one 
particular sensation in fact corrupts a body of grand Dao as the body no longer retains its 
unity as an intuitive, indivisibly changing plateau. Forgetting about the body, for 
Zhuangzi, does not mean a permanent alienation of the body itself. Instead, it means an 
estrangement of a self-centered body that indulges itself in certain intensified pleasure 
and is indifferent to the dynamic interrelationship with the heart so as to make it difficult 
for the heart to achieve constant balance. Forget-the-body is a mode of transformation, 
through which both the heart and the body get elevated in a balanced mutual relation. 
Therefore, Zhuangzi’s heart-body theory is not so much a reproach of the body as an 
adjustment of the reciprocal relation between the two. The heart and the body are thus in 
a horizontal relation with each other. 
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         Zhuangzi’s heart-body theory is fundamentally different from the mind-body 
dichotomy of Descartes. In Descartes’ framework, the mind-body dichotomy consists of 
two aspects. First, in Meditations, Descartes is positing a mind that is complete and 
substantive. The Cartesian mind is above and beyond all that senses (e.g., body) as an 
idea that doubts, understands, wills and thinks to its full capacity. Descartes’ mind is not 
only cognizant of the outside to ascertain that it thinks but also ensure the existence of the 
thinking mind. For Descartes, the mind cognizes the outside through chains of 
causality—the former being the cause of the latter, or vice versa. As Rozemond rightly 
observes, Descartes is suggesting that “An adequate idea of the mind contains knowledge 
of everything pertaining to it; a complete idea only enough to see that the mind (as a 
thinking thing) is a complete things, a substance” (Rozemond 2012: 138). The mind is an 
intellect, as Descartes himself would see it, capable of assuring its existence by being 
perceptive. Therefore, body in this relation to the Cartesian mind resembles an 
unavoidable alienation, unanimous in all areas of its presence. Body is a confined 
enclosure: “by ‘body,’ I understand all that is capable of being bounded by some shape, of 
being enclosed in a place, and of filling up a space in such a way as to exclude any other 
body from it; of being perceived by touch, sight, hearing, taste, or smell; of being moved 
in several ways, not, of course, by itself, but by whatever else impinges upon in” 
(Descartes 1993: 19). In this Cartesian mind-body dualism, the body is dependent, and its 
existence is even in doubt absent the thinking mind. Contrary to the thinking mind as an 
intellect, the body is passive and at best responsive to “what else impinges on it.” Thus, 
the essence of this mind-body dichotomy is located in the dualism between mind as 
enlightenment, body a limit.  
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            However, on the other hand, there also exists a unity between the mind and body 
in the Cartesian framework. That is, as a dependent, the body is subsumed under the mind 
to be both the interior and exterior extensions of the thinking mind. In Descartes’ 
example of wax, the wax is by no means perceived through senses, in a way that Hume 
and Locke would perhaps see it. Instead, it is perceived through the particular kind of 
“sensing” of the body that is nothing but thinking. Put it another way, without thinking, 
there is virtually no sensing. In Descartes’ own words: “But I need to realize that the 
perception of wax is neither a seeing, nor a touching, nor an imagining. Nor has it ever 
been, even though it previously seemed so; rather it is an inspection on the part of the 
mind alone” (Descartes 1993: 22). For Descartes, the unity is precisely formed by a 
privileged mind that understands and leads all senses by empowering the bodily sensing 
through its ability to think. The implication of this Cartesian mind-body dualism for the 
creating of selfhood is that self is constituted by a thinking I who is not only self-standing 
but also self-sufficient, capable of reasoning—“I am therefore precisely nothing but a 
thinking thing, that is, a mind, or intellect, or understanding, or reason…” (Descartes 
1993: 19). 
           Contra Descartes’ hierarchical structure of the mind-body dualism, Zhuangzi’s 
heart-body relation is horizontally based in its composition of self. The difference of the 
two is illustrated in the following figure.  
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Figure 3.1 The self-body dimensions 
 
Clearly, for Descartes, the self is a consequence of a perpendicular continuation of the 
mind in this hierarchical relation. In this relation, the mind penetrates the body and 
assimilates it into its realm of thinking, making the Cartesian self a metaphysical concept 
of being. It exists only as an extension of the thinking mind. It is a self that thinks, doubts, 
questions, and distinguishes. Hence, a relation of causality is very distinct in Descartes’ 
structure. But Zhuangzi’s self is very different. The Zhuangzian self is a creative 
transcendence through dynamic interrelation between the heart and the body. As 
demonstrated in the figure, this process of interaction involves a two-dimensional 
proceeding. First, Zhuangzi emphasizes that instead of dominating the body, the heart 
listens to the body, and it feels the impulse and rhythm of the body when the energy force, 
qi, choreographed in a variety of ways, runs through it. As mentioned earlier, “listen with 
energy” exactly means that the agency of the heart gets activated by listening to the 
energy of the body. In addition, the body, in its mode of blandness and indeterminacy, is 
also cultivated by the balanced heart in return. Being dispossessed and spontaneous 
suggest the inherent agency of the body in getting the most out of its interrelation with 
the balanced heart. Therefore, it is important to stress at this point that, for Zhuangzi, the 
self does not emerge in either side of the heart or the body. In other words, neither can 
determine the composition of the self alone. The Zhuangzian self is a result of the 
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perpetual relation between the heart and the body rather than an effect of either side. Put 
it another way, the self is born out of the dynamics of this reciprocal relation, a product of 
the ongoing in-betweenness. The self is creative and transcending. In the following 
paragraphs, I want to continue to explain how Zhuangzi’s self is configured through the 
dynamics of this in-betweenness. 
          Prior to a further examination of Zhuangzi’s self, there are two important concepts 
that need to be clarified—I (youwo) and no-I (wuwo). First, for Zhuangzi, the I is always 
an illusory consciousness, constructed as a result of one-way flow of power relation 
between the heart and the body. In this case, instead of a mutual two-directional exchange, 
the heart either dominates the body in its full capacity, or vice versa, turning the process 
into a singular enclosure. Under this circumstance, the I is formed in this unilateral 
relation with itself alone—positioning the selfhood solely upon the outward expansion of 
the I and hence rendering any exchange of energies unworkable. This self-expansive I, 
according to Zhuangzi, shuts itself off to a changing, morphing and positional 
environment and pumps its complete energy out of either a static, supreme idea or a 
lonely, isolated body that is fully steeped in sensational intensifications. Thus, the heart 
and the body no longer converge. Deriving from this I, the self begins to know, to judge 
and to distinguish. It is a close-off that rejects mutual becoming and transformation; and 
it is instead fond of constructing all sorts of lines and boundaries between us and them, 
friend and enemy, good and evil, men and women, citizen and terrorists, police and 
criminal, patriot and traitor, or heterosexual and homosexual. Zhuangzi’s example of “the 
praying mantis” is an example par excellence: 
         Don’t you know about the praying mantis? It will wave its arms furiously and stand bang 
          in the middle of a rut, it doesn’t know that the weight of the wheel is too much for its  
          strength. This is because the stuff it’s made of is too noble. Be alert, on guard! If you  
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          confront him with something accumulating in you which takes pride in your own nobility,     
          you won’t last long (Graham, chap 4, 2001: 72) 
 
The tragic praying mantis is an excellent example of how a dislocated and fractured I 
would be destructive. For Zhuangzi, the problem of the praying mantis is the 
intensification of a closed self that has been swelling in the heart and the body of the 
insect. The reciprocal communication between the heart and the body is disrupted as each 
engages in the world of its own. The heart is no longer a balanced state while the body is 
obsessed with the conquering heart. The mantis’ self is a self that wills and conquers in 
the fate of relentless destruction. It is thus ultimately invasive and would without doubt 
inevitably meet its doom. “The praying mantis here could be a Promethean figure,” as 
Perkins insightfully observes, “asserting its own power to defy he gods while inevitably 
being crushed for that defiance…These figures of defiance are undeniably attractive, 
even the soon to be flattened praying mantis, but in the Zhuangzi, they are not heroes but 
tragic fools, both stupid and comic” (Perkins 2011: 80). As Perkins continues to point out, 
the contrasting figure of the praying mantis is the flying butterfly who “goes happily with 
even the most radical transformation” (Perkins 2011: 81). 
          Contrary to the praying mantis, the butterfly dispossesses itself as no-I. In 
Zhuangzi’s philosophy, no-I is an ideal state of chaos (hundun) wherein energies of 
vitality flow freely and spontaneously between the heart and the body in maintaining 
their status of xu. This is a bland, incomplete and indeterminate state where every 
encounter among the energies not only helps the heart to achieve a prolonged balance but 
also enables the body to morph and transform in ways that are not yet determined. In one 
word, no-I is the condition by which both the heart and the body are retrieved back into 
the state of xu where the self, born in this reciprocity, is structureless and aimless, like an 
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amorphous and chaotic vacuum, unfilled and yet all-inclusive at the same time. In 
Zhuangzi’s words: 
          The essence of the perfect Tao is hidden in darkness, lost in silence. Nothing seen; nothing     
           heard. Embrace the spirit in quietness, the body with its own rightness. Be still, be pure, do  
           not make your body struggle, do not disturb your essence. All this will result in a long life.  
           The eyes do not see, the ear does not hear, the heart knows nothing, yet your spirit will  
           guard your body and your body will have a long life (Palmer, chap 11, 2006: 86) 
 
Here, the heart and the body are no longer ambitious in being externally invasive. Rather, 
they withdraw themselves into a pluralist wholeness, a vigorously vibrating whole that is 
made up of countless interdependent relations that connect “the ten thousand things.” The 
self produced by the no-I, therefore, is a dilution of a cluster of enclosed and self-
centered I, rendering them scattered, discrete, formless and unworkable. To say the no-I 
is an ideal state of chaos is exactly to mean it is such a pluralist cosmos, both spatially 
and temporally, that positioning the self in any fixed location is virtually impossible. 
Thanks to the no-I, the heart and the body successfully elude forms of essensialization, 
for they can be no more defined with concrete substance. However, Zhuangzi’s no-I must 
not in any respect be read as an example of nihilism. Commenting on the no-I, Wang is 
certainly correct in saying that, “While it transcends the closure of self, it does not 
attempt to annihilate all individual lives. It merely opens their closure and leads them to 
the authenticity of life that precisely lies in the absence of the distinction between self 
and other” (Wang 2000: 355).  
          Zhuangzi’s statement that “all things live as one” (wanwu qiyi) entails the 
perception of the no-I as an ideal state in which the chaos has reached a perfect balance 
of transformation. This process of transformation is called de-I (quwo), which is a 
perpetually recurring course by which the I gets deconstructed and dissolved. Here, the 
story of Cook Ding is illustrative. The Lord Wen-hui was deeply impressed by the cook’s 
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very fine skill in carving and dissembling an ox. In replying the Lord’s compliment, 
Cook Ding says: 
“What your servant cares about is the Way, I have left skill behind me. When I first  
began to carve oxen, I saw nothing but oxen wherever I looked. Three years more and I  
never saw an ox as a whole. Nowadays, I am in touch through the daemonic in me, and   
do not look with the eye. With the senses I know where to stop, the daemonic I desire to  
run its course. I rely on Heaven’s structuring, cleave along the main seams, let myself be  
guided by the main cavities, go by what is inherently so. A ligament or tendon I never  
touch, not to mention solid bone. A good cook changes his chopper once a year, because  
he hacks. A common cook changes it once a month, because he smashes. Now I have had  
this chopper for nineteen years, and have taken apart several thousand oxen, but the edge 
is as though it were fresh from the grindstone (Graham, chap 3, 2001: 64) 
 
The very fine skill that the cook employs is a demonstration of the course by which he 
learns to integrate himself into the oxen through repetitions of practice until he eventually 
finds that “at that joint there is an interval, and the chopper’s edge has no thickness; if 
you insert what has no thickness where there is ample room to move the edge about” 
(Graham 2001: 84). The moment when the cook finds the intervals inside the oxen’s 
bodies, he disassembles without looking at them: he has successfully grasped the Dao of 
the body, his movement guided by the bland heart. This is a state of no-I whereby the 
cook wanders freely inside the body of the oxen. But what truly matters here is the 
process of de-I, through which the cook gradually learns to deviate from a conquering 
self that forms an outwardly invasive subject in order to possess and control. The reason 
why the ordinary cooks change their chopper every month is because they are 
overwhelmed by the conquering self that is only fond of going against the body. They are 
essentially the parallel of the tragic praying mantis who is ignorant of the fact that the 
body should never be treated for the joy of conquering. 
        For Zhuangzi, de-I is a repetition, an ongoing practice; in one word, it is a habit. It is 
a habitual act that renders the processes of deconstructing the I and becoming the no-I 
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perpetually incessant. What occurs during this process is a creative Zhuangzian self that 
takes apart the I and transforms its fragmentary segments into the constituents of the no-I. 
Due to the pluralist nature of the latter, the dissolved I has now engaged in act of 
multiplying itself by a variety of ways and in a variety of new forms. The I has become 
formless because it is already endowed with a manifold of forms and shapes; it has 
become unrecognizable because it has already been deconstructed into numerous new 
and different faces. This habitual act of de-I is a limitless and autonomous event that does 
not come with definite origin and end. It is an infinite process of change and becoming 
without spatial and temporal boundaries. The habit of de-I means I (as a transformed self) 
am not a butcher whose only goal is to smash the oxen into pieces against all odds, but 
rather an artist who, by forgetting myself, listens to the rhythm of the body and create 
something new. Against essentialized notion of selfhood, Zhuangzi proposes that it is 
habit who occupies us, rather than we them. It is by no means a form of mechanism. On 
the contrary, it is a process about the creative, the new through action. Here, Zhuangzi 
resonates with Grosz. In Grosz’ line, “Habit marks our mode of engagement with and 
transformation by the real; and this is quite precisely a measure of the extent to which the 
real is itself transformed by living beings” (Grosz 2013: 218). Habit, in this sense, is a 
mutual engagement between the living things and their environment, or cohesion, as 
Grosz would put it, “between the living beings’ activities and its milieu.” The stake of 
this habitual reciprocity lies in its two-way transformation between I as a living thing and 
many other living beings such as plants and animals that surround us. Not only do we 
affect the surrounding environment, but we are also internalizing what the environment 
has to offer for us such that a fixed and firm I is untenable. Therefore, Grosz would call 
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the process of de-I an intuitive and organic habit of transformation and becoming. Thus, 
the Zhuangzian self, emerged in the process of de-I, is a flowing and transforming self 
that can never be settled into pre-organized structures. 
The Zhuangzian Freedom 
          Zhuangzi’s idea of self has profound implication for our understanding of freedom. 
Through the configuration of the self, Zhuangzi brings up his very distinctive concept of 
freedom. For Zhuangzi, freedom is deeply implicated in the process of de-I, wherein the 
self is composed spontaneously as the heart maintains its balance with the dispossessed 
body. The self constantly forms and re-forms as a creative reaction to the changing 
environment. It immerses itself inwardly in new experiences and engages a process of 
involution to internalize those experiences obtained through its becoming of the outside 
world. Outwardly, the self is also affective in rearranging without organizing the world in 
its very chaotic state. Therefore, freedom in Zhuangzi’s view is precisely a capacity in 
maintaining this spontaneous course in which the self is constructed. It is not defined by 
how much liberty one can enjoy in exercising his/her free will in satisfying the egoist 
desire but by the extent to which one is able to keep and make the most out of this 
spontaneity. In this sense, freedom does not necessarily mean being free in a very literal 
sense of the term. On the contrary, it refers to a kind of unfreedom through which we are 
bound by “what should I do” rather than “what I want to do.” The difference is that while 
the latter indicates a certain unencountered self that wills and acts independently in its 
absolute freedom, the former can be considered as a form of obligation that understands 
to be self-restraint.  
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            Zhuangzi opposes the self that is immanent to Mill’s sovereign individualism. 
What comes as most important in constituting Mill’s freedom is “the inward domain of 
consciousness; demanding liberty of conscience, in the most comprehensive sense” (Mill 
2008: 16). For Zhuangzi, such rights-based self is problematic, confining individuals in 
bubbles of self-enclosure so as to create defensive separation between individuals and 
their living environment. Thus, as Zhuangzi may see it, Mill’s liberty is a unitary 
involution whose centrality is located in a self that is unencountered. In the same vein, 
John Dewey reflects on the crisis of the laissez faire liberalism by pointing out that 
liberalism is particularly weak in accounting for collective actions and organizations: “the 
beliefs and methods of earlier liberalism were ineffective when faced with the problems 
of social organization and integration. Their inadequacy is a large part of belief now so 
current that all liberalism is an outmoded doctrine” (2000: 37). We as social individuals, 
argues Dewey, need organizations because they give us inner fulfillment and enrichment 
that cannot be satisfied by inalienable rights alone. Democracy as represented by 
universal suffrage lacks an education of the spirit of democracy and freedom (e.g., the 
purpose and process of voting rather than voting itself), which is essentially another form 
of enslavement and mechanization. What Dewey is calling for is a sense of 
interdependence in conceiving of liberty in the context of history. Like Dewey, being free 
for Zhuangzi also means that no one is completely free in standing above and beyond 
everything; being free for Zhuangzi means the recognition of the self that is composed as 
a result of interdependence rather than a self-standing and self-sufficient “free will.” In 
other words, the self is contextualized. It is an awareness of the fact that not only does the 
self transform “the ten thousand things,” but it is also transformed by them. Even though 
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the Zhuangzian self is spontaneous and intuitive, it is so in a manner that appreciates 
mutual becoming such that I am also obliged to “the ten thousand things” that make up of 
me. I am, therefore, not myself. To certain extent, Zhuangzi’s self reflects that of 
Alaistair MacIntyre who proposes that self should be understood in a set of various and 
interconnected narratives which positions the composition of the self in a manifold of 
interrelations between my story and others’ stories. As MacIntyre writes, “I spoke earlier 
of the agent as not only an actor, but an author. Now I must emphasize that what the 
agent is able to do and say intelligibly as an actor is deeply affected by the fact that we 
are never more (and sometimes less) than the co-authors of our own narratives” (1984: 
135). Echoing Zhuangzi, MacIntyre rejects the idea that attempts to break the 
construction of selfhood into pieces of separate and isolated events of fracture so much so 
that the self is only reduced to unconnected episodes. In this regard, Zhuangzi is 
proposing a de-politicizing way to approach politics. Politics, for Zhuangzi, should by no 
means be confined within its traditional milieu of institutional procedures—voting and 
representative democracy are, put it another way, far from enough in cultivating a healthy 
and diversified political self. Rather, politics should be extended beyond its conventional 
realm of institutionalization to include more excluded fields, events and actants to enrich 
the indeterminate reciprocal relations between political agent and their living 
environment. The Zhuangzian freedom means not only the recognition but also the 
enactment of those ever-changing new political relations in the making of the selfhood in 
a multitude of related contexts. 
          Zhuangzi has a specific name for this freedom—xiaoyao (roaming free). In his 
praise of Liezi, another renowned Daoist thinker, Zhuangzi writes, “As for the man who 
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rides a true course between heaven and earth, with changes of the Six Energies for his 
chariot, to travel into the infinite, is there anything that he depends on? As the saying 
goes, the utmost man is selfless, the daemonic man takes no credit for his deeds, the Sage 
is nameless” (Graham, chap 1, 2001: 44-45). For Zhuangzi, Liezi is a man of xiaoyao, 
who learned to dissolve himself into the changing vicissitudes of “the ten thousand 
things,” abandons the ingrained and narcissistic I through the process of de-I, and 
transforms himself into the energies of all things between the Heaven and the Earth. As 
Carl Dull puts it, this free roaming is applied to “both the wellbeing of the xin as well as 
the manner in which people (or animals) should learn to navigate the changing patterns of 
a world in constant flux” (2012: 223). What should be further emphasized here is that 
Zhuangzi’s xiaoyao is by no means an ideal state which represents just the opposite side 
of the I. Rather, it is a continuous event, highlighted in a manifold of interrelated 
incidents that concern the in-betweenness in the self’s transformation from I to no-I. It is 
infinitely close to, and yet never able to reach the ideal state of the no-I. In other words, 
unlike many previous interpretations who approach Zhuangzi’s xiaoyao as an ideal 
daemonic state, my examination focuses on the concept’s dynamic nature as a process on 
the go—a never ending and repetitive occurrence of transformation and becoming.  
          In this light, Zhuangzi’s xiaoyao shares similarity with Nietzsche’s “eternal 
recurrence.” Isn’t the “eternal recurrence” a mode of Nietzschean self-transformation? 
Isn’t bodily permanent transformation the incarnation of Nietzsche’s principle of the Way 
(the Dao)? “Everything goes, everything comes back; the wheel of being rolls eternally. 
Everything dies, everything blossoms again, the year of being runs eternally. Everything 
breaks, everything is joined anew; the same house of being builds itself eternally. 
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Everything parts, everything greets itself again; the ring of being remains loyal to itself 
eternally” (Nietzsche 2006: 175). For Nietzsche, eternal recurrence is an infinite 
extension of occurrence wherein selves turn themselves into strangers from previous 
selves and start to probe into each other. It is not an eternal return of the same. Rather, it 
is perpetual recurrence of something new, something different, through a cluster of 
occurrences whereby things “break and are joined anew” with themselves. Like xiaoyao, 
it is also a process of creative transformation. Freedom for Nietzsche means a self who 
wills freely to intensify itself and the power it possesses in enforcing this self-
transformation. However, Nietzsche and Zhuangzi also differ from each other. For the 
former, “I myself belong to the causes of the eternal recurrence” (178). But for the latter, 
this cause of mutual transformation relies more on its interdependence with others. Thus, 
looking from this perspective, the Zhuangzian freedom is a self that roams freely among 
“the ten thousand things” without being constrained and limited by a determining I. The 
body is no longer an obstacle but an opportunity, and the heart is free from 
intensifications. In Tao Jiang’s interpretation, xiaoyao means “…all our sense organs are 
perfectly attuned to the way of the world such that it enables us to roam along the myriad 
creatures by acclimatizing ourselves to the world” (2012: 76).  
           In addition, it is equally crucial to underline that xiaoyao also entails the 
recognition of distinctions among various things. Mutual becoming does not in any sense 
mean the annihilation of heterogeneity so as to pursue a unified and homogenous 
universality. For Zhuangzi, this heterogeneity lies in the distinctive ways in which each 
individual engages its transformations, how the transformations may go through 
differently and what experiences it receives along the way. Violation of this rule of 
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heterogeneity will inevitably result in undesirable consequence: “A man of Sung who 
traded in ceremonial caps travelled to the Yueh tribes, but the men of Yueh who cut their 
hair short and tattoo their bodies had no use for them” (Graham, chap 1, 2001: 46). The 
embarrassment of the man indicates the tension of irreconcilability during the process of 
mutual experiencing—no two experiences are and should be alike. In this example, 
xiaoyao means to embrace the world while respecting its various distinctions. It means 
my freedom should not be forcefully imposed upon others as a universal ruling principle. 
Roaming freely, in Zhuangzi’s theory, eventually leads to a very unique Daoist 
wholeness: on the one hand, it identifies itself with a chaotic cosmos in which things 
become each other spontaneously in their own ways and with different and unexpected 
results; on the other hand, the wholeness sees itself with inherent unity that is also shared 
by all its individual members. Distinctions without difference—this is how Zhuangzi’s 
pluralism-minded xiaoyao, or freedom truly refers to. When it comes to politics, one of 
the key issues for Zhuangzi is how to deal with its plurality while on the other hand, 
retain a sense of unity. To him, the core of freedom (xiaoyao) concerns how likely one is 
able to get the most of his/her experiences in making the political in a multitude of living 
contexts through meaningful engagement with others.  
           For Zhuangzi, the making of the political does not necessitate the state. The 
political happens at substate level in everyday quotidian life because for Zhuangzi, 
politics is ultimately about transcending various binary oppositions in all aspects of our 
lives that make cross-boundary transformation impossible. As Zhuangzi would see it, 
making the political means the unsettlement of assumptions, categorizations and 
schematizations, and it allows for further investigations into the mechanisms that cement 
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institutionalized boundaries and lines. It necessarily involves the self as creative 
transcendence in inviting for more possibilities of engagement. In the making of the 
political, Zhuangzi’s freedom even carries certain moral implications, for one is obliged 
to take obligations as a member of a given community, a citizen of a state, or a caregiver 
of a family. It is a statement that we are not who we are, but who we become. 
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Chapter 4: Memory and Body: Reexamining the Politics of Mao’s 
Cultural Revolution 
   The more you want to tell the truth, the more disruption you will have. I desperately 
find it is just impossible to restore reality. Memory is always changed and masked by my 
emotion, betraying and making fun of me, leaving me frustrated and confused. 
                                                                 —Ma Xiaojun, In the Heat of the Sun (1994) 
Introduction 
    The aim of this chapter is to re-examine the politics of the Cultural Revolution. It 
seeks to discuss the molding of Mao’s revolutionary subject as such by closely looking at 
how the memory interact intimately with the body to reinforce the party-state’s writing of 
the its grand historical narrative of class struggle. The chapter explores in what ways the 
political image of class struggle is projected by the state through the manipulated relation 
between the memory and body. It discuses the case of the Bo Xilai incident as an 
example to show how and why the memory is a forbidden area that is enclosed within the 
party’s red line. The chapter also introduces Zhuangzi’s idea of xu to explore how the 
memory and body may find themselves in alternative relations with each other to 
introduce new power relations. It explicates the concept to find out how Zhuangzi’s 
philosophy helps us reevaluate memory and body as well as their political implication for 
a particular mode of politics—the politics of indeterminacy. Drawing on this idea, the 
chapter then proceeds to reinvestigate the Revolution by way of an analysis of the 
indeterminate relation between the memory and body to suggest that despite the party-
state’s red line, different modes of politics prevails and makes the Revolution itself even 
more ambiguous.  
   This chapter attempts to show that the politics of the Cultural Revolution is 
premised on the intimate interplay between memory and body where the project of 
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political identity composition was deployed mnemonically through physical embodiment 
of class struggle. The core of the Cultural Revolution is the molding of revolutionary 
identity as the constitutive of the unified revolutionary discourse through the mutual 
compliance between the memory and body. In the Maoist revolutionary discourse, the 
memory is charged with political functions. The memory is by no means a result of fluid 
streams of remembrance that freely composes one’s recollection of the past. Rather, it is 
molded as such under the strict surveillance of the state and bears the political duty of 
policing the boundary between what should be remembered and what should not. Its 
revolutionary function is particularly empowered when the body is no longer obscure in 
its absolute support of memory. The memory endorsed by Mao’s revolutionary politics is 
greatly strengthened when in loyal compliance with the body—their close mutual 
reinforcement consolidates the foundation of the Revolution. The intermingling of the 
memory and body as such helps the state to distinguish enemy from friend by identifying 
the categories of their bodies. While one type of body takes on the role of ideal 
revolutionary body, its opposite is degraded as the deviant and cursed, condemned by the 
revolutionary discourse. The partition of the body is facilitated with the help of a 
recurring memory that is frequently invoked to reinforce the division. The division of 
friend versus enemy, where the essence of class struggle lies, is hence consolidated as a 
result of distinguishing one type of body from another through memory. Yet, Mao’s 
revolutionary logic never goes unchallenged. The seemingly well-established political 
landscape based on the interplay between the memory and body can be alternatively 
approached from the perspective of Zhuangzi’s theory of xu—a particular mode of 
politics based on indeterminate power relation and power structure. For Zhuangzi, xu 
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embraces incompleteness. It not only fragments the memory and body, but also disrupts 
the predetermined relation between them. Xu turns both parties into nomadic agents, 
changing and indeterminate as they may be, powerful and tenacious without ever being 
contained. As a result, the memory and body no longer cooperate; instead, they end up in 
relations of indifference and apathy, which leave them with many indeterminate 
possibilities for change. Previous cooperative relation then collapses and is ultimately 
replaced by tension. With the breakdown of previous intimacy, the memory and body, 
now caught in indeterminacy, transform politics from rectification to contestation. From 
this point of view, identity gets recomposed within an indeterminate zone—a political 
arena in which the memory and body are entangled in the absence of presupposition, a 
site where power contestation cannot be settled.     
The Bo Xilai Incident and the Forbidden Memory 
     On September 22 2013, Bo Xilai, the former communist party secretary of 
Chongqing and a high-raking party official, was sentenced to life imprisonment as he was 
found guilty of corruption and abuse of power. The crackdown of Bo symbolizes the 
downfall of the recent revival of Maoism in China—a leftist movement that is largely 
based on the worship of Mao and the reminiscence of the Mao era. Ostensibly, the 
dismissal of Bo is a showcase of the party’s determined fight against corruption. 
However, behind the veneer there is an intense political struggle over the memory of the 
red era—an era of Maoist social movement culminated at the peak of the Cultural 
Revolution. On the side of the state, the historical position of Mao’s Cultural Revolution 
has been officially evaluated and allows for no alternation. The danger of Bo, for the 
party, is not so much his indiscretion but his rising popularity built on a mass social 
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movement of memory reconstruction that threatens the unity of the party-state—an issue 
of life and death the party learned from the crisis of the 1989 Tiananmen pro-democracy 
protest—by manipulating the public’s memory of the Revolution. To further understand 
the grave danger of Bo, we need to look more closely at how the party-state views its 
relation with respect to history and memory. 
    In fact, the Chinese political elites have a long tradition of legitimizing their power 
through historical justifications. The writing of the official history of each dynasty not 
only records what is permitted to be passed down in the official account but more 
importantly grounds the power of the dynasties in the long stream of the country’s 
political history. The official account of the dynastic history in China is so important that 
no ruler in the history can afford to pass it casually (one good example is the 
incarceration of Sima Qian, whose monumental work the Records of the Grand Historian 
enraged the Wu Emperor of Han for its low appraisal of the emperor). The Chinese 
Communist Party is no exception. It carries this political lineage with yet even more 
ambitious historical goal and task, which is that the party is a historically justified and 
progressive force to lead the country and its people to the glorious end of the history—
communism. The official historiography takes a variety of forms in educating and 
reminding the people of the “approved” past. For example, Hung’s study of the 
establishment of the Museum of the Chinese Revolution in 1961 suggests that the way in 
which the Museum is designed and built reflects the party’s red line on how the writing 
of the history should be supervised. The Museum is not a mere artistic enterprise; rather it 
symbolizes the “an intricate amalgam of political supervision from the top, official 
historical interpretations, strategic display…” and “the attempt by the CCP to control the 
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collective memory of the nation…” (2005: 914). The state sponsored narrative of history 
penetrates into every aspect of the social/cultural life in China to assume the function of 
political propaganda. Besides rule legitimacy, more at stake, for the party, is the way in 
which the writing of history can be manipulated to censor the public’s memory. This is 
particularly true in the post-Mao era in which value vacuum is pervasive, left by the 
demise of the Marxism. In order to retain its political effect of rally-around-the-flag, the 
state more than ever relies on the unification of the approved grand historical narrative to 
not only places itself at the helm of the country’s progress but also exercise its 
surveillance upon the construction of the public memory.  
    The memory is an effective and powerful weapon in the party’s repertoire of 
propaganda tools. Its political function mainly consists of molding political subjects that 
are submissive to the rule of the party-state’s ideological regime. The rising Chinese 
nationalism against Japan in recent years is illustrative of the fact that the party’s memory 
construction has successfully generated profound implication for the Chinese society 
today. Slogans like “wuwang guochi” (never forget national humiliation) and “yiku 
sitian” (recalling the bitter past to appreciate the sweet present) are frequently used 
tactics to be repeated in the state’s patriotic education in order to breed generations of 
patriots who loyally subscribe to the party-state’s political agenda. To remember also 
means to forget. The public memory is crafted by way of selection. In observing the 
party’s memory control during the Mao era, Béja suggests that individual’s memory is so 
politically charged that it is not even contestable in family life:  
         “The Party was so keen on controlling the minds of citizens, especially the youths, that it 
made it quasi-impossible for people to transmit their personal ideas and memories to their 
heirs even inside the family. If the family head’s political attitude coincided with the 
official one, he would encourage his children to become activists with all his strength. 
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Otherwise, the great majority would adopt an attitude encouraging their sons and 
daughters to follow the official line, for the sake of their children’s future, and in many 
cases, people were afraid that if they expressed their anti- official attitude, they could be 
denounced by their children. And in fact, there were many instances when children trace 
the line of demarcation from their parents (huaqing jiexian). Besides the fact that when a 
person became the target of a movement, his (her) spouse divorced him (her) so as not to 
be considered counter-revolutionary too. Those who refused to do so never talked about 
the husband (wife) who had been labeled a reactionary, and often sent to the countryside 
for re-education, if not to jail. They especially refrained from presenting his (her) ideas 
objectively to their children so that they could judge by themselves. Pressure was such 
that even inside the warmth of a home, family members resorted to official discourse 
when talking to each other. People would use newspaper language to refer to the ‘crimes’ 
of their spouses so that children would not ‘make mistake’ when going to school”  (Béja, 
2003: 8) 
The dissolve of the boundary between the public and the private is enacted powerfully by 
the state’s engineering of the memory. Under the surveillance of the state, the memory is 
statically pinned on the written history of the People’s Republic and enjoys little room for 
change. The sole purpose of the memory, so to speak, is to place itself in seamless 
conjoining with the state’s grand historical writing to both justify the legitimacy of the 
CCP’s rule and hinder potential oppositional experiences of the history (especially at the 
individualistic level). 
    This is especially the case for the memory of such sensitive political event as the 
Cultural Revolution. When the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of 
the Communist Party was held after the end of the Cultural Revolution in 1978, it 
critically assessed the legacy of Mao and denounced the massive destruction of the 
Cultural Revolution (xinhuanet.com). The conference is viewed as a critical turning point 
of the party as it helps the party unify the historical view of Mao’s Cultural Revolution. 
In 1981, the Sixth Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the party passed 
“The Resolution on Certain Issues of the Party Since the Founding of PRC,” which 
determined the nature of Mao’s Cultural Revolution. “The Resolution” states clearly: the 
	  	  
99	  
history proved “Mao’s revolution neither conforms to the Marxism-Leninism nor accords 
with China’s actual condition. These points regarding the estimate of our country’s class 
and political conditions at that time were completely false…They eventually led to the 
gravest loss and setback of the party, the country and the people” (xinhuanet.com). “The 
Resolution” is not only the final nail of the coffin of the event but also the finalization of 
a unanimously collective decision on this particular period of history. As the party 
collectively put the final nail in the coffin of the Cultural Revolution, the message is very 
clear: the history of the Revolution should be selectively remembered as such in 
accordance with the state’s account, and any deviation from the official line is subject to 
severe punishment. Thus, here comes the crime of Bo—his political ambition in reviving 
Mao’s red culture is inevitably perceived as a threat to the unity of the party’s historical 
discourse. 
    Apparently, Bo is politically shrewd about the importance of the memory. During 
his term of office in Chongqing, Bo launched the movement of “Singing Revolutionary 
Songs, Cracking Down Crimes (Changhong Dahei).” Against the will of the party’s 
collective rule, the major purpose of this campaign was to revive and enshrine Mao’s 
revolutionary legacy charismatic authority as a response to social inequality that is 
rampant in China today. As the campaign requested, Chongqing organized a large scale 
“red culture movement” featuring public performances of red songs, broadcasting red 
tunes and airing red dramas (Figure 4.1).  
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Figure 4.1 Bo Xilai’s “Red Song” Movement. 
    The city also stepped up its security measures against crime. As Bo himself 
claimed, “singing red is rectification and cracking down crime is eliminating evil. A city 
needs both material and spiritual civilization…without them, we will be lost in direction 
and led to corruption” (takungpao.com). Yet, his campaign was not well received by 
leaders outside Chongqing. Without the approval of a unanimous higher authority, Bo’s 
ambition apparently threatened the baseline of the party’s discipline—the memory of a 
particular history, especially one with hyper political sensitivity such as the Cultural 
Revolution, should be crafted collectively by the party as a unity and allows no individual 
deviation. More importantly, Bo not only broke the taboo but also challenged the party 
discipline by usurping the party’s own traditional strategy against rivals—mass 
mnemonic movement. Where “Singing Revolutionary Songs” is a lure to publicly 
demonstrate the collective embodiment of Mao’s revolutionary spirit, “Cracking Down 
Crimes” is the stick to be brandished in front of those who dare to say no. The sin of Bo, 
for his rivals within the party, is exactly his sophisticated knowledge and savvy skills in 
manipulating the production of the public memory and steer it defiantly toward his 
private desire for more political power.  
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    As a matter of fact, Bo belongs to the “red generation” whose coming-of-age 
arrived in the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution. Bo himself was among the “red guard” 
zealots who were faithful followers of Mao’s creed of class struggle and avid participants 
of pidou (violent public humiliation and persecution of class enemies) during the 
Revolution. Those who were denounced as the enemies of the people were physically and 
psychologically tortured to be displayed to teach the people about class struggle. Pidou 
was not a simple performance. Instead, it was a significant political ritual that aimed to 
repetitively invoke the recurring memory of the party’s heroic past of revolutionary 
struggle through the public reminder of enemies’ ugly, disgraceful bodies and the 
denunciation of their identity as class enemy.  In Mao’s revolutionary politics, the body 
and memory are political. The body is mobilized and policed under the state’s control. 
And so is the memory, a similar area that the authority was not willing to loose its grip. 
Under the dominance of the state, the two interacted effectively to reinforce the state’s 
project of “the great proletarian revolution.” The boundary between the permitted and 
unpermitted was so unambiguously observed that any divergence would receive severe 
punishment. The memory, body and politics thus got tightly intertwined within each other 
during the era of the Cultural Revolution to produce the vitality of the mass social 
movement and ensure the safety of Mao’s power. What Bo and his clique inherited from 
the legacy of Mao’s Cultural Revolution is exactly the myth embedded in this relation—
an enigma that structures the very foundation of the revolutionary politics that rumbled 
across the whole country almost fifty years ago. Although Bo’s adventure did not pay off 
for him, the crackdown reveals the secrecy of the state’s insistence on extracting political 
power from the memory and body, which lasts from Mao to today. However, on the other 
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hand, Bo’s case also suggests that despite the state’s tight control, attempts to breach the 
boundaries have never been ended. Bo was not the first and will not be the last both 
inside and outside the party. However, the boundaries are never impervious as agency is 
found in memory and body in the making of contentious politics. In this sense, the two 
fields are no longer to be politicized; rather, they are the agents that initiate and sustain 
politics—they politicize. The focus of the memory and body thus gives us an alternative 
and yet important perspective in viewing the revolutionary politics. In the following 
section, I further unravel the close interrelation between the body, memory and politics 
embedded within the politics of the Cultural Revolution. 
Intensifying Class Struggle, Intensifying the Revolution 
            In 1966, Mao launched his Cultural Revolution. One major aim of the revolution 
was to re-impose the authority of Mao, but it eventually turned out to be a mass 
movement of purge that targeted those who were suspected of being unfaithful to 
socialism. The great purge spread rapidly across the country in the name of class struggle 
and led the country to tragic chaos. In Mao’s own words, “class struggle, some classes 
triumph, others are eliminated. Such is history, such is the history of civilization for 
thousands of years…A revolution is not a dinner party, or writing an essay, or painting a 
picture, or doing embroidery; it cannot be so refined, so leisurely and gentle, so temperate, 
kind, courteous, restrained and magnanimous. A revolution is an insurrection, an act of 
violence by which one class overthrows another” (Selected Works). For Mao, class 
struggle is a critical issue of life-and-death, a policing tactic whose aim is to distinguish 
enemies from friends. So is the logic of his revolutionary politics, the purpose of which is 
to identify and solidify the opposition between us and them. One of Mao’s strategies was 
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to reshape the opposing political identities by setting up the aesthetic (and of course, also 
political) division between revolutionary and reactionary bodies. Where revolutionary 
heroes are embodied in their upright and heroic looking in propaganda, class enemies—
landlords, rich peasants, reactionaries, and rightists—are portrayed in their disgraceful 
and abject bodies. If one major purpose of the revolution is the overthrow of an old 
aesthetic regime, its first task, as Wang Molin insightfully points out, is “a negation of the 
order built on the old world’s besiege of body and the establishment of a renewed world 
for the mode of body’s existence” (Wang 1996). The crackdown on the enemies’ body is 
accompanied by the eulogy of revolutionaries’ body. The politics of class struggle takes 
place in the tension between the two opposing bodies of which each is shown to represent 
its own class interest. Hence, the division of the body constitutes the heart of Mao’s class 
struggle. In Mao’s project, body is deprived of its private attribute as a lived corporeality, 
capable of self-initiating and self-illuminating. On the contrary, it is treated as pregiven, a 
raw material to be inscribed upon and a precondition for conscious political life. In this 
sense, body is not trusted with its inherent political agency. Rather, it is born to be 
political, produced and manufactured externally as such. Mao does not like the idea of the 
private body; for him, a privately operated body is unorganized, undisciplined, and worst 
of all, apolitical. It is energized by the undistinguished primitive and grows with the 
expansion of desire, posing threat to his well-structured revolutionary politics. In his eyes, 
the private body cannot be communicated politically, nor will it serve the end of the 
revolutionary politics. It only poses as a threat to the efficiency of mass social 
mobilization. That body comes under political scrutinization and should be subordinated 
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politically henceforth largely constitutes the material foundation of the Cultural 
Revolution. 
     However, the body alone is not enough.  “Carry out revolution deep down the 
soul (linghun shenchu nao geming)”—it takes something beyond the bodily sphere to 
intensify the revolution. Class struggle cannot be sufficiently achieved in the bodily 
sphere alone; what is more important, for Mao as for his followers, is to find another 
terrain politically responsive to the partition of body. One area of such is found in 
memory. In fact, the party has a long tradition of engaging in “thought work” (sixiang 
gongzuo). Of particular importance in this “thought work” campaign is the reconstruction 
of memory. While one vital part of “thought work” was anchored in the unified writing of 
the country’s history and the persuasion of the legitimacy of the party’s historical 
position, memory, however, often slips the hand of official account and dwells in 
temporal fragmentation. Unlike the incontestable official historiography, the memory 
usually hides beneath the collective historical discourse and is full of contradiction. As an 
important tool in justifying the communist revolution, the history is composed 
unanimously as a continuous project of nation-state building. The Cultural Revolution 
was counted as a sheer rupture with the country’s backward tradition—a hurdle that 
stands in the way of the country’ marching toward communist modernization. The 
rupture, as counted in official record, is a significant turning point from which China 
gains its historical motivation to move forward toward a brand new nation. Nevertheless, 
contrary to history, the memory is nevertheless different. It has its own temporal 
unfolding, and its historical trajectory refuses to be enclosed. The memory insists on its 
own route in consistently obtaining illuminations from the past, however discrete, 
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backward, or cyclical it may be. In writing the tension between history and memory in 
China, Ban Wang suggests that “In China historical discourse performs interpretations 
that are frequently antimemory and antitradition; these interpretations intervened time 
and again, in radical, revolutionary fashion, against the ‘obsolete’ tradition anchored in 
cultural memory” (2004: 6). Yet, in the eyes of the state, this tension must be eliminated 
for the purpose of the revolution. The memory has to be reconciled into the state’s 
historical discourse to ensure the success of the revolution—it has to accept and endure 
the rupture as well. The state spent an enormous amount of efforts in engineering the 
public memory into a coherent and faithful supplement to the grand historical narrative. 
According to the study of Li Lifeng (2013), in order to effectively craft the revolutionary 
memory and lock it in the minds of the peasants, the party usually used suku (outpouring 
of bitterness) as a powerful technique in transforming and shaping the individual 
peasants’ memory. As Li points out, the revolutionary memories “did not form naturally 
but resulted from purposeful shaping by the revolutionary party and the socialist state” 
(2013: 71). At the core of this memory molding is the transformation from the bitter 
memory to the revolutionary memory. The party-state selectively filtered through the 
peasants’ bitter recollection of the past in the intermingling context of class, poverty and 
revolution to evoke the sense of shared, collective experiences of exploitation among the 
peasants. “By using such effective tactics as promoting anger, fostering activists, tapping 
into awareness of consanguinity, and condemning landlords, the party and the state 
emotionalized and homogenized rural public’s memories of bitterness and integrated 
them into the grand narratives of class, revolution, liberation and nation-state” (Li, 2013: 
71). The engineering of the public memory among the masses is thus a necessary political 
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strategy that the party-state has been skillful in utilizing. Reshaping the collective and 
homogenous memory turns out to be a necessary pre-condition for the CCP state to 
inaugurate the coming of the revolutionary subjects. 
    At the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, Mao proposed to destroy the “Four 
Olds” (po sijiu)—old thought, old culture, old custom, old habit—which, as he claimed, 
had been poisoning the minds of the Chinese for thousands of years (On June 1, 1966, 
Mao wrote in his famous essay  “Sweep All the Ghosts and Monsters” that the “Four 
Olds” had been manipulated by all reactionary and exploiting class in the history to 
oppress the Chinese people). Confucius was harshly repudiated, monasteries were 
smashed, and archives of classics were burned. The political reason behind this 
movement is that, tradition, as Mao saw it, provides individuals with persistent 
illuminations in shaping the masses as nomadic subjects (without unity) through self-
initiated recollection of various traditions of village, tribe, or family. In this process, 
collective identity is hindered by tradition and falls out of the hands of the state. Instead, 
it is a function of individuals’ spontaneous self-reflection, a consequence of internal 
consciousness rooted in the traditional conventions of a set of given communities one is 
born into rather than external imposition from the party-state. Thus, erasing the intimate 
connection between the memory and tradition so as to facilitate the state’s annexation of 
the former was a necessary part of the revolutionary politics. The state resorted to various 
forms of media to propagandize its project of memory re-construction. 
     For instance, in order to better integrate both the body and memory into the 
revolutionary discourse, the party created yangban xi (model opera) as an effective 
medium in developing and promoting this integration. This particular kind of theatrical 
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form is especially good at incorporating body and its performance into not only the 
reshaping of memory but also the modeling of a new revolutionary subjectivity. Yangban 
xi was an invention of Jiang Qing, Mao’s wife, who was a fervent pursuer of power and 
one of the major initiators of the Cultural Revolution. Featuring glorified revolutionary 
heroes, yangban xi was a purposeful denunciation of traditional operas that were usually 
about emperors or kings and was condemned as feudalistic and bourgeois (there were 
eight major yangban xi produced during the Cultural Revolution, which, beside The Red 
Lantern, also included Shajiabang, Taking Mountain Tiger by Strategy, Raid on the 
White Tiger Regiment, Ode of the Dragon River, and On the Dock). In this light, I take 
The Red Lantern (Hongdeng Ji) as an example par excellence to help illustrate.  
     The Red Lantern (1970) tells a story of a communist family’s underground life 
under the Japanese occupation in the 1930s. Li Yuhe, the male protagonist, is a veiled 
communist whose job is to cover a local party communication station. After Li’s 
execution, his mother Grandma Li passes the red lantern, the symbol of the party in the 
opera, to Li’s daughter Li Tiemei as a symbol of passing down the family’s revolutionary 
tradition. Like most of other yangban xi, The Red Lantern relies on a socialist realist 
portrayal of the division between heroes and villains, where class struggle between the 
oppressed and the oppressor undergirds the central theme. However, The Red Lantern is 
particularly interesting in terms of its depiction of the relation between the body, memory 
and politics. The composition of the identity of Li Tiemei, the young daughter, speaks of 
how the state’s engineering of individual political subjectivity takes place. First, Li 
Tiemei’s identity is manufactured through the bodily emblem of the state’s historical 
narrative—a glorious history of the revolutionary past—that dominates the writing of her 
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family tradition, in which the fabrics of her individual memory get completely dissolved 
into a collective recollection of the state’s historical account of class struggle. Reflecting 
on The Red Lantern, Wang (1996) suggests that “the red lantern is the totem of absolute 
authority…thus when Li Tiemei’s face gently caresses the lantern which is a 
representation of phallic authority, we see an intercourse with feudal relation.” Yet, there 
seems more than that. From a feminist point of view, Li Tiemei’s body is neutral and 
indifferent to gender specificity. On the one hand, her role as a woman and daughter of 
the revolutionary family highlights the productivity of a female body whose fertility 
ensures the continuation of future revolutionary generations to come. On the other, seen 
in her logo-like manly gestures and antagonistic facial expression, the masculinity of Li 
Tiemei suggests that the materiality of her body is concretized in her desexualized 
identity as a loyal descendent of the communist revolution (Figure 4.2). 
 
 
Figure 4.2 Li Tiemei holds the red lantern in her logo-like revolutionary gesture. 
   As Grosz rightly observes, “the specificity of bodies must be understood in its 
historical rather than simply its biological concreteness…the body must be understood 
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through a range of disparate discourses and not simply restricted to naturalistic and 
scientific modes of explanation” (1994: 19-20). The body should be understood as a 
contextualized enterprise. The inevitably contextualized body (especially women’s body) 
speaks of the fact the body is by no means reducible to an absolute entity. It is not a result 
from the disintegration of what surrounds the body but a consequence of a mesh of a 
multiplicity of forces integral to the contexts to make the body as such. In her study of the 
political symbol of the Chinese footbinding tradition, Hagar Kotef (2015) examines the 
bound body in the context of the Western political thought and proposes that this erotic 
bodily immobility not only serves as the mirroring function to constitute the contrasting 
image of the other by way of sexuality, but more importantly it reflects the dynamics with 
respect to the interior-exterior relation that is not yet completely externalized in the 
context of the Western discourse with veiled political implication. As Kotef points out, it 
is exactly through the denied intimacy with the exotic footbinding convention does the 
west find a way to justify its universal standards so much so that the west should 
overcome this immobility by differentiating itself form the immobile both outside and 
inside:  “it also means that the core of liberal political thought is articulated, and even 
constituted, in a fragmented manner that particularizes from the outset the ‘universal’ 
subject” to legitimize the policing politics in the form of gender inequality and 
imperialism (2015: 350). That the Chinese women’s bound foot receives substantially 
different cultural/political treatment in its home environment and foreign context attests 
to the Grosz’s insightful observation that the body should be understood in its irreducible 
specificity. In the case of The Red Lantern, Li Tiemei’s body is tethered to the 
composition of a political subjectivity that is vulnerable to and captured by Mao’s 
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revolutionary discourse of mnemonic, gender and political teleology. Evident in the 
example of Li Tiemei, the substantiation of the revolutionary political subject is thus 
consigned to the unanimous and absolute historical narrative repeatedly intensified by the 
memory of the family’s revolutionary tradition to be inscribed upon the girl’s de-
sexualized body. Echoing the bound foot, Li Tiemei’s body metaphorically represents a 
similar kind of immobile body—a body deprived of its gender specificity, a body lacks 
self-autonomy, and most importantly a body incapable of political mobility. The female 
body in The Red Lantern is a disabled body, rendered in the perfect agreement between 
the body and memory, that fails to enact the traversal of boundaries between the lawful 
and the unlawful, the legal and illegal, the permitted and unpermitted. However, as Grosz 
suggests, the corporeality of the body is full of potentials to be volatile and indeterminate. 
Might there exist any occasions where the mode of the body becomes less stable in the 
example of the Cultural Revolution? Might the body and memory be caught in alienation 
from each other such that they come to act as productive agent of tension and strangeness? 
If so, how might we reevaluate the important roles of the two such that Mao’s Cultural 
Revolution can be possibly re-examined to unveil the hidden politics? To answer these 
questions, I now turn to Zhuangzi’s theory of xu. 
Dreaming of Butterfly: The Body and the Memory in Zhuangzi’s Theory of Xu 
   A prominent Daoist philosopher, Zhuangzi writes extensively in reference to 
experiences of ordinary life. In his writing, the mundane and quotidian is pervaded with a 
ubiquitous sense of impermeability that renders the ordinariness perpetually unknowable. 
For Zhuangzi, we, as humans, are intertwined in a manifold of indeterminate relations 
such that our accidental encounters with others in everyday life is replete with 
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unexpectancy and surprise. What undergirds this unknowability in Zhuangzi’s writing is 
the idea of xu, which is an important and yet elusive philosophical idea in his Daoist 
thought that serves as the engine of various changing relations. For Zhuangzi, xu is a kind 
of reversibility that works as a repository of mutual relations by eliminating the gulf 
between “ten thousand things” (a Chinese philosophical term that encompasses all things 
in the universe).	  It promotes the proliferation of a multiplicity of diverse linkages, 
tangible or intangible, among all things. Xu entails various dimensions of spontaneous 
interacting relations and the breakdown of forceful integration, necessarily involving the 
defiance of normalization that is compliant with simplistic determinism. Politically 
speaking, xu is a terrain that refuses to be completed when it comes to the understanding 
of power relation. It decomposes the center and rejuvenates the marginal and periphery in 
shaping political subjectivity. It is the grey area that readily intrudes and permeates 
through the substantiated. Xu is the opposite side of fullness replete with presupposed 
power hierarchy—a challenger of an enclosed power nucleus that is only accessible to the 
few. Central to Zhuangzi’s idea of xu is its denotation of incompleteness. In his 
cosmology, incompleteness is a receptivity sustained via new and reversible relations. 
Incompleteness in xu is always about the excess that escapes forceful annexation from the 
exterior. It is a persistent chasm between the dominating and the dominated. From this 
perspective, xu is registered with profound political meanings. It can be viewed as a 
radical re-articulation of power structure and power relation in the first place. In what 
follows, I focus on Zhuangzi’s famous story of “Butterfly Dream” to further illustrate the 
concept of xu as well as its political implication as the “Butterfly Dream” is probably the 
most interpreted story in the Zhuangzi due to its mysteriousness: 
   “Once upon a time, I, Chuang Tzu (Zhuangzi), dreamt that I was a butterfly flitting around    
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and enjoying myself. I had no idea I was Chuang Tzu. Then suddenly I woke up and was           
Chuang Tzu again. But I could not tell, had I been Chuang Tzu dreaming I was a butterfly 
or a butterfly dreaming I was now Chuang Tzu? However, there must be some sort of 
difference between Chuang Tzu and a butterfly! We call this the transformation of things” 
(Palmer, chap 2, 2006: 20) 
    The interpretation of this parable is diverse. Many mention the quest for and crisis 
of identity entangled in this story. For example, Zhihua Yao proposes that the butterfly 
symbolizes a human soul or self, a spiritual soul that is still capable of communication 
and transformation while the body soul is asleep. For Yao, the butterfly dream is 
interpreted as an evidence of a contradictory self, or a self against self, in a mutual 
objectifying relation with each other between Zhuangzi and the butterfly. Reflecting on 
the dream, Xiaoqiang Han suggests that being an image in the dream, the self is created 
by the butterfly, not the dreamer of I. In this relation, the self is not identified with the 
substantial, and it is the butterfly that essentially becomes the dreamer and “dreams of 
there being me” (Han 2009: 1-9). In Kuang-ming Wu’s reading, the dream indicates that 
the belief of a fixed idea is doubtful. The awakening from the dream is in fact a release of 
ourselves from the obsession with objective realism (1986: 4). 
    Although the above renditions make good attempt at extrapolating the butterfly 
dream, a political reading of the famous story is very much omitted. The political 
meaning of this butterfly dream in fact hinges on its interesting conceiving of the memory 
and body, as well as their interactive relation. In this story, the confusion of Zhuangzi and 
the butterfly are not found in this seemingly puzzled dream; instead, it is actually in their 
perplexed recollection of the ambivalent and incomplete past do they find the encounter 
bewildering. The blurred boundaries of explicitly defined memory and body disturb 
Zhuangzi as a capable knowing subject. Politics occurs exactly when these perplexities 
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take place, gaining its life and endurance when the pre-forged boundary between the 
memory and body is breached and penetrated. In this regard, I propose that, thanks to the 
affect of xu, Zhuangzi turns the interlace of the memory and body into a site of 
contestation in his blind encounter with the butterfly—an area of power struggle that 
invites discursive modalities of the memory and body to compete and experience the 
unsettled and unanchored. During this course, the interaction becomes an active agent 
that takes its initiative to act rather than to be acted upon. 
    Palmer’s translation is not entirely accurate as she omits to mention the panic 
Zhuangzi. In the original text, Zhuangzi becomes terrified right after he wakes up from 
the dream, as he is not able to distinguish from both dreams. Zhuangzi’s panic in fact 
arises from the dissolved assertion between the past and the present. While he enjoys his 
metamorphosis as a joyfully flying butterfly, this enjoyment is abruptly terminated in his 
sudden awareness of a disturbing memory, a mnemonic moment where the pre-supposed 
temporal order falls apart. According to Zhuangzi, what happens before by no means 
determines what ensues after. There always exists a rift between the two, spanned by the 
discrete and fragmented attribute of the memory. However, this is not to say that 
Zhuangzi negates the effect of the past on the present. On the contrary, Zhuangzi views 
the past as a necessary component of the present, wherein the former keeps illuminating 
the later insofar as it is deprived of it absolutist power. Through a disparate memory, the 
present is far from being settled. The indeterminate, lived experience that links the two 
overthrows a teleological regime where future is predictable as it can be abstracted into 
the knowledge of the present. In this light, a comparison between Zhuangzi and Henri 
Bergson helps to make more sense here. For Bergson, memory is contracted into modes 
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of intuition that eventually gets integrated to the perception of the present. “...If there be 
memory,” writes Bergson, “that is, the survival of past images, these images must be 
constantly mingle with our perception of the present, and may even take its place” (1911: 
70). In Bergson’s line, the memory acts on the past in order to prolong the perception of 
the present. It is, in other words, consistently absolved into the intellect of now. Yet, for 
Zhuangzi, the present is not the end of the memory, it is even foreign to the latter. The 
perplexed dream turns out to be a source of disturbance for Zhuangzi who wakes up in 
panic. 
    So is the body. Zhuangzi’s xu-ed body is an incomplete body that retreats from full 
substantiation. It is a body that is detached from self-assertion and self-fulfillment. The 
xu-ed body is averse to solitude as it grows and functions in its exchangeability with 
other bodies. In Zhuangzi’s theory of xu, the ideal body is weak, handicapped and even 
ugly; its incompleteness welcomes and requires the interchangeability with others to 
sustain it. Instability is the body’s consistent state in finding opportunities to experience, 
to learn and to become, without which its life would inevitably meet its doom. For 
Zhuangzi, the disabled body broadens our accesses to the inaccessible of the world. For 
instance, xu is embodied in the unusual tree encountered by Tzu Chi—giant, twisted, 
snarled but is unuseful for any utilitarian purpose.	  Zhuangzi uses the example of the 
deformed tree to indicate that the incomplete body lengthens the tree’s life as it is saved 
from the unusefulness of its trunk and branches (chap 4, 2006: 34). Xu is also represented 
by Crippled Shu’s deformed body with his “shoulders higher than the top of his head and 
his topknot pointing to heaven, his five vital organs all crushed into the top of his body 
and his two thighs pressing into his ribs” (Palmer, chap 4, 2006: 35). Although these 
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incomplete bodies are usually regarded as useless, they enjoy their own life circle in 
experiencing the discursive, in their own ways and by their own means. Bodily speaking, 
the dream is the place where Zhuangzi communicates with the butterfly through his body 
and in his enjoyment of this unusual experience of transforming into the insect. 
Zhuangzi’s trepidation comes exactly from his sudden awareness that he has already 
withdrawn from an incomplete body the very moment he wakes up. When Zhuangzi says 
“there must be some sort of difference between Zhuangzi and the butterfly,” he is not 
referring to substance distinction between the two. Rather, he is confirming the different 
processes through which he and the butterfly undertake to experience each other. Put it 
another way, body, for Zhuangzi, is always found in incessant morphing—or, “the 
transformation of things” in his own term (Palmer, chap 2, 2006: 20). 
   As mentioned earlier, the politics of the butterfly dream takes place when the 
memory and body no longer work together as a solution to make up a knowing Zhuangzi. 
It happens when the memory and body do not cooperatively reinforce each other any 
more in forming ideological fixation. Incomplete memory and body are dissolved into 
self-alienation, causing trouble to the construction of a stable identity. Where the memory 
is engulfed with fabrics of the disparate and flowing memory that renders the linkage 
between the past and present difficult to comprehend, the body resides in its incomplete 
forms to be fulfilled by others. The two live in their own specific routes, making the 
interplay impossible to anchor. Here, the life of politics keeps being nurtured by xu-
generated deformity such that unsettled power contestation is always on the go and can 
never be terminated. The instability of identity composition is continued in Zhuangzi’s 
loss in self-affirmation. That identity is a myth to be imagined immanently but not 
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manufactured externally lays the foundation of xu’s politics—indeterminate identity is 
the precondition rather than obstacle of politics. Zhuangzi’s theory of xu provides us with 
an alternative perspective in reexamining the politics of the Cultural Revolution, to which 
I will turn in the following section. 
Distorting Memory, Distorting Body: The Cultural Revolution Re-experienced 
    Although Bo is cracked down for boldly trespassing the party’s red line on 
memory, the implication of Bo’s case still remains. That Bo attempted to re-manipulate 
the interplay of the memory and body to reverse the composition of political subjectivity 
attests to the fact that remembrance of the history is by no means impervious despite the 
policing boundaries set up by the state. It indicates that the alternative memory of this 
political event can never be dispersed away. The contestation over a mnemonic 
rediscovery of the past is itself a witness of different modalities of politics, fluctuating as 
a response to changing power relations. The fragility and instability of the memory 
suggest that it is far from being completed due to its intrinsic and unavoidable nature of 
incompleteness. The Cultural Revolution, as many other political events in the history of 
the People’s Republic, has been experienced and re-experienced time and again in 
different occasions, at different times and by different means. The paradox of 
indeterminacy is inlaid in the already intertwined narratives of the history and is too 
unsettled to be reduced to one universal mnemonic experience. It is all about those 
experiences of particularity, indifferent and contradictory here and there, but 
impermeable at all times. The memory of the Cultural Revolution offers us a good 
opportunity to re-think how a political event can be alternatively conjured up, and more 
at stake, how new political relation can be re-invented. To further explain my point here, 
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I focus on Jiang Wen’s film In the Heat of the Sun (1994) to find out how Zhuangzi’s 
idea of xu plays out to deploy the critique of Mao’s Cultural Revolution. 
    Directed by Jiang Wen, In the Heat of the Sun tells a story about the coming-of-
age of a group of young kids who spend their teenagehood during the Cultural Revolution. 
Given its convoluted narrative and experimental film style, interpretations of the film are 
multiple. Yingjin Zhang, for example, considers this film as “nostalgia for the Cultural 
Revolution” (2002: 12). But it is certainly more than that. The story is recounted by the 
narrator, Ma Xiaojun, many years after he grows up, in the flashback of his teenage days 
during the revolution. The most interesting part of the film is its involvement in an 
intertwined configuration of subjectivity—an identity in question—unfolded in the 
account by a self-confessed lying narrator. The film develops its narrative in the intense 
contradiction between reality and fantasy in battling over a troubled past through memory. 
In this film, the body becomes an unrealistic fantasy embodied in a struggling and blurry 
memory. The configuration of Ma Xiaojun’s identity is a process from self-assertion to 
self-frustration and eventually self-alienation. In the Heat of the Sun reflects a special 
mode of politics—a politics of xu, wherein memory becomes an untrustworthy liar, body 
a strange phantom. The core of this politics lies in its challenge to unequivocal divisions, 
as a result of the dynamics between the memory and body that is hardly finalized. That 
the project of identity formation, as the film shows, is an ongoing, dynamic and distorting 
intrusion into the unknown attests to the gist of xu—politics can never be settled.  
   Growing up during the Cultural Revolution, Ma Xiaojun, the male protagonist, is a 
bad-boy character who hangs around with other children of privilege (sons of high-
ranking military officials), idling and obsessed with violence, in the absence of parental 
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guidance at the peak of the social upheaval. A son of a military family, Ma Xiaojun is a 
fervent admirer of communist revolutionary heroes. He bathes himself in revolutionary 
songs, salutes to military parade and enjoys throwing himself into the illusion of being a 
glorious soldier on battleground. In his own words, “I long for the war between China 
and the Soviet Union, because I firmly believe in the new world war, the iron fist of our 
army will surely smash the war machines of both the Soviet and U.S.A. A new hero will 
attract the attention of the whole world—that’s me!” For Ma Xiaojun, his self-fabricated 
identity as an imagined war hero is tethered to the embodiment of Ma Xiaojun’s imitation 
of revolutionary posturing, unmasked by a seemingly undisrupted narration in voice-over 
(Figure 4.3). 
 
  
Figure 4.3 Ma Xiaojun is immersed in his illusion as a war hero. 
   Here, the memory matches perfectly in the narrator’s recollection with his proud 
body gesture captured in a medium shot to reveal his indulgence in priding himself in 
being a revolutionary family’s descendent. In this scene, the concretization of a Mao’s 
political subject is undoubtedly casted and integrated into the young boy’s childhood as 
part of his adult memory. Inheriting the “rebellious” spirit of the Cultural Revolution, Ma 
Xiaojun is fond of ridiculing authorities such as his teacher and the policeman, and 
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trespassing the prohibited exemplified by his hobby of picking locks. Up to this point, the 
red-guard typed young boy is self-portrayed as an unscrupulous hero, assertive and 
confident in his mnemonic experience closely associated with the revolutionary discourse 
of the era. 
  Yet, the appearance of Mi Lan changes all. Ma Xiaojun’s first accidental encounter 
with the girl is through a telescope that provides him with a voyeuristic gaze of her 
sexualized body in photograph—chubby and attractive in a red swimming suit (Figure 
4.4).  
 
Figure 4.4 Mi Lan is found by Ma Xiaojun in the telescope. 
   The boy immediately becomes enamored of her body in the telescope. For Ma 
Xiaojun, Mi Lan is an embodiment of desire, both sexually and politically, of dominance 
and control. His craze for Mi Lan is in fact a forceful integration of sexuality (represented 
by the girl’s female body as an ideal sexual symbol) into his dominating revolutionary 
subjectivity, an omniscient political discourse that is supposed to dissolve and assimilate 
all. However, his experience with Mi Lan triggers a frustrating trip of self-recognition, 
revealing memory as an inveterate liar. A stark contrast is set up between the time Ma 
Xiaojun enjoys with Mi Lan and the troubled memory that starts to get more and more 
	  	  
120	  
blurry. In a scene where the boy is holding the girl’s hands and happily dancing with her, 
the long shot captures the warm picture of the two happy youngsters (Figure 4.5).  
 
Figure 4.5 Ma Xiaojun enjoys a joyful moment with Mi Lan. 
   However, the scene is strangely juxtaposed with a perplexed voice-over which 
confesses in frustration: “it seems that there is something wrong with my memory. The 
reality is mixed up with fantasy…” For Ma Xiaojun, Mi Lan is mysterious. She is an 
emobodied myth that corrupts the consistency that structures the relation between body 
and memory established by previous revolutionary subjectivity. The closer he approaches 
her body, the farther away he is pushed in flashback. Even though Ma Xiaojun insists that 
Mi Lan holds him while he carries her at the back of his bike, next cut shows the abrupt 
disappearance of the girl in the forest, leaving the boy disappointedly frustrated. As Mi 
Lan’s body is always distant and refuses to be annexed, Ma Xiaojun becomes more 
agitated and depressed—very much the similar reaction that Zhuangzi receives when he 
wakes up from his memory of the butterfly dream. “The more you want to tell the truth, 
the more disruption you will have. I desperately find it is just impossible to restore reality. 
Memory is always changed and masked by my emotion, betraying and making fun of me, 
leaving me frustrated and confused,” recalls Ma Xiaojun. In fact, Mi Lan is Ma Xiaojun’s 
butterfly dream, magically real and fantasized at the same time with similar experience: 
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once infatuated in it but awaken puzzled and desperate in the end. Her body is ironically 
both a desirable sexual object he wants to hold dear and an enemy he resents fiercely in 
the memory. But unlike Zhuangzi, Ma Xiaojun is even more radical in dealing with the 
ramification: his discontentment with Mi Lan culminates at the point when he kicks love-
hate girl hard into a swimming pool. His later attempted rape of Mi Lan is another 
indication of the radical assertion of his waning masculine dominance over the girl’s 
body. Commenting on this, Silbergeld insightfully observes, “the pure object of desire 
becomes an imperfect object of conflicted feelings, attraction and disgust, embodying 
both his longing and feeling of rejection, a woman sought after with increasing 
desperation yet increasingly ripe for abuse” (2008: 27). At this point, Ma Xiaojun’s 
previously established identity as a revolutionary hero is completely shattered in his 
confused recollection about Mi Lan.  
   A contrast between Li Tiemei in The Red Lantern and Mi Lan in In the Heat of the 
Sun is also meaningful. Where the former represents the successful embodiment of the 
integration of a family’s memory into the party’s grand history, the latter emerges as a 
disturbing threat to the consistency and stability of the state’s ideological writing. Ma 
Xiaojun’s ambition in manufacturing himself as a true and loyal inheritor of the 
revolution is confronted again and again in his troubled memory of Mi Lan. The 
politicization of both women’s bodies has fundamentally different effects in The Red 
Lantern and In the Heat of the Sun regarding the Cultural Revolution. The fullness of Li 
Tiemei’s body is achieved in her complete memory as a heroic revolutionary soldier 
whose integrated subjectivity is smoothly accepted into the external environment—the 
undoubted family tradition. In Li Tiemei’s case, the interplay of the body and memory 
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successfully represents the state’s powerful ideological regime—a politics that rectifies. 
But Mi Lan’s body is awfully incomplete and remote in Ma Xiaojun’s eyes, making the 
latter’s subjectivity replete with confrontational uncertainties from pieces of fragmented, 
unfaithful memory. Intertwined together, body and memory interact with each other to 
produce the xu-ed area, a grey terrain where political identity stubbornly defends its 
indeterminacy, a state Zhuangzi would call xu, by rejecting a presupposed cooperation 
between the memory and body. Unlike Li Tiemei’s thorough revolutionary enthusiasm, 
Ma Xiaojun’s hormonally charged energy fails to be recycled into the revolutionary 
passion. It bypasses Mao’s ideology of class struggle as it is inevitably trapped in the 
blurred boundary between friend and enemy. In this sense, under the dominant authority 
of censorial culture in China, In the Heat of the Sun is itself a grey middle ground that 
engages in the making of Zhuangzi’s xu-ed politics—a politics that mystifies, in contrast 
to Mao’s politics that rectifies. 
    In conclusion, the relation between body and memory provide us with alternative 
perspectives in viewing the politics of the Cultural Revolution. First, as we see in the Bo 
incident, the memory is a politically forbidden area that is closed to contestation. The 
crime of Bo and his followers exactly lies in their unapproved intrusion, which is 
perceived as a threat to the authority of the party-state. That the memory is immune from 
autonomous individual specificity and is put under the strict censorship of the state in 
accordance with the latter’s grand historical narrative indicates that the memory 
constitutes a crucial part of the party-state’s political legitimacy based on how its past is 
remembered. In addition, the body also plays an indispensible role in this mnemonic 
experience. The body offers the corporeal foundation for the unified memory to be 
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shaped and consolidated in shaping political subject. However, while the state aims to 
construct revolutionary subjectivity through the consistency between the two, political 
identity is itself a xu-ed area in which body and memory contests each other without ever 
being settled and grasped. For Zhuangzi, xu is a state of incompleteness in which the 
mnemonic and bodily specificities are made possible via the unstable differences in their 
relations to each other. As demonstrated in In the Heat of the Sun, beneath the facade of 
the revolution that is seemingly organized and structured by Mao’s ideology of class 
struggle, different modalities of politics prevails. 
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Chapter 5: Modernization in Doubt: The Body as Moral Critique of 
State Capitalism 
Introduction 
     What is most distinctive about China’s post-Mao era is perhaps the intermingling 
of the country’s aspiration for modernization via fast capitalist growth and the state’s 
ever-tight political control. On the one hand, China’s economy is successfully spurred 
through large-scale privatization; on the other hand, the state still manages to maintain its 
power supremacy, largely speaking, in the wave of the country’s economic re-structuring. 
However, the new era is also accompanied with rising social protests. The uprisings 
occur everyday, in ways large and small, publicly visible or invisible, throughout the 
country as responses to a variety of issues that include (and certainly not limited to) 
official corruption, illegal land appropriation, environmental crises, laid-off workers, etc. 
These protests are direct and indirect confrontations that disclose the tension hidden 
inside the contemporary Chinese society. This tension is an indication of the deeply 
entrenched gap between the state and the society—a paradox in a myriad of aspects—that 
permeates the country.  
        This chapter is devoted to the understanding of this tension. Its focus is the body 
and its aim is to explore the political implication of the body that speaks of this tension in 
the context of Chinese politics. The major purpose of this chapter consists of the 
following aspects. First, it describes and analyzes the paradox of the modernization by 
closely looking at its core content of state-led capitalism. Next, it introduces the idea of 
absurd body proposed by Zhuangzi, which lays down the theoretical foundation of the 
relation between the body and politics in the post-Mao era. Third, the chapter explores in 
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depth how the effect of state capitalism is unfolded and demonstrated on the bodies of the 
migrant workers. This includes ways in which the body is perceived and constituted as a 
function of the power nexus congruent with the logic of the state’s capitalist political 
economy. Lastly, it closely investigates the body’s inherent agency that engages the 
external politico-economic environment in the making of the political. Here, rather than 
being objectified by the state, the body turns out to be an active agent in creating 
dissident political subjects who, instead of being absorbed into the homogenization 
sponsored by the state capitalism, demonstrates themselves as constant moments of 
rupture en route to modernization. It ultimately attempts to unfold the body’s intrinsic 
agency in the context of everyday life as a moral critique of the state capitalism. In so 
doing, the chapter relies on the film Beijing Bicycle (2001) to help me illustrate the 
embodiment of the tension and ways in which it reveals hidden power relation.  
      I argue that the rhetoric of modernization provides the growth of the state 
capitalism with a particular economic form of governance by which the state is 
empowered to re-organize the structure of the body in a way that facilitates its extraction 
of the instrumental value of the migrant workers. The state’s expropriation of the body is 
attempted through a process of homogenization wherein forceful spatial arrangement of 
the body is implemented to normalize both the body’s economic and political function on 
a par with the state’s capitalist principle of pursing maximum profit. However, as 
indicated in the film, the structure of the body is far from being settled. For Zhuangzi, the 
body is an absurdity. It is a radical re-carving of space, not only of its own territory but 
also of the external environment into which the body is inserted as an incompatibility. 
This absurdity stems from the idea of xu as various stages of rupture that refuse to be 
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assimilated into the process of the homogenization of the capitalist political economics. 
Instead of normalizing and rectifying the body, xu deforms the body. It makes the body 
into multiple modes of unconformity that deviates the body from the outside center. This 
dissident body constitutes the very autonomous space where the migrants are identified 
with their individual desires, frustrations, and experiences that are present as too 
heterogeneous to be resolved into the metanarrative of modernization. Yet, its autonomy 
necessarily requires the existence of external power to be recycled by the body for 
alternative use. The political core of this type of body hinges on its persistent 
indeterminacy that keeps the tension between the state’s reason of political economy and 
the stubbornly unsettled body from being eliminated. 
Modernization, State Capitalism, and the Paradox 
      Since Mao’s death in 1976 and the fall of the Gang of Four, China has embarked 
on a series of ambitious reforms under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping and his 
successors. Unlike the Mao era whose political foundation was based on large-scale 
socio-political movements of class struggle, the Deng era was marked with its embrace of 
“the market economy with the Chinese characteristics.” Abandoning Mao’s ideology of 
planned economy, Deng adopted pragmatic policies toward economic reform. One of the 
most famous mottos of the Deng era was “it doesn’t matter whether a cat is black or 
white, as long as it catches mice” (Li 1977: 107). During the Deng era, the market 
economy was re-introduced to the country to jumpstart its economy. Although the 
essence of the market economy under Deng’s leadership was still largely state-led, it 
successfully stimulated China’s economy at a speed that was unprecedented since the 
Mao era. Despite a short period of setback following the crackdown of the Tiananmen 
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pro-democracy protest in 1989, Deng managed to resist the pressure from the hardliners 
within the party to re-institute his economic reform. Since then, China’s economy has 
been undertaking a rapid growth, as the increase of GDP constitutes the center of the 
economic reform.  
      What should be noted in this post-Mao reform era is the state’s re-engineering of 
the fundamental politico-economic discourse of “modernization.” Modernization has 
perhaps been the most underlying metanarrative in the course of China’s political history 
since the mid-19th century. Since its first major violent encounter with the modern West 
during the Opium War (1840-1842), China started to embark on a series of self-
strengthening (ziqiang) projects of development in order to modernize the country and 
catch up with the West. These projects spread across a wide array of fields in areas of 
politics, economy and military, etc. The road to modernization during the late Qing 
Dynasty marked the country’s very first encounter with modernity. Yet, since its 
historical debut, the account of modernization has always been a seed of tension between 
new ideas and traditions that keeps insinuating itself into the relation between the state 
and the society in the country. The outbreak of a series of both peaceful and violent social 
movements such as the Boxer Rebellion (1900) and the May Fourth Movement (1919) all 
speak to the fact that the road to modernization is as fuzzy as is the meaning of the term 
itself. And this ambiguity, as well as the entailed tension, continued throughout the 
history of the People’s Republic.  
     After Mao and his colleagues established the communist regime, the state 
attempted to resolve this ambiguity into the grand political discourse of Mao’s communist 
revolution. Modernization, during the Mao era, became a crucial segment to be woven 
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into the grand historiography of the communist regime. As Mao himself pointed out, “we 
can’t follow the old track of technological development in other countries, crawling 
behind one step after another. We should break convention, in a short period of time, turn 
our country into a modernized and powerful socialist nation” (Mao 1964). For Mao, 
modernization serves as both means and end in structurally transforming the Chinese 
society into a revolutionary political entity that sets itself radically apart from its 
predecessors.  
       However, in the post-Mao era, the term has been re-invested with new and 
different content—economic growth has replaced class struggle in composing the core of 
the new era’s project of socialist modernization. “Make economic development the 
central task, uphold the four cardinal principles and reform and opening up policy, and 
turn China into a prosperous, democratic and civilized modern socialist country” 
(Xinhuanet). In this era, the state places economic growth at supreme position and 
adopted a series of ambitious reform policies to re-invigorate the country’s economy. 
Under this new political/economic guiding principle, the state aims to re-direct the path 
toward modernization by increasing average material gain. The juxtaposition of 
economic development and modernization attests to the state’s ambition in modernizing 
China’s economy by taking whatever approach that will help the state achieve this goal. 
Modernization, in this sense, has now become considerably substantiated by its goal of 
material pursuit in the new post-Mao era.  
       Nevertheless, on the other hand, the state is also deeply concerned with lesson 
from the fall of the Soviet Union and keeps alert about the potential grave consequence of 
mishandling the relation between economic growth and political liberalization. For the 
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Chinese leaders in the post-Mao era, one critical and yet risky task is ultimately: how can 
the growth of the economy be spurred while retaining the political grip of the central state? 
Such a dilemma comes as a particular threat to the Chinese state for two major reasons: 1) 
after the demise of communism as a legitimate political ideology, the state urgently 
needed alternative discourses to restore and justify its political legitimacy; 2) with 
economic liberalization, how might the state continue to remain its tight political control 
without losing the benefit of economic growth? Hence, in order to secure its powerful 
political influence over the society, the state has to find out new strategies to consolidate 
its hierarchical power structure in the face of changing economic relations.  
       The new strategy embraced by the state is coined “socialist market economy with 
Chinese characteristics” (you zhongguo tese de shehui zhuyi shichang jingji). The term is 
invented to reconcile capitalist economic relationship into the paradigm of the Chinese 
socialist economy. The true content of this term, however, is about resolving the 
contradiction that while China’s modernization is inseparable from capitalism, the 
supreme role of the central state in restructuring the country’s political economy must be 
retained. As Du Yanhua points out, “in contrast with the Soviet model, China’s 
modernization model is characterized by the choice to cast aside the concepts of 
traditional socialism, so as to avoid the errors that emerged in the construction of 
socialism in the former Soviet Union; this primarily involved learning how to exploit 
capitalism” (2013-14: 49). On the one hand, this newly defined “socialism with Chinese 
characteristics” separates itself from traditional Maoist communist modernization that 
heavily relied on a rigid planned economic system and is hostile to free market. On the 
other hand, it refrains from implementing westernized free market by re-organizing and 
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re-structuring the distribution of resources produced by the market toward the benefit of 
the privileged few. The former indicates the will of the state in re-appropriating social 
resources with different approach and in different context whereas the latter suggests that 
any possible social autonomy generated out of the new economic relation should be 
closely checked for its potential challenge to the authority of the state. In addition, what 
is also noteworthy is that this particular form of state capitalism also renders accessibility 
to power rather limited. In this system, power is intertwined with the distribution of 
material gain in a mutually reinforcing relation. Money and power are so intimately tied 
together that one cannot exist without the other.  
     “Socialist market economy with Chinese characteristics” is exactly a statement 
which highlights the key features of China’s state capitalism: “this represents the correct 
management of the relationship between socialism and capitalism: thus China’s 
modernization may exploit capitalism to the fullest extent but can also avoid the 
disastrous consequences of capitalist modernization” (Du 2013-14: 50). This is, therefore, 
essentially a manifestation of China’s distinctive state-run capitalism, one that pursues 
the maximum accumulation of capital in the hands of the few, and yet in the meanwhile, 
bases itself on a fixed and closed power structure secluded from the rest of the society. 
Accessibility to the power hierarchy is strictly limited as a privileged resource. 
Modernization, in the post-Mao era, plays a critical role as the ally of the state capitalism 
in China in helping strengthen the latter’s zoning of its dominating power. Modernization 
fortifies the formulation of the state-capitalism by supplying it with necessary knowledge, 
discourse and rhetoric. It radically re-shapes the Chinese people’s view of the relation 
between the past, present and future of both their lives and the country they are living in. 
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Slogans such as “Let some people become rich,” “To be rich is glorious,” and “Poverty is 
a shame” are frequently seen in every corner of the country to remind the people that 
economic development is not just an individual choice but a compulsory moral 
obligation—a form of loyalty to the state, a patriotism. Modernization, in other words, is 
moral rectitude. In Kim’s observation, “the glorious past of China with its advanced 
scientific knowledge, and its losses to the western-dominated modern world, stimulate 
Chinese people and authorities to hold on to the development of science in promoting 
patriotism…” (2011: 689). In this light, modernization “with the Chinese characteristics” 
assumes the important political function of nation-state building. As Chun Lin 
insightfully observes, the hybridization of a shameful history and modern development 
makes the Chinese government “look simultaneously moralistic and pragmatic, 
patrimonial and professional, and patriarchal and socialist” (Lin 2006: 29). By its 
commitment to “modernizing,” the state projects another national allegory and itself 
being a historically progressive and advanced force in unifying and leading the country. 
The state, now equipped with new ideological innovations, is confident again in re-
asserting “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” (zhonghua minzu de weida fuxing) 
and convince its people to rally around the flag. 
      To further look at the Chinese state-capitalism and its politico-economic form, I 
focus on a particular group of people—the migrant peasant workers—who constitute a 
crucial segment of China’s transformation into state capitalism. The emergence of the 
migrant workers is coupled with the rapid development of urbanization in China. This 
population mainly consists of millions of workers who originally come from rural areas 
of the country and move to the cities to sell their labor. These rural-to-urban workers 
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assume very special roles in the changing Chinese society. During the Mao era, peasants 
were strictly prohibited from moving to the urban areas mainly due to limited resources 
that were retained as a privilege to urban residents. Yet, in the post-Mao era, despite ever-
present limited openness for the peasants to permanently settle in the cities, the mobility 
of these workers has been greatly enhanced. Leaving their rural home and family far 
behind, a large population of peasants chooses to move to the urban area to find jobs. By 
2012, this number had reached 260 million (Chinanews). The country’s fast-paced 
industrialization and commercialization not only need the peasant workers as cheap labor 
to ensure its advantageous productive force in the world market but also views them as a 
large group of potential consumers. Nevertheless, on the other hand, the migrant workers 
are confronted with the imperviousness of the cities and have hard time being accepted 
and assimilated. As Jian Xu comments, “the state, however, has an ambivalent attitude 
towards this new subaltern class. On the one hand, it recognizes the migrants substantial 
contributions to national economy; on the other hand, it sees the mobile people as a 
potential problem for social stability on account of the difficulties involved in regulating 
and transforming them into a new kind of subject” (2005: 434). The chain of attempted 
suicides occurred in recent years by Foxconn’s (the world’s largest contract electronics 
manufacturer) employees suggests that this tension must be real and sharp. Struggling 
with their ambivalent identity as being both wanted and undesired, the migrant workers 
have become an important phenomenon to study the power nexus generated in China’s 
pursuit of modernized state capitalism. This irreconcilability between the peasant workers 
and the impenetrable metropolis tells of a compelling story of how the state capitalism 
unfolds itself in the political context of the Chinese society. 
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The Body as Absurdity  
      One interesting and useful point of entry into the understanding of China’s post-
Mao modernization is from the perspective of the body. The body has been playing an 
important role in the history of the country’s political life. It functions as both political 
symbol and agent in the practice of the country’s everyday political experience be it the 
body as a critical source of physical labor during the Great Leap Forward, the body as a 
sign of political classes in the Cultural Revolution or the body as a site of political dissent 
for the students who launched hunger strike during the Tiananmen protest. The body not 
only exemplifies the dynamic formation of political power as well as its struggle in the 
concrete Chinese social context, it also functions as the agentic site that keeps spawning 
the making of the political. What is particularly interesting, in this regard, is the very 
narrative concerning the relation between the body and the external power composed 
through the positioning and re-positioning of the former in the circulation of everyday 
mundane life. Following Michel Foucault and in relating sovereignty and “bare life,” 
Giorgio Agamben describes the life of homo sacer (sacred man) and its inevitable fate 
bound by state politics. According to Agamben, homo sacer refers to those “who may be 
killed and yet not sacrificed” as a necessary form of inclusive exclusion that plays a 
crucial role of testimony to the absolute sovereign power of the state” (8). Via the 
convergence of both the realm of bare life and the realm of politics, inclusion and 
exclusion, the sovereign exception successfully unveils its mask of supreme power. This 
is the irreversible paradigm secretly embedded in the foundation of human politics that 
transcends the realm of religion. From Agamben’s perspective, biopolitics has shifted the 
location of politics to the site of everyday life. In this respect, the body assumes a vital 
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role in weaving the narrative of life politics. The body not only bears the mark of power 
imposed from the outside but also acts out as agent (or the “outside-in” vis-à-vis “inside-
out,” in Elizabeth Grosz’ terminology) from within. Placed in the context of the Chinese 
society, it is a modality of tension that necessarily requires the linkage between the state 
and the body that lives or is made to live as both object and subject. This persistent 
tension is meaningfully illustrative of the formation and reformation of power and its 
structure in the changing Chinese society during the post-Mao era.          
          To provide a meaningful theoretical background for the agency of the body as well 
as its political implication for understanding the tension, I focus on Zhuangzi’s writing of 
the absurd body to investigate the underlying ground on which the body is conceived in 
his theory. A renowned Daoist philosopher, Zhuangzi writes extensively on the body. 
Zhuangzi is particularly famous for writing bodies that are deformed and useless. 
Crippled and ugly-looking bodies that are considered to be of little value always receive 
enormous favorable evaluations from Zhuangzi. These bodies are never viewed as 
valuable by the majority and usually tend to be ignored for their uselessness. Throughout 
his writing, Zhuangzi devotes substantial portion of his writing to examples of bodies that 
are caught in shapes alien to the aesthetic and utilitarian norms of the society. More 
interestingly, these bodies, as indicated in Zhuangzi’s writing, make up the significant 
segments of rupture that annoyingly interrupt the consistency of the structure of a given 
society organized by bodily indoctrination. They constitute areas of inconsistency, grey 
zones, that spontaneously emerge from and permeate through the society. For Zhuangzi, 
these bodies are the bodies of xu—indeterminate as they are, and yet find their way to 
constant tension with the external orders and values. On the one hand, they reject forceful 
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imposition from the outside; but on the other hand, they internalize the outside for its 
reuse. They retain their internal vitality in outwardly re-structuring the space that 
attempts to absorb it in the first place. They are strange and absurd, connecting 
themselves with the outside in ways that are hardly captured by external power. This 
absurdity comes out of a kind of dislocation that is bodily registered and operated in 
misplacing and misorganizing the operating space of power. This absurdity is also a form 
of persistence whose existence is only found in its co-existence with the power that tries 
to tame it. Therefore, the body as absurdity exactly means that the body is a creative 
incompatibility which yields frictions with the center while keeps rejuvenating itself by 
harnessing the latter. More importantly, to Zhuangzi, the body as such is also morally 
charged in questioning and critiquing established forms of power that are easily bypassed 
without being checked. Zhuangzi’s xu-ed body is a zone of unsettlement where stored 
values are inescapably revoked and suspended for critical reevaluation. 
          Two major properties are primarily associated with Zhuangzi’s body of deformity: 
formlessness (wuxing) and uselessness (wuyong). Formlessness refers to the spontaneous 
spatialization that helps the body escape from the confinement of any given form. 
Uselessness means a radical insertion of an unprincipled knowing that ultimately disrupts 
the deeply entrenched regime of discriminating knowledge that distinguishes one thing 
from anther. Both usefulness and uselessness serve as accommodating force that mediates 
the reshaping of the indeterminate zones of the body in relation to its outside environment. 
For example, in the story of the oak tree, Zhuangzi talks about a grand and old oak tree 
venerated by its local people as their home of the spirits of the land: 
The tree was so vast that a thousand oxen could hide behind it. It was a hundred spans   
round and it soared above the hill to eighty feet before it even began to put out branches.  
There were ten such branches, from any one of which an entire boat could be carved. Masses 
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of people came to see it , giving the place a carnival atmosphere…(Palmer, chap 4, 2006: 33).  
A carpenter comes across the tree and comments that the tree is uselessly old: “make a 
boat from it and it would sink; make a coffin and it would rot quickly; make some 
furniture and it would fall to pieces…this wood is useless and good for nothing” (Palmer, 
chap 4, 2006: 33). Apparently, the carpenter’s indifference to the oak tree is derived from 
his unfamiliarity with the formlessness of the tree which is foreign to someone who only 
subscribes to the bodies that are of particular shape and use value. In the carpenter’s eyes, 
it is a world of static and unchangeable objects that compose a final and complete 
inventory of furniture without unexpected surprise. To the carpenter, the world is made 
up of the bodies as fixed layers of constituents settled in a variety of predetermined forms 
for a multiplicity of instrumental values, in serving for the power of his knowledge as a 
skilled and professional carpenter.  
        The carpenter’s prejudice is sharply contrasted by the wisdom of Nan Po Tzu Chi: 
        Nan Po Tzu Chi, wandering amongst the mountains of Shang, came upon a great and  
        unusual tree, under which could shelter a thousand chariots, and they would all be covered. 
        Tzu Chi said, “what kind if a tree is this? It surely is a most wondrous piece of timber!”  
         However, when he ooked up, he could see that the smaller branches were so twisted and  
         gnarled that they could not be made into rafters and beams… “The tree is certainly good  
         for nothing,” said Tzu Chi. “This is why it has grown so large. Ah-ha! This is the sort of  
         uselessness that sages live by (Palmer, chap 4, 2006: 34). 
 
Unlike the carpenter, Tzu Chi is able to the tree’s inability to settle in one form and wind 
up in practical utility. The formless and useless body of the oak tree, for Tzu Chi (and 
also for Zhuangzi), forges a mode of uncontained otherness that cuts across the field of 
the carpenter’s knowledge and decenters the carpenter as a powerful knowing subject. All 
claim to the universal center of the carpenter is hence renounced when the body of the 
oak tree creates an irresolvable tension between there-is-form and there-is-no-form, and 
between usefulness and uselessness. When the tree extends and grows its body in ten 
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thousand different ways for ten thousand different purposes, it brings about a kind of 
randomness that marks the surrender of the fixed and discriminating knowledge of all 
kind. In the oak tree’s own words (in response to the carpenter): 
         What are you exactly comparing me with? With ornamental fruit trees? Their fruits are  
          knocked down when they are ripe and the trees suffer. The big branches are damaged and  
          the small ones are broken off. Because they are useful, they suffer, and they are unable to  
          live out the years Heaven has given them. They have only their usefulness to blame for  
          this destruction wrought by the people (Palmer, chap 4, 2006: 34). 
This is a Zhuangzian statement of absurdity. It belies the tyranny of knowledge in 
authoritatively structuring bodily space as dependent appendix to its power regime. This 
absurdity is an irruption of variegated spontaneous forces to overthrow the enclosure of 
forms. The grandness of the oak tree speaks of its objectless desire (wuyu), or to borrow 
the term from Ames and Hall, “deferential desire,” which is “based upon a noncoercive 
relationship (wuwei) with the world and a ‘mirroring’ understanding (wuzhi) of it,” and 
“is shaped not by the desire to own, to control, or to consume, but by the desire simply to 
celebrate and to enjoy” (2003: 42). The spatial understanding of this observation is that 
formlessness exemplifies an indeterminate spatial relation wherein the body morphs in a 
myriad of dimensions in re-constructing space without owning, possessing and 
controlling it. In one word, Zhuangzi’s absurd body is a grey area of xu that is not only 
difficult to be circumscribed by boundaries but is also disruptive to well-established 
outlines. 
         Zhuangzi’s formless and useless body is radically different from that of Confucius. 
For Confucius, the body is by no means an end by and of itself. Rather, it is a means 
through which the moral transformation of both individuals and the society gets enabled; 
and however, the ways in which it is utilized is dependent upon the established moral 
codes and principles of a given society to fulfill its maximal social value. The Confucian 
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body, to put it another way, is a dependent entity, disciplined, tamed and trained as such. 
It is a crucial social instrument in the sense that it is obliged to resolve the tension 
between individuals and the state so as to help the former to reconcile itself into the order 
of the latter. For Confucius, the state is the highest form of ethical code which demands 
the subsumption of all social beings into its supreme moral enclosure through the 
repeated practices of bodily performance that are socially meaningful.     
        Two crucial aspects constitute the Confucian process of bodily cultivation—ren 
(humanity) and li (ritual), with the former being the moral core of Confucianism and the 
latter serving as the mediatory process in which the body becomes moralized. Ren is the 
cardinal value to Confucianism. To Confucius, ren entails a series of moral values that 
ultimately aim for human elevation. As Confucius says, “to devote oneself earnestly to 
one’s duty to humanity and, while respecting the spirits of the departed, to avoid them, 
may be called wisdom…The man of virtue puts duty first, however difficult, and makes 
what he will gain thereby an after consideration—and this may be called virtue” 
(Confucius 1995: 31). What underlines the foundation of ren is its anthropocentric focus 
on reciprocal duties to human relations (e.g., father-son, ruler/ruled, husband-wife, elder-
young). Questions such as how to become a better human being or what distinguishes 
human from animals are the top concern for the Confucian moral principles. It is not 
exaggerating to say that the teaching of Confucius is exactly about elevating human 
above and beyond the nonhuman world by fulfilling a set of constant social relations. In 
this regard, ren dictates a set of moral codes that men should devotedly engage in dealing 
with their relations with other people. As neo-Confucianist scholar Tu Wei-Ming 
suggests here, “surely, ‘love’ remains a defining characteristics of ren, but as the scope of 
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ren becomes qualitatively broadened, it is no longer possible to conceive of ren merely as 
a localized value” (Tu 1985: 84). Although changing contexts render ren a multiple form 
of meanings (love, faith, loyalty, filial piety, etc.), it is regarded as the guiding principle 
in cultivating men’s behavior in relation to both the outside world and their inner heart.  
         Ren has profound moral implication for Confucius’s understanding of the body. The 
vital process through which the Confucian body is transformed into human body of ren is 
called li (ritual). In Confucius’s teaching, li is a bodily expression of the moral paradigm 
of a given society. Or in Bockover’s phrase, “li is the body language of ren or the 
authentic expression of our humanity” (Bockover 2012: 177). Li is invested with a system 
of social intelligence invented and indoctrinated by the state as an overarching moral 
order. Li is so important that it is considered as the social enshrinement of ren via the 
process of ritualization: “Tzu Kung wished to dispense with the live sheep presented in 
the Ducal Temple at the announcement of the new moon. The Master said: ‘Tzu! You 
care for the sheep. I care for the ritual” (Confucius 1995: 14). Since the act of ritual is 
sanctified to enact the moral empowering of ren, the life of the sheep is certainly not to 
be spared. An acute moral sensitivity is required to be cultivated through li. In addition, 
the teaching of li, according to Confucius, requires the bodily participation of social 
rituals in everyday life as a critical intermediary to transform social individuals as well as 
human condition in general. Through ritual, men undertake a course of self-
transformation to cultivate themselves to act as a noble man (junzi). As Gier correctly 
points out, “li is essentially a discipline of the body, and the literal meaning of teaching 
by example, which is to be preferred over teaching by words, means body teaching” (Gier 
2001: 384). Therefore, in Confucius’s teaching, the meaning of the body is dependent 
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upon a variety of dynamic relations as a way of both externalization and internalization: 
on the one hand, it outwardly expresses the cultivated moral value of ren embedded from 
within; on the other, this inner cultivation necessarily involves the attempts to internalize 
the exterior moral order. 
          Yet, while Zhuangzi may agree with Confucius to the extent that self-cultivation 
requires everyday practice, he radically disagrees with Confucius’s conceptualization of 
the body as such. For Zhuangzi, the Confucian body is too dogmatically contextualized to 
“wander free.” As Tu observes, “our bodies, for instance, are not our own possessions 
pure and simple; they are sacred gifts from our parents and thus laden with deep 
ethnicoreligious significance” (Tu 1985: 118). The body, in this sense, does not have its 
self-standing virtue as an organic being in transforming and creating the world on its own. 
Instead, its capacity rests upon li as its proxy in manifesting its social meaning and value. 
There is no such thing as the body in and of itself; rather, there is only body language 
orchestrated into semiotic systems of social linguistics. This, for Zhuangzi, is utterly 
wrong. The problem of Confucius exactly lies in his revocation of the body’s intrinsic 
agency. Instead of eulogizing Confucius’s noble man, Zhuangzi praises the true man 
(zhenren), the venerated Daoist sage, who abandons the moral training of the body and 
gladly loses him/herself in the indistinguishable chaos of “the ten thousand things” 
without moral distinction: 
The true man of old did not hold on to life, nor did he fear death. He arrived without  
 expectation and left without  resistance. He went calmly, he came calmly and that was that. 
 He did not set out to forget his origin, nor was he interested in what would become of him.  
 He loved to receive anything but also forgot what he had received and gave it away. He did 
 not give precedence to the heart but to the Tao, nor did he prefer the ways of humanity to  
 those of Heaven. This is what is known as a true man (Palmer, chap 6, 2006: 48). 
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The obliviousness of the true man refers to a kind of de-moralization in conceiving of the 
body. Rather than a social instrument loaded with moral obligations, the body of the true 
man is a mode of randomness and intuitiveness that follows his spontaneous body in 
transforming and becoming the world. The true man cherishes his/her body as an 
unorganized and yet capable agent in opening up a world of opportunities to him/her, 
even though it may look rather absurd in many ways looked down upon in a Confucian 
society. As Chong suggests, the true man is true because he “could refer to what is 
natural as opposed to human artifice and falsity, and it could be used to refer to a true, 
original nature, whether of things in general or of human being” (2011: 337). For 
Zhuangzi, the spontaneous body of the true man is not only a bodily denial of 
Confucius’s disciplined body, it is also Zhuangzi’s critique of Confucius’s noble man as a 
limited moral paradigm. Zhuangzi’s body provides a fundamental ground for the moral 
critique of the Confucian body.   
          In his comparison between Kierkegaard’s attack of Hegel and Zhuangzi’s challenge 
of Confucius, Daniel Johnson (2012) points out that both Kierkegaard and Zhuangzi 
provide a “social misfit” critique in undermining the irreducible ethical life deeply 
entrenched in Hegel’s and Confucius’s moral politics (365). According to Johnson, 
Kierkegaard takes issue with Hegel regarding the latter’s notion that “there is no criterion 
fro morality external to the social norms realized in a community, and no one exists and 
can exist in abstraction from their roles in their community…” (2012: 365). In Fear and 
Trembling Kierkegaard suggests that Hegel can neither justify the value of Abraham’s 
faithfulness to social morality, nor can Hegel provides hope for those who find 
themselves unable to fulfill this social morality, which turns Abraham into a moral misfit 
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of the Hegelian community. Johnson continues to argue in the same vein that Zhuangzi’s 
“social misfit” critique lies in its account for those unaccounted ways of living that are 
uncounted in Confucius’s moral system—“there must therefore be value in valueness, 
usefulness in uselessness, a perspective on value that lies beyond human society” 
(Johnson 2012: 366). The “social misfit” critique, to Johnson, is essentially a moral attack 
of pre-imposed socialization of ethical life that aims to provide a universal accountability 
for human relations and human existence. According to Johnson’s “social misfit” theory, 
such moral universality “cannot do justice to the value of those beings and actions which 
simply cannot meet social norms” (2012: 367). The key element of the “social misfit” 
critique is found in its capacity in disrupting pre-established moral order by making 
visible the unaccounted as the unanimous and yet irreducible rift—the misfit—that 
refuses to be assimilated into the overarching moral system. In the specific case of 
Zhuangzi, what is more important in understanding the power of the moral critique is the 
awareness of the absurd body. For Zhuangzi, the absurd body itself is a misfit of the 
moral norm in a given Confucian society. The existence of the ugly oak tree or the 
deformed body of Crippled Shu is indicative of Zhuangzi’s view that the body is 
absurdity, generative of disrupting forces in Confucius’s moral regime. It betrays the 
didactic core of ren, as it goes against the socialization of li, revealing the vulnerability of 
the Confucian society. To Zhuangzi, the critiquing power of the absurd body comes from 
its stubborn insistence on creating the deviant, the marginalized, the new, the misfit. It is 
an agentic site that breeds spontaneity and intuitiveness. It is a long-lasting process of 
practice, through which men shun away from pre-given moral roles and turn themselves 
into zhenren (the true men).  
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Dissidence Rearmed: The Body as Moral Critique of the State Capitalism  
         Yue Minjun is a renowned contemporary Chinese artist  famous for his works in the 
“laughing-face series.” The series features self-portraits of wide-mouthed laughing faces 
with identical, exaggerated facial expressions of hysteria (Figure 5.1 & 5.2): 
  
Figure 5.1 The Sun, 2000 
 
Figure 5.2 The Soldier  
Yue Minjun, among other Chinese artists (e.g., Zhang Xiaogang and Fang Lijun), is 
associated with the artistic movement of Cynical Realism, which expresses disguised 
discontentment toward harsh political repression and permeating social illusion in post-
Tiananmen era in China. Yue’s works are characteristic of contextual dislocation, which 
entails the processes of re-juxtaposing the background contexts with their subjects. By re-
investing familiar everyday contexts with strange and abrupt subjects, Yue is able to lend 
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his audiences an opportunity to escape from their familiar environment and lure them into 
uncommon experiences. What is key to this experiential recreation is Yue’s distinctive 
portrayal of the body. In one sense, Yue creates a form of irreducible body—or bare 
body—that refuses to be absorbed into the storytelling of the context in a pre-given way. 
The context alone does not occupy the body (not even the laughter), as it is unable to 
reduce it to one singular element of its narrative; on the contrary, the absurd bodies act as 
agent in orchestrating the varying contexts into new rhythms and new stories. Put it 
another way, for Yue, the pre-established political structure carefully inserted in a given 
context is eventually found unable to effectively exert its dominating control. The 
absurdly gestured bodies, with their repeated effect of intensifications, now act as 
powerful actant in reshuffling power relation and carving out new political dissidents. 
The political stake of Yue’s dissident body hinges on its witty and cynical recreation of 
unfamiliarity out of familiarity—an irresistible and bold re-structuring of existing 
contextual space that gives birth to the making of the political through the creating of the 
new in everyday life.  
           The aim of this section is to highlight the political significance of this 
everydayness in ways that reveal the logic of the state capitalism that penetrates into the 
Chinese people’s everyday life. It also intends to explore how the making of the political 
takes place in a bodily sphere as a critical moral response to the exploitative nature of the 
state capitalism. Modernization is a bodily project that aims to re-organize and re-possess 
the migrants’ body by turning it into prosthetic body in serving for the state’s goal of 
economic growth. Yet, the body is far from being settled; it actively engages in re-
shaping politics by creating a zone of indeterminacy, a perpetual area of irreconcilability. 
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The visual representation in Beijing Bicycle (2001) illustrates this tension. The film 
depicts the state capitalism as a closed enclosure in which power is produced in its strong 
adherence to the logic of free market, with the state centralizing the distribution of both 
political and economic resources. Disguised under the veil of economic growth, 
modernization is essentially an instrument by which the state capitalism executes its 
dominating power. In Beijing Bicycle, the state capitalism is represented in the filmic 
portrayal of China’s mainstream urban culture—an emblem of social hierarchization with 
a high degree of homogenization—that fetishizes modernized life as well as the social 
relations that it “promises” to deliver. By setting limits on the extent to which and the 
form through which a more plural living conditions can be alternatively achieved and 
expressed, the state capitalism, as represented by both the narrative and style of the film, 
extends its political dominance via its powerful rhetoric of economic modernization to 
every segment of people’s mundane life. Yet, as will be described and discussed in the 
following analysis, the juggernaut of the state capitalism inevitably encounters the 
resistance of the body—a sphere of indeterminacy that refuses to be incorporated into the 
state’s dominant discourse.  
           Directed by Wang Xiaoshuai, Beijing Bicycle tells a story about a young rural 
migrant’s search for his lost bike in the city of Beijing. The opening scene registers a 
strong sense of documentary realism: while a group of boys are being impatiently 
interviewed for a courier job, Wang uses a series of close-ups to capture the rustic faces 
of the boys who emotionlessly answer the questions of the offscreen interviewer (Figure 
5.3): 
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Figure 5.3 Guo is undertaking a job interview for a bike courier position. 
One by one, the boys identify themselves in a seemingly unrehearsed interview. Their 
accents, attire, and manners all indicate that they come from the rural areas from outside 
the city. This is the very first framing of rural bodies from the perspective of urbanites—
they are clumsy, rough-looking and raw. The awkward faces rendered in the close-ups 
reveal the gaze of the interviewer who finds the bodies of the boys uninteresting, 
unattractive and undifferentiated. For the impatient interviewer, these untamed and 
undisciplined bodies represent the rural culture of the country that is too barren and 
uncultivated to be accepted into Beijing’s modern life. For the express company, the 
transformation of the rural boys necessarily has to involve the “modernization” of their 
primitive bodies operated on the logic of the city’s frenetic wave of commercialization by 
recreating their bodies. Not surprisingly, the boys are soon to be found in the next scene 
lined up and dressed in the company’s uniforms, being instructed by the manager. The 
manager tells the newly employed boys that “the bikes provided by the company are 
supposed to enhance your delivery efficiency and they are not free. The company will 
deduct partially from your earnings to compensate the bike’s cost until you have earned 
enough to fully own it. This is a new model of management. From now on, you are the 
Camel Xiangzi of the new era!” The manager is reminding the boys of Lao She’s famous 
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novel, Camel Xiangzi, which is about the story of a Chinese peasant rickshaw man, 
Xiangzi, who spends all his savings from three years’ hardworking on a new rickshaw 
but only finds that his rickshaw is destroyed in the war. By being called “the Camel 
Xiangzi of the new era,” the migrants has been unquestionably reduced to their 
dependence upon a working body that finds its position only in a production relation 
enclosed within the particular politico-economic milieu of the highly commercialized city.  
          The film then cuts to a street scene of Beijing, where hundreds of bike riders are 
shot with a wide-angle lens in slow motion (Figure 5.4): 
 
Figure 5.4 Bikers on Beijing’s street. 
In this scene, Wang intends to slow down the pace of the bikers, making each of their 
pedals heavy and strenuous. The street is teeming with migrant workers who keep 
pedaling hard enough to struggle for their lives in Beijing without realizing the danger 
and allure of the city. “The new management model” is exactly a state-imposed 
economic/political paradigm through which the burdened bodies on the street are turned 
into prosthetic body whose meaning is twofold. On the one hand, its existence is 
accounted by the extended portion of its body—bicycle—as an indispensible auxiliary to 
produce its liveliness. On the other hand, the body of the migrants is itself a prosthetic 
protrusion transformed and instrumentalized by the state’s economic form of politics. The 
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implication of the prosthetic body consists of two major aspects. First, it introduces an 
inseparable relation between the migrants’ body and their prosthetic body, namely the 
bikes, without which, the former’s existence will be seriously challenged. The bikes are 
not only the necessary tools for the migrants to make a living in the city but also testify to 
the bare existence of their bodies. In this sense, with the assistance of the prosthetic body, 
the body has now an isolated enclosure that shuts itself off from chances of being 
different—they are becoming homogenized (in collective form as manifested by the 
swarm of identical cyclists in the street) in ways to live and act. In addition, the body is 
prosthetic also means that it is deprived of its intrinsic agency in making the change. 
Rather, the body is being instrumentalized for the wellbeing of the state’s economic and 
political operation. The process of prostheticization is ultimately a process of 
politicization by which the absolute power of the state is being proclaimed.  
         In his insightful reading of Judith Butler’s meditation on the politics of legibility, 
Michael Feola explores some urgent questions that include “how do forms of meaning 
and discourse render certain agents illegible as the kind of bodies that demand 
protection,” and vice versa, and what are the “mechanisms through which some are 
differentially subjected to violence” (2014 : 132)? For Feola, Butler’s politics of legibility 
is also a politics of sensibility that enriches and consolidates juridico-insitutionalist 
models that screens the visibility of the violence to certain population. In reflecting on 
Butler’s “frames of war,” Feola convincingly points out that what matters to this political 
discourse is the enactment of the norms that produce differential structure of 
vulnerability. That is, some are permitted to receive full treatment of humanity while 
others are consigned to “extra-human” and are hence more readily exposed to 
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surveillance, correction and without doubt, violence. This is, in Feola’s terminology, an 
“unseen condition of seeing,” which refers to a particular form of norms through which 
“some agents pass unmarked and others show up as problems to be solved, cured, 
disciplined or mastered” (2014: 136). In one word, Butler’s politics of legibility, as Feola 
finds out, indicates a mode of politics that bears its very foundation on entitlement.  
          In the context of the Chinese state capitalism and as demonstrated in the film, this 
heightened politics of sensibility hinges on the creation and sustenance of the prosthetic 
body as an entitlement of legibility for the migrants to be both economically and 
politically “modernized” (compliant). It is a process of both differentiation and 
undifferentiation in the sense that the system not only screens out the migrants’ bodies as 
deviants in its close-ups but also attempt to prostheticize the bodies as homogenous 
appendix to the gigantic machine of the state capitalism. The migrants’ bodies are made 
as such to receive their social visibility granted by the supreme power of the state. In this 
light, Jie Yang’s anthropological study of informal surrogacy in China is a case in point. 
According to Yang, the state-led restructuring of the country’s economic structure has 
produced “surfeit of bodies,” “a surplus of reproductive labor including rural migrant 
women, female university students, and women laid off from state enterprises whose 
bodies and reproductive potentials are devalued” (Yang 2015: 93). The fluidity of the 
boundaries between the patriarchal state, the male-dominated family and commercialized 
society has placed women from the lower social class in very disadvantageous position 
that subjects their bodies to harsh exploitation: “the bodies and emotional and 
psychological labor of underprivileged women have increasingly become sites of 
capitalist production; single women are becoming vulnerable to the exploitative desires 
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of a male-dominated market around sexual relations” (Yang 2015: 93). The country’s 
secretive industry of surrogacy reduces the women’s bodies to reproductive 
instruments—or prosthetic bodies—to ensure the vitality and stability of the market’s 
labor force and consumption. Thus, the surrogates’ wombs are exploited for their 
instrumental values in birthing more than simply children—they are forced to produce a 
hierarchical economic relation as well as ensuing political relation that separate the ruler 
from the ruled. It is exactly a politics of differentiation that pre-determines power 
distribution by differentiating types of bodies. 
   However, Beijing Bicycle shows another kind of body that is worth our attention. It 
is a neglected site where a hidden power relation secretively lurks. In the film, the body is 
portrayed as a discursive narrative, a storytelling that emerges out of the trunk of the 
state’s metanarration and yet, eventually manages to escape its presupposed relation with 
the state by growing itself into an estranged offshoot that goes astray (very much similar 
to Zhuangzi’s useless trees). The body as a deviant narrative finds itself in a strange 
relation to the universalist discourse produced by the state. On the one hand, its existence 
is inseparable from the normativity espoused by the state and its capitalist economic form 
of reasoning; on the other hand, it recycles the materials provided by the dominant 
discourse for its own reuse. Here, the migrants’ body in fact resembles Zhaungzi’s absurd 
body which transforms itself from there-is-form to there-is-no-form, returning itself from 
usefulness to uselessness. Politics happens exactly when this duality starts to unravel 
itself. Yang’s research also describes this agentic body. In her observation, the 
surrogates’ bodies possess “subjective, experiential dimension” in their affective lives 
that cannot be captured by the state and its form of governance (2015: 90). While being 
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exploited by the state’s capitalist system, the surrogates’ bodies communicate with and 
transform social, moral and political codes, which eventually lead to the transformation 
and awakening of the women’s political self-consciousness.  
   This is most evident in a scene when Guo, the rural boy and the protagonist of the 
film, is found lying on the ground, surrounded by a group of city boys who try to take the 
bike away from him. Guo holds onto the bike, refusing to loose his tight grip of the too-
precious tool. The near background is set against the glamorous night view of the 
metropolitan Beijing (Figure 5.5): 
 
Figure 5.5 Guo and the gangster boys found in dilemma about the bike’s ownership. 
  The scene is preceded by one in which Guo’s limbs are being pulled in the air by 
the urban boys to separate him from the bike, yelling painfully at the top of his lungs 
(Figure 5.6): 
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Figure 5.6 Guo refuses to let go the bike. 
  In both scenes, Wang creates a meaningful closed film form in re-aligning Guo with 
the city that the rural boy firmly believes to promise his livelihood. The urban boys are 
no longer ordinary thugs who are deprived of their political meanings. Rather, in the 
cinematic rendering of the scenes, they have become the indispensible ally of the state to 
help constitute the gigantic exploitative system whose frenetic adherence to the norms of 
economic development takes the form of violence against whoever is against it. As 
mostly evident in Figure 5.5, the specific cinematic arrangement of the urban boys’ 
positions in relation to the background neo lights of the city alludes to the fact that they 
are already part of the oppressive force to circumscribe Guo, the poor migrant peasant. 
The suffocating space of the scenes, cultivated at the peak of the boy’s cry, speaks of the 
intensified pain that bodily occurs out of the latter’s persistent and painful incompatibility 
with the state’s forceful reconciliation into its designated economic/political machinery. 
Such pain is not unfamiliar to Elaine Scarry, for whom it is a consequence of torture that 
aims to proclaim the yielding of the torturer’s power in relation to the prisoner’s suffering: 
“within physical events of torture, the torturer ‘has’ nothing: he has only an absence, the 
absence of pain. In order to experience his distance from the prisoner in terms of 
‘having,’ their physical difference is translated into a verbal difference: the absence of 
pain is a presence of world; the presence of pain is the absence of world. Across this set 
of inversions pain becomes power” (Scarry 1985: 37). In this sense, the violent 
interrogation inflicted upon Guo is a way to “induce the pain so intense and inexpressible 
as to isolate individuals—alienating them from their language and values, aborting them 
from the common world an deducing them to a pre-linguistic state of noises and cries” 
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(Tambornino 1999: 179). Or simply put, the rural boy is singled out for violence to 
strengthen his tie with the bike, the prosthetic body of the migrant worker. 
 Yet, this pain has another important layer of meaning—it is a statement of an absurd 
body as a discursive narrative abruptly inserted into a pre-organized discourse with 
ensuing moments of rupture. In The Practice of Everyday Life, Michel de Certeau 
describes a special kind of narration, a storytelling of the ordinary, which is analogous to 
what we have seen in Beijing Bicycle. For de Certeau, narration creates a fictional space 
where it escapes from the real and the present circumstances by manipulating and 
displacing the arrangement of the setting such that it creates an ambience, an effect rather 
than object. As de Certeau writes, “narration does indeed have a content, but it also 
belongs to the art of making a coup: it is a detour by way of a past (‘the other day,’ ‘in 
olden days’) or by way of a quotation (a ‘saying,’ a proverb) made in order to take 
advantage of an occasion and to modify an equilibrium by taking it by surprise” (1984: 
79). It essentially concerns “the style of tactics.” For de Certeau, the difference between 
tactics and strategy is that while the latter entails the rationalization of a delimited 
boundary between its own place as the possessed and the exterior as the threat, the former 
concerns “the absence of proper locus” that plays upon an imposed terrain owned by a 
foreign power. Yet, tactics vigilantly takes advantages of the changing locus by creating 
unexpected surprises (coup) within the system. Therefore, in de Certeau’s own words, it 
is “an art of the weak” (1984: 37). To say the narration is a political tactic is equivalent of 
saying that it is capable of reproducing new and surprising power relations out of an 
existing narratocracy—both denied and demanded at the same time—that bases its power 
structure upon pre-determined regime of narrative relations. 
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   From this perspective, the body as tactical narrative means its interplay with the 
surrounding environment is capable of bringing about unexpected effect, or unknowable 
knowledge, in overthrowing predestinated way of storytelling, which is another important 
aspect of Zhuangzi’s absurd body. In its interrogation, Guo’s obstinate body has become 
an irreducible place that unexpectedly re-organizes the spatial relation (including power 
relations) of the subjects involved. The absurdity of the boy’s body stems from 
spontaneous manipulation of the presupposed context into which it is inserted so much so 
that it not only changes the configuration of itself but also changes the contextual setting. 
Akin to the ways in which Yue places his warped laughing bodies under varying socio-
political context to compose new political allegories, the process of manipulation 
rendered in the film is a re-juxtaposition of both the contextualized setting and its 
involving subjects. Guo, the rural boy, is no longer a sufferer; instead, he re-invents his 
role as a doer, a political agent who is actively engaging the making of the political in 
ways unseen and unexpected before. Manifest in his prolonged and stubborn insistence 
on the bike, Guo and his body compose a different story that can never be envisioned by 
the state. In this process, the authority of the state is both denied and required. On the one 
hand, the body has become an alternative locus of discourse that accounts for the 
moments of rupture found in metanarration, making the city’s glamorous neon lights 
meaningless and lackluster. On the other hand, the story of rupture exercises its power 
out of the dust of what is already known—reinvention of new story off of the old. Contra 
the old story, the new story empowers the previously marginalized the subject by turning 
him into an unknowable enigma that looks frustrating and alien to its exterior power. 
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   The last scene of the film is also compelling and illustrative in this regard. After a 
violent fight with the street gangsters who wreck the bike in the end, the all-bruised Guo 
struggles to his feet, painfully picks up the wrecked bike and loads it onto his shoulder, 
dragging his heavy feet out of the scene. In the following scene, the boy is captured 
walking on the street, slowly but assertively, with the bike on his shoulder, passing 
through an intersection before the stopped traffic. The director uses another slow motion 
shot to locate the scene in which the frenzied city looks static and quiet, watching the 
rural boy finishing crossing the road (Figure 5.7): 
 
Figure 5.7 Carrying the wrecked bike, Guo walks across the street. 
 At this point, Guo and his bike seem useless and abandoned by the city. This time, 
nevertheless, the pre-fixed meanings of the prosthetic body have been permanently 
revoked. In this scene, the bike is grown into the body of the rural boy to create a new 
political ensemble—a body of betrayal that has been described by Milan Kundera in The 
Unbearable Lightness of Being. For Kundera, the body is most interesting when it turns 
itself into a private and personal space, however absurd it may look to the public realm, 
in exercising its power of transforming. To Kundera, the initiation of the body’s agency is 
found in its sensual relations (as seen in Tomas, Franz and Sabina’s secret and 
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intertwined erotic relations with their lovers) that may be perceived obscene to the state-
sponsored public. The political power of the body, for Kundera, lies in its ability in 
distorting the moral organization of public space backed by a totalitarian regime and 
blurring the already-thin boundary between the private and the public. Joining Kundera, 
Wang also sees the potential of the body in enacting moral critique of the state. In this 
final scene, the new ensemble is re-affirming the uselessness of the body—traumatized 
and loaded with a piece of wreckage as such. More importantly and interestingly, the 
body induces a sense of new political subjectivity—a new nomadic identity that bases 
itself upon its indeterminate corporeal reality. It is an unsettled identity that successfully 
escapes the enclosure of the state’s political/economic governance and orients itself 
toward a multiplicity of possibilities. Bypassing the hustle and bustle of the city, the boy, 
for the very first time, both reclaims his useless body as a territory of autonomy and finds 
himself as a political dissident that crowds out the moral indoctrination of the state by 
alienating its universal, all-encompassing discourse of economic growth. The dissolving 
of Guo’s prosthetic body dovetails with the arrival of the Zhuangzian body, a 
spontaneous body, as represented by the country’s primitive, uncultivated and yet 
stubborn rural culture, that powerfully rejects the disciplined and tamed body by the logic 
of the state’s political economy. This bodily transformation is also transposed into a new 
mode of identity, which is not only concerned with how the body is made but also what 
the body does. The way the body acts as an agentic doer reflects how one, either 
consciously or unconsciously, sees himself as a political actant. That the body is an 
indeterminate entity debunks the illusion that the making of the political subjectivity can 
and should be essentialized in one singular way. The moral grounding of this Zhuangzian 
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body, as seen both in the film and Yue’s paintings, exactly rests on this indeterminacy 
that is too precarious to be settled in any fixed metanarration. The country’s zealous 
aspiration for modernization, in its form of frenetic state capitalism, is therefore doomed 
to failure when this absurd and dissident body is at work.  
    In conclusion, the unfolding economic restructuring in China can be viewed as an 
event taking place in the sphere of the body. The reign of the capitalist form of 
governance engenders profound ramification in reshaping the politics of the 
contemporary Chinese society. On the one hand, the body is reduced to a lucrative tool to 
be exploited in reinforcing the new production and consumption relations, and its 
political function is hence abstracted into the new moral paradigm backed by the state. It 
is both included and excluded from the preaching of the moral system in order to 
consolidate the state’s supreme power. However, on the other hand, the body is also 
characteristic of its pluripotentiality, fully invested with indeterminate and strange forms 
that are irreducible to normativity. The absurd body, as proposed by Zhuangzi, is a body 
of indeterminancy that can hardly be settled in any given form and with any given value. 
Such a body confronts the moral system that exploits it by creating stubborn ruptures that 
keeps disrupting the consistency of the state’s politico-economic order. In the meantime, 
the agency of the body lies in its power of making dissident territory in which the state-
imposed moral regime falls apart with its fragmented elements being recycled and reused 
for new political ends. Modernization, in its form of state capitalism, is therefore 
continuously contested and confronted when the absurd body is suffused with 
ambivalence and keeps reproducing itself with new, strange and unexpected power 
relations that are forever alien to the state. 
	  	  
158	  
Chapter 6: Conclusion 
In the opening chapter, I stated a dilemma that has been troubling many Chinese 
who live in the era of the People’s Republic—a situation in which many of us are 
captured in the predicament about our identity.  In many ways, the dilemma can in fact be 
boiled down to a central question—given the unstable and repressive 
political/economic/cultural environment, how can we, as Chinese citizens, find a way to 
deal with the paradoxical politics of the country in understanding who we are. The 
complexity of this question begs even more related ones: what else could we possibly do 
when democracy, free speech, fair election, deliberation, and most importantly, an open 
and tolerant social environment are virtually inaccessible? Outside of the state institutions, 
how might we deal with the ramification of the rapid economic growth that leaves the 
country a variety of serious social issues such as income inequality, low public political 
participation, environmental pollution, shrinking public sphere, etc?  How can we still 
engage in dissent politics, in other words, absent favorable and necessary conditions to 
make the difference? If there does exist a way, what would it be? These questions are of 
significant importance to understand how the Chinese form their identities in this 
changing context and what political effect it entails in relation to the country’s politics. 
And these questions are by no means easy ones. In fact, the frustrations we have indicate 
that no simple or definite answer can and should be given in answering who we are and 
how we are made of. Our personal frustrating experiences as overseas Chinese students 
suggest that the state itself is apparently not a sufficient answer at all. Being the 
representatives of the country is not the solution, either. The questions not only require us 
to look at the country’s politics from a perspective that goes beyond the state but also 
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urge us to find alternative locations in which politics can still take place without effective 
and functioning socio-institutional procedures. As I make clear in this dissertation, this 
alternative realm can be found in individuals’ ordinary life through their various bodily 
experiential dimensions. Here, focusing on individuals does not mean to study their 
behavior in schematized ways as proposed by, for example, rational choice theory. Rather, 
to theorize the politics of everyday life demands the awareness of the indeterminate 
dynamics between individuals’ everyday practice and the external environment in ways 
that are open and pliable. This is to say that we should pay close attention to how the 
Chinese people’s identities are formed in indeterminate ways as a result of the interaction 
between the internal and external without being simplistically reduced to either.  
  In answering similar questions, Leigh Jenco points at one interesting direction. 
In her study of Zhang Shizhao’s idea of weizheng (making the political), Jenco suggests 
that Zhang is proposing a theory that tries to bridge the gap between individuals’ internal 
struggle from within and the arrival of social change from the outside. As Jenco writes, 
“part of what makes this approach to social transformation credible is the very social 
embeddedness of individuals: existing within social and familial (if not political) 
frameworks, the work of singular actors can build to dramatic effect simply by 
influencing those closest to them” (2010: 15). By reading Zhang’s writing in this way, 
Jenco attempts to propose that large-scale socio-political issues are not likely to be solved 
by collective actions, as many democratic theorists would emphasize. Instead, they 
should be better approached through individual efforts in a way that is termed by Zhang 
as “making the political.” Zhang’s “making the political,” according to Jenco, ultimately 
“lies in persons” (2010: 227). In this sense, social change evolves through the cultivation 
	  	  
160	  
of the sense of self-awareness (zijue) among the individuals before functioning 
institutions become available. Although Jenco’s reading of Zhang generates profound 
implication for our understanding of individuals’ important political role, the theory is 
only partially convincing. I agree with Jenco in the sense that social individuals should be 
viewed as the pivot of politics, and to the degree that a sustainable politics requires the 
cultivation of the political awareness from within to make individuals shine forth as 
promising political participants. But I am suspicious of the Confucian solution about the 
extent to which internal cultivation can be automatically translated into effective and 
systematic social action in its plural form. In other words, the inherent social-
embeddedness within individuals is by no means presupposed. In addition it is also 
unlikely for this embeddedness to have an end only reflected by external political/moral 
orders. Nor do I believe the Confucian way of making compatible the internal moral 
cultivation and external social construction is viable and realistic. What seems to be more 
likely, instead, is the possibility that social change emerges out of spontaneity. This 
spontaneity is an enduring gap between the external and internal conditions that can 
never be bridged. Internal cultivation undergoes a spontaneous process without being 
preconditioned at the very start such that the internal converges, negotiates and conflicts 
but never settles with the external. Politics thus unfolds as a result of a network of diverse 
intuitive actions, across space and time, by individuals who may or may not realize the 
political meaning of their everyday practice. Recognizing this political significance of 
everyday life is to reject the saying that the state represents a moral founding of politics 
in the first place.  
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 Rather than contemplating on democracy as a systematic social evolvement, my 
dissertation emphasizes the political value of indeterminacy and argues that socio-
political change emerges out of spontaneity. In answering the aforementioned questions, I 
first contend that in the context of China (perhaps in other societies as well), politics 
should be understood as a fluid process in which normative system founded on the 
dualism of either/or is questioned. It dissolves the moral/ sexual/political/ economic basis 
of this dualist structure and transforms power relation into a process of contested 
negotiation rather than domination. Understanding politics in this way alludes to a 
nomadic subjectivity by which one freely wanders (in Zhuangzi’s term, xiaoyao) between 
sameness based collectivism and “sovereign individualism” based solipsism without 
winding up on either end. In this light, identity is no longer about a settlement. On the 
contrary, it is about the processes of diverse experiences that mark who we are through 
what we do. It is called the politics of indeterminacy—a political mode that orients 
toward the unknowability of spontaneity while estranging itself from the founding of 
normative politics. In addition, the internal cultivation of the self does not occur in order 
to influence the external so much so that external collective action is not a purpose but an 
accident of this selfhood cultivation. Put it another way, a given political society does not 
have a presupposed purpose inherent to its system. Rather, it is a consequence of the 
spontaneous interactions among a variety of forces that make it so. In the context of the 
Chinese politics, realizing the agency of every individual Chinese citizen in his/her 
everyday practices (even though they are purposeless) is far more important than the 
materialization of institutions. Here, this work does not talk about the predictability of the 
country’s future (as many political analysts are fond of doing). Instead, it is interested in 
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how the randomness of the ordinary life is valued for its political significance in 
eventually transforming the politics in directions that are hard to be predicted. To 
conclude, in randomness lies the past, present and future of China’s politics. This 
randomness goes beyond the dominant control of any involving party into an infinite 
range of choices and possibilities. At this point, what we do perhaps precedes who we are 
as the former breeds and nurtures the latter—we are what we do. Therefore, the forming 
of identity is no longer about finding an ingrained root but about using and reusing 
materials and opportunities provided by everyday life to experience the unexperienced.  
The preceding chapters addresse each aspect of this central argument in the four 
substantive chapters. It relies on Zhuangzi’s idea of xu and the body to look at how the 
ordinary Chinese may make the political in their ordinary lives. The second chapter 
brings up Zhuangzi’s concept of xu and discusses how the political import of xu is 
manifested in the aesthetical and bodily realms. Xu denotes the meanings of lack of 
substance and blandness, both of which concerns ambivalent relationality. The third 
chapter examines the Zhuangzian body as both spontaneity and dispossession in 
understanding the creation of the self. It argues that the making of the self should be 
understood as an indeterminate mutuality between one’s internal perception and the 
external environment. This indeterminate mutuality is achieved when the body is 
perceived as an embodiment of changing relations. The next chapter investigated the 
interaction between the body and the memory in creating a xu-ed grey zone in which the 
Cultural Revolution is reexamined. It proposes that Mao’s revolutionary logic of class 
struggle gets questioned when this body-memory interaction becomes ambivalent and 
incomplete in bringing up ambiguous subjectivities. Chapter five talks about the state 
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capitalism in China as a homogenizing process where the body is rectified for its 
instrumental values. Yet, the body escapes this enclosing process and turns the 
composition of identity into a myth.  
Each chapter points to one specific aspect of the theme; and read together as a 
whole, they address the questions I raised at the beginning by pointing at the central idea 
of the politics of xu—a mode of political indeterminacy in which power relations are 
never settled. With its promising political blueprint, this particular mode of politics 
presents a different perspective in approaching the Chinese politics by way of looking at 
how the ordinary Chinese can alternatively identify themselves. As I mentioned briefly 
earlier, the future of China’s politics cannot be predicted. The complicated reality within 
the country defies any explanatory models that try to enclose the country’s route into a 
set of fixed trajectories. The sixty years’ turbulent history of the People’s Republic 
suggests that absolutism only brings tragedy. The country’s convoluted experiences of the 
past, present and future blend into each other in making the country a stranger to many 
political terminologies such as democracy, freedom, autocracy, equality. Instead of 
understanding its politics based on established political catalogues, we must decipher its 
myth through the recognition of change—an indeterminate state where the pliability of 
politics is demonstrated and underlined. In this circumstance, being a Chinese in a 
political way means not only to adapt to but more importantly make the best out of the 
rapid changes by embracing the condition of xu in dealing with the state. Realizing this 
interpenetration is not an impediment to but an opportunity of making the political is a 
prerequisite to the transformation of a political subject. In this making of the political, the 
political agency of the ordinary Chinese is found in their everyday life external to 
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institutions through their everyday practice. Here, the body plays a crucial role for this 
individual transformation. With every bit of its mundaneness, the body provides the 
individuals with valuable material and immaterial sources to engage politics. The body is 
a material site in which all sorts of political forces execute their power to gain influence. 
But it is also a convergence of a multiple of diverse energies that run through it and 
makes it formless. Via incompleteness, emptiness, spontaneity, the xu-ed body is an 
absurdity that challenges the principles of normative politics. The body bridges the gap 
between the everyday ordinariness and a broader political scope. It teaches us that we are 
what we do and we are what the body becomes. Thus, maintaining this indeterminacy is 
equivalent of maintaining the vitality of the ordinary Chinese, especially those from the 
most vulnerable group—the peasants, the workers, the intellectuals, the dissidents, the 
sexual workers, the disabled, the low income family members, the ethnic minorities, the 
homosexuals, the prisoners–in changing the country. 
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